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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the large and complex 
subject of transport planning. In particular it focusses 
on the problem of evaluating competing or proposed modifications 
to a transport system in terms of their system-wide 
implications. That is, the manner in which apCirticular 
course of action will affect the other components which 
together make up the system, is examined. Prediction of 
the impacts associated with any plan requires prediction 
of the corresponding pattern of flows which will then occur 
in the often multimodal transport network. To analyse a 
transport problem systematically a wide variety of 
alternatives must be studied and their differential impacts 
traced out. 
Given that a country's (or region's) major impetus for 
growth stems from its ability to produce goods and services 
demanded by the international (or national) economy, and 
to market these competitively against other countries (or 
regions), transport facilities, by linking production and 
consumption centres, clearly playa distinct role in 
influencing both the pattern and magnitude of growth. 
Though it is usually realised that transport facilities are 
critical and basic, there is a large degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the effects which may follow modifications or 
innovations to an existing system. Such uncertainty po;ses 
real problems to the transport planner. 
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Like other capital goods, transport systems continually 
wear out and must be replaced, and additional investment may 
be required to keep pace with growth; certain resources must 
be allocated to enable its role to be accomplished in a 
satisfactory and efficient manner. In view of the rapid 
rate of technological advance currently being experienced 
within the transport industry, it is essential that in 
replacing or expanding the system due attention be taken of 
emerging techniques. Detailed analysis must support these 
investment decisions as there are usually several different 
ways in which resources may be allocated to the transport 
sector, and a country burdened with debts from an outdated 
transport system is hardly aided in its development ambitions. 
In approaching such investment decisions it is important 
to realise that the demand for transport is a derived demand. 
That is, the level of demand for the movement of goods is 
derived from the demand for th,e goods being shipped. There 
is no point in merely moving products from one place to 
another. Bearing this in mind, it is clear that investment 
decisions must be made with an awareness of the objectives 
of the particular transport system. Although the selection 
of these objectives is a task for government, it must be 
appreciated that these decisions will have a differential 
impact, both spatially and in terms of groups affected. A 
theoretical example illustrates this point: 
(i) With the introduction of new facilities into th,e 
transport system, direct savings will initially occur 
to the transport operator. These may be in the form 
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of reduced operating costs, or time savings which 
serve to increase the productivity of his plant. The 
extent to which these benefits will be passed on to the 
producers of goods - perhaps in the form of freight 
reductions or improved service - will depend upon the 
level of competition or governmental price regulations. 
(ii) Should this improvement result in a transport cost 
reduction to the producer, it may enable him to compete 
in more distant markets - this enlarged market allowing 
economies of scale in production to be obtained. In 
addition, transport improvements may increase or decrease 
the relative desirability of certain locations, 
necessitating a producer having to relocate in order to 
compete. 
(iii) Assuming the existence of competition, there may 
be a reduction in the sales price to the consumer. For 
some products this may lead to an increase in demand, 
resulting in increased production and further for 
transport. 
(iv) While government itself will benefit by this 
increased production, it may also determine which groups 
will bene from these savings in cost - by manipulating 
the location of facilities, its regulation policies and 
tax structure. Furthermore the direct expenditure of 
government funds on transport projects within a region 
will cause an immediate increase in the amount of money 
circulating within that local economy_ 
least of short-term importance. (1) 
This will be at 
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Through its control over the transport system, exerc 
through various rate, entry and investment regulations, 
government has a powerful means of guiding the development· 
process. As well as determining the location, magnitude 
and timing of this investment, it may also affect income 
redistribution. To ensure that this control is used in. 
accordance with development objectives, it is vital that the 
widespread consequences which may result from changing the 
structure of a transport system, or the nature of transport 
services, be understood. 
1.1 Scope of the Study 
Over the past 25 years the transportation industry as 
a whole has undergone a technological revolution. Many 
major innovations affecting every facet of the movement of 
goods and passengers on land, sea and air - for example, the 
jet aircraft, the diesel engine, the intermodal movement of 
containerised freight, the automated ship, and the divided 
highway system - have been introduced. As several authors 
have noted, the problems generated by the introduction of 
technological change are among the most difficult of those 
confronting modern industrial society (see Levinson, et.al., 
1971). A recent study which developed a number of concepts 
of fundamental importance to the understanding of technological 
change, concluded that " ••• the so-called "problem of 
technological change" resides less in technological change,. 
per se, and more in the effect or impact of technological 
change ••• " (Gannon, et.al.,l966,4). Gannon found that the 
effect of technological change has not been a primary area 
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of research, and where the effects have been considered, the 
treatment has been narrowly constrained within disciplinary 
boundaries. 
In evaluating technological projects a key issue is 
the differential incidence of impacts. Thomas and Schofer 
(1970) examined and analysed the processes used to make 
decisions about alternative transportation plans. They 
stated and discussed fundamental concepts associated with 
plan evaluation, described relevant criteria that might be 
used in such evaluation, identified problems associated with 
present evaluation techniques, and proposed some practical 
solutions to these problems. Their study emphasised that 
" ••• decisions about alternative transportation plans must 
be based on the probable impacts of the various choices ••• " 
(Thomas and Schofer,l970,2). (2) 
One sector of the transportation industry which has 
been subject to widespread and substantial technological 
innovations during recent years, is the maritime industry. 
Far-reaching changes in methods of handling cargo in ports 
have, and are, taking place. The transport of goods in 
containers or other unit loads, over land, through ports 
and by sea has become increasingly common. Ships have had 
to be tted out to carry containers or to enable cargo to 
be loaded by the roll-on/roll-o principle, and the equipment 
and organisation of ports have also had to be improved. 
Although a number of studies have investigated the impa.ct of 
these cargo-handling innovations on shipping - especially in 
regard to increasing efficiency and improving service - less 
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attention has been focussed on the system-wide implications 
of such technological changes, a point noted by Forward 
(1970,187). The introduction of cargo handling systems -
such as containerisation - as well as directly affecting the 
distribution function, also affect the economy within which 
the distribution system operates. In evaluating such 
systems it is necessary to examine both the impact on the 
distribution system and the broader impact on the economy 
in general. Some of the important repercussions stemming 
from recent cargo handling trends have been examined by 
Evans (1969), who reported on how some countries solved 
associated problems in the field of port organisation and 
dock labour. 
Many of these cargo handling innovations are leading to 
the concentration of traffic through a reduced number of 
ports. While the immediate effect of this reduction in port 
activity is redundancy in capital investments, Ogundana(1970, 
178) suggests that the impact of the declining port functions 
on the economy of the port town and its region is much more 
significant. He forecasts that with this tendency towards 
port consolidation will come a similar regional concentration 
of economic phenomena - population, industries, transport 
facilities and employment opportunities. 
A review of current literature suggests that little 
detailed research has examined the probable system-wide 
impacts of cargo handling innovations within the transportation 
industry in general, and the maritime industry in particu.lar. 
While the amount of literature has expanded with new 
developments, (and articles analysing and describing sl:ipping 
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innovations abound}, studies of the more far-reaching 
consequences of these developments are scarce. In this 
research an empirical study is made of some of the wider 
(or so-termed "socio-economic") implications of certain 
rapidly expanding cargo handling techniques. Speci 
the ramifications of the introduction of unitised cargo 
handling methods are examined in terms of their possible 
impact on a group of New Zealand ports and their adjacent 
economies. 
1.2. Transportation and the New Zealand Economy 
Being an integral part of the production process, 
ly, 
transportation has a direct bearing on any country's economy 
and development prospects. As an island nation, New Zealand 
is completely dependent on shipping to transport the bulk of 
its products to overseas markets and to import the equipment, 
raw materials and machinery necessary for the development of 
its industries. Considering the degree to which the countryi s 
economic well-being is related to overseas trading activities, 
and the isolated position it occupies in relation to its 
major markets, the need for an efficent transport system can 
be seen as imperative. 
Some basic statistics illustrate the importance of the 
transport industry in New Zealand. Data presented to the 
Royal Commission on Containers (1972) indicate that in 1970 
approximately 30 percent of New Zealand's total capital 
investment was in transport plant and equipment - a total of 
$3,200 million. (3) During 1970 alone $350 million was 
directed into providing new facilities for this industry, and 
a further $1,120 million was absorbed in operating expenses. 
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As well as performing a vital service, the transport sector 
an important industry in itself, as is shown by the 
that in 1970 it employed 14 percent of New Zealand's total 
labour force. 
Considering the SUbstantial investment in transport, 
and the magnitude of annual freight payments, it surprising 
that comparatively little research has investigated the 
efficiency of this sector. However during the past decade 
several factors have contributed towards the focussing of 
greater attention on the overall performance of the industry. 
Finance for capital investment became harder to obtain and 
this, combined with the increasing cost of transport 
improvements, resulted in a more detailed appraisal of proposed 
developments. With New Zealand's major eXl?orts facing 
depressed prices on many world markets, areas in which costs 
could be reduced were sought. A more intensive examination 
of the complete distribution system linking producer and 
consumer - a system greatly influencing the country's 
production and marketing cost structure - eventuated. Finally, 
overseas shipowners seeking an improved return on their 
invested capital, initiated several studies to examine the 
efficiency of existing cargo handling methods. 
1.3. Transport Planning in New Zealand 
As the Secretary of Transport recently commented, " ••. the 
present administrative machinery through which Government 
formulates and administers its transport policy is extra-
ordinarily complex ••• II (Polaschek, 1970,506) • To i11ust:r:ate 
this complexity the main Government institutions involved in 
- 9 -
the planning and administration of transport within New 
Zealand are presented in Figure 1. In addi tion to 
numerous institutions, other organisations and pressure 
groups combine to influence transport ions. 
pressure groups include Producer Boards, Shipping Lines, 
Labour Unions and Harbour Boards. Moreover Commissions of 
Inquiry are periodically appointed to investigate speci 
matters. 
Although there have been a number of definitions of 
"planning", that of De Salvo (1971,2) captures the essence 
of most definitions. He viewed planning as ". •. a formal 
or ordered process in which men seek by forethought to affect 
action so as to bring about more des states than it is 
anticipated would otherwise occur ••• ". In discussing the 
planning of New Zealand's transport system, and in particular 
its ports, national transport objectives must be kept in mind. 
The Ministry of Transport (1969,5-6) has formulated a range 
of goals which the transport system should aim to attain: 
"In the broadest sense the objectives ••• would be the 
increase of industrial and agricultural productivity 
and consumption per head of population, ••• and the 
promotion of regional development to the extent that 
government has decided that there should be a 
particular pattern of regional development and location 
of industry." 
More specific objectives were also presented including: an 
increase in the standard of service; reduction in operating 
costs; reduction of cost to the user; increased accessibility 
to centres of production. As the Ministry of Transport 
(1967,7) pointed ou~ many of these goals may be conflicting 
and difficult to quantify. 
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Government Institutions Involved in New 
Zealand's Transport Administration 
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Control over developments within the shipping industry, 
(as expressed through port activities), is held by two 
government organisations. In the Ministry of rt Act 
1968, the functions of the Ministry are outl 
"Section 4 (2) ••• the Ministry shall have the following 
functions: 
(a) shall be responsible for advising the 
Minister on the development of an efficient 
transport policy for New Zealand. 
(b) It shall undertake research into all aspects 
of transportation, including the economics 
of the various forms of transport, whether by 
road, rail, sea or air. 
(c) shall be responsible for advising the 
Minister on investment in transport whether 
by road, rail, sea or air •.• " 
Clearly the evaluation of alternative cargo handling techniques, 
as they might affect New Zealand's port would fall 
within its jurisdiction. But even more specifically these 
responsibilities are afforded to the New Zealand Ports 
Authority. Under the terms of the New Zealand Ports Authority 
Act of 1968, its functions are,described as being: 
"Section 11 (1) 
(a) To foster an efficient and integrated ports 
system for New Zealand; 
(b) For that purpose, to prepare ••• a plan ••• for 
the development of ports and harbours in New 
Zealand. 
(3) In the exercise of its functions the Authority shall 
have regard to -
(a) Internal transport, ship design, cargo handling, 
and likely developments in these and related 
matters; 
(b) National, regional, and local economic and 
transport planning." 
Both these acts clearly demonstrate that Government has 
recogni,sed the need for some form of control over transpe>rt 
investment. 
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Since 1964 several studies have endeavoured to determine 
the most efficient method of shipping New Zealand's exports 
and imports. (4) Their conclusions were, in principle, 
... 
very similar. They emphasised the need to achieve a faster 
turnaround of ships on the New Zealand coast and greater 
efficiency in cargo handling, and suggested the establishment 
of a limited container service between New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. Following the completion of an independent 
study, the Transport Commission who had been charged by 
the Government to report on the benefits to New Zealand 
resulting from such a container service, recommended that 
..... the early introduction of a container service will in 
the long term be in the national interest of New Zealand ..... 
(Transport Commission,1969,43). 
Despite these reports many doubts still remain as to 
whether this form of unit loading is the cargo handling 
system New Zealand should be attempting to develop. While 
objections are often regarded as merely reflecting parochial 
or sectional interests, it is dangerous to dismiss many of 
the points raised so lightly. Many transport organisations 
are uncertain of the implications of the container system. 
This is illustrated by the following remit which was discussed 
at a recent Harbours Association Conference. 
"That, with the impending introduction of containers 
to New Zealand's overseas trade, and the necessity for 
ports to plan for such trade, the Government gives 
urgency to -
(i) the designation of further container ports 
for the European trade, in addition to 
Auckland and Wellington: 
(ii) the determination of policy as regards 
aggregation of container cargoes, and; 
(iii) the effects of the introduction of the 
container system upon the smaller ports". 
(Harbours Association Conference, 1971, Remit 7). 
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An extremely implication made in the 
above quotation: that the Transport Commission, in reaching 
its decision to give approval to the container system in 
principle, was not aware of the repercussions their decision 
could have on New Zealand's port system. Neither was it 
aware of the method to be used for the internal aggregation 
of container cargoes. 
Following pressure from many harbour boards, the New· 
Zealand Ports Authority undertook a study to determine the, 
impact the containerisation of the New Zealand - United 
Kingdom trade might have on certain ports. To determine 
this impact detai of likely container aggregation methods 
and patterns were required. However in the Report of the 
New Zealand Ports Authority (1971,12) it is stated that 
" ••• information on these proposals has not been forthcoming 
and it has therefore not been possible for the authority to 
attempt to make an assessment of the likely effect of cargo 
aggregation on ports". 
1.4. Statement of the Problem and Approach 
Important technological developments are occurring within 
the maritime industry and the traditional methods of shipping 
New Zealand's import and export cargoes are predicted to 
undergo marked changes in the near future. A review of the 
recent history of port investment planning within New Zealand 
suggests that frequently decisions are reached without an 
awareness of probable or possible system-wide repercussions. 
With many shipping proposals involving the aggregation of 
traffic through a reduced number of ports, it is considered 
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that in evaluating such proposals, account should be taken 
of: 
(a) the effect on total internal aggregation costs .. 
(b) the effect on the national port system and the 
economic viability of particular ports, 
(c) the regional socio-economic implications which may 
result from ports gaining or losing trade. 
The aim of this study is to examine recent port 
investment planning in New Zealand, and to demonstrate an 
approach whereby alternative shipping proposals may be 
evaluated in terms of the possible impact they may have on 
inland transport costs and on a group of ports and their 
adjacent economies. The characteristics of several developing 
cargo handling systems are described so that their effect 
on ports, (in terms of special facility requirements) , may 
be appreciated. 
The problem is one of predicting the impacts associated 
with a particular set of options. It is necessary to model 
cargo movements through a transport system and network 
analysis techniques are used to achieve this. The South 
Island's transport system is abstracted as a network, cons ting 
of a set of nodes and links, with relevant cost and capacity 
values being assigned to the nodes and links. By changing 
these values it is possible to represent alternative cargo 
aggregation schemes, and to compare these schemes in terms of 
total internal transport cost. 
This approach enables cargo flows through particular 
ports under the different aggregation systems to be 
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determined. To enable the impact of this cargo loss or 
gain on the economic viability of certain ports to be 
predicted, a detailed study is made of the revenue accruing 
to po through its handling of different commodities and 
trades. By tracing the flow of this revenue out into the 
local economy, through the purchase of goods and services, 
an estimate is made of the regional economic implications 
associated with various shipping proposals. 
Throughout this study every possible precaution has been 
taken to ensure that the data forming the basis of the 
evaluation procedure is the most reliable and accurate 
available. Much data was drawn from government and local 
body publications, supplemented by unpublished material held 
by harbour boards and other organisations within the transport 
industry. Within the body of the text data sources have 
been acknowledged and, where appropriate, the actual data 
used in the analysis included in the Appendix.(S) In evaluating 
alternative cargo aggregation plans the basis for comparison 
has generally been the transport charges incurred. Whi 
there is undoubtedly a strong case to be made for using data 
reflecting costs, rather than charges, the task of obtaining 
the precise costs involved in maintaining and operating certain 
portions of the transport system would have formed the basis 
of a complete study in itself and for this reason proved 
impractical. Permission to collect data was not granted by 
some organisations who viewed information which may have 
held commercial value as strictly confidential. 
cases estimates had to be calculated. 
In such 
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The thesis is organized into seven chapters. Following 
Chapter I which provides an introductory overview of the 
study, Chapter II examines some of the economic which, 
particularly in the past decade, have contributed to rapid 
technological developments within the maritime indus 
Characteristics of new cargo handling methods are cussed 
and the probable impacts of these techniques on the spatial 
structure of the country's port system, and on the physical 
nature of individual ports, are suggested. 
Recent studies which appear to have influenced and 
guided the development of New Zealand's transport system are 
reviewed in Chapter III. Attention is focussed on port 
investment planning, the objective being to examine the 
mechanisms of investment appraisal. In particular, 
decisions are studied to determine the extent to which 
probable impacts associated with certain proposals were 
considered during the evaluation process. Objections to 
the Government's decision to approve the container princ 
are reviewed. 
Chapter IV presents a method of estimating, in 
quantitative terms, the impact of ports on the functioning 
of their adjacent economies. Using this method, an empirical 
study of the impact of certain South Island ports is made. 
This analys allows the broader implications of changes in 
shipping technology, which may lead to the concentration of 
cargo through a reduced number of ports, to be quantitatively 
assessed. The remainder of the chapter examines the revenue 
generated by particular cargoes at various ports, and a s 
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of income multipliers are calculated to assess the indirect 
impact of shipping policies on regional economies. A number 
of cargo aggregation schemes are studied in terms of their 
differential port impact. 
Network analysis techniques, which are used to generate 
alternative internal cargo flow patterns which may accompany 
developments within the shipping industry, are outlined in 
Chapter V. Commodity flow patterns of wool and frozen meat 
are generated to demonstrate the impact several cargo 
aggregation proposals may have on internal transport costs. 
Chapter VI investigates current trends in New Zealand's 
coastal shipping industry and the changing role played by 
rail and coastal shipping within the national transport 
system. The ramifications to ports of these emerging 
trends are noted, and the feasibility of introducing a coastal 
shipping container feeder system discussed. 
The study's overall findings are reviewed in Chapter VII 
and future developments within New Zealand's port system are 
predicted. Some areas of critical importance to the 
efficient planning of transport investments within New Zealand, 
on which further detailed research is required, are identified. 
Footnotes 
(1) This is based largely on an example presented by Roberts 
(1966). Wi1son(1970,46-S0), also presents three 
theoretical examples of the effects of improved transport-
ation, in order to indicate the diverse possibilities. 
(2) Their study, which contains a most extensive bibliography, 
provides an excellent description of approaches which may 
be used to identify a comprehensive set of impacts which 
appear relevant to transportation choices. 
(3) Further background statistics are provided by Geddes(1971). 
(4) These studies are reviewed in Chapter III. 
(5) Some confidential data was supplied on the understanding 
that it would not be released or published in any form. 
CHAPTER II 
SHIPPING DEVELOPMENTS : TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A full appreciation of the underlying forces which 
have led to recent developments within the shipping industry 
and the nature of these developments is necessary in order to 
estimate their likely ramifications on New Zealand's port 
system. The changes which have occurred in shipping and 
cargo handling operations over the past two decades have been 
so widespread that not only have the physical characteristics 
of ports and the nature of port operations been greatly 
affected, but the philosophy towards port development has 
so changed. As Ordman(1971,1) points out " ••• the concepts 
of obsolescence and flexibility are now firmly fixed in the 
minds of port planners ••. ". 
2.1. Recent Shipping Developments 
The extensive changes that have recently occurred within 
the maritime industry have received widespread publicity. 
For example, the rapid growth in the size of oil tankers and 
bulk carriers, the introduction of the Marconaflo system (a 
slurry process for the loading and discharge of iron ore), 
the development of the first LASH ship followed by the SeaBee 
system, and the introduction of gas turbine powered container 
ships, have all captured public attention. These innovations 
are for the most part related to the trend towards the 
application of the systems approach; they reflect an awareness 
that the ship is only part of a broader transportation system. 
A comprehensive summary of modern developments in sea transport 
is given by Stevens (1971) • This chapter will concentrate 
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only on the implications of innovations within the general 
cargo trade. 
Underlying many of the cargo handling changes which 
have occurred within the general cargo trade is the 
"unitisation" concept - unitisation being the combining of 
individual packages of goods into larger, more compact units, 
which can then be handled as one. This concept is based on 
a very simple notion: the more times a product is handled, 
the greater its final price will be. If this handling, 
which is an expensive, labour intensive process, can be reduced, 
then so should the commodity's final price. It is relatively 
cheap to move goods in large and uniform quantities, but 
when cargoes of assorted shapes and weights are moved from a 
number of origins to a number of destinations, the opposite 
is the case. With unitisation economies also result from 
the speedier flow of goods during the distribution sequence. 
It is ironical that until recently many of the more valuable 
cargoes have been shipped by means less efficient than have 
been employed for less valuable cargoes - such as coal or 
grain. An important feature of recent shipping developments 
is that these much more valuable goods are able to be moved 
by methods more nearly approaching bulk carriage, instead of 
individually in packages, sacks or cases, as was the case 
in the past. 
The use of containers is one method by which this 
uniti'sation concept may be applied. Although a container 
may be regarded as being "just a box", it is a precision 
designed and built unit of transportation. The intermodal 
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container is specifically designed to facilitate the movement 
of one or more commodities by several modes of transport without 
intermediate reloading. The term IIcontainerisation tl refers 
to a transport system in which cargo is unitised, secured and 
transported within containers of set dimensions equipped 
with standard material handling and securing fittings, to 
provide for compatibility and interchangeability between 
different transport modes. 
The volume of literature on containerisation has expanded 
rapidly in the last few years~ indeed there are now a number 
of periodicals devoted exclusively to the topic. Comprehensive 
descriptions of this cargo handling system, including its 
advantages and disadvantages, are given by Co1e(1971), Evans 
(1969), Forward (1970) , Johnson and Garnett (1971) , McAllum 
(1971), Miller(1970), the Transport Commission(1969), and 
the United Nations(1970). 
While the concept of intermoda1 transportation of goods 
in units of the same size and configuration dates to the 
nineteenth century, the containership phenomenon was not 
introduced until the late 1950's. This was on two services -
the Matson container service from the West Coast of the 
United States to Hawaii, and the Sea-Land service from the 
East Coast of the United States to Puerto Rico. At the time 
of their introduction, the maritime industry looked upon 
the container as an inefficient and unjustifiable shipping 
vehicle. This was because the introduction of containers 
would require large capital expenditure on containers, ship 
conversion, and terminal modifications. At the same time, 
the container itself used up weight and space that could be 
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better used for revenue payloads. Crake(1963,30) expressed 
many of the doubts held by shipping operators when he asked: 
(i) Would the saving in handling justify the extra 
capital tied up in the system? 
(ii) How can it be ensured that one component does not 
incur higher costs for the benefit of the other 
parts of the system?". 
Accepting that a principle of the container system is 
that cargo space may be sacrificed if ship turnaround 
speeded up, containerisation will show maximum advantage on 
those routes where port time is high in relation to steaming 
time. Crake(1963) suggested that this was the reason 
behind the rapid development of the container concept 
coastal shipping. To place this turnaround advantage in 
proper perspective he calculated the loss in revenue-
earning space which would occur in a typical cargo liner. 
Assuming that there would be a· 30 percent loss in effec.tive 
capacity when containers are used, he found that any 
conceivable advantage from faster ship turnround disappeared 
by the time the voyage neared 9,500 miles (see Figure 2). 
When a 40 percent conversion loss was assumed this advantage 
was nullified when voyage distance reached 6,000 miles. 
Should ships sail with less than a full load the advantages 
of conversion would disappear around the 3,000 mile mark. 
Many traditional shipping operators have made the mistake 
of evaluating container shipping from the viewpoint of the ship, 
rather than as an element in a larger intermodal system. 
Both the Matson and Sea-Land Companies took a broader vielWpoint 
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and concluded that the improved productivity which could 
achieved through the rapid loading and discharge of containers, 
and the faster service offered shippers, would more than 
compensate for the loss in payload and increased capital 
investment requirements. In recent years container shipping 
has experienced tremendous growth with approximately 80 
of all the North Atlantic general cargo trade now moving in 
containers. Undoubtedly a major contributing factor to the 
success of the system has been the marked reduction in time 
(1) 
spent in port. 
Studies of conventional break-bulk ship operations have 
shown that these ships may spend more than 60 percent of their 
time in port loading, discharging or awaiting cargo (Producer 
Boards' Shipping Utilisation Committee, 1964). The ship 
therefore serves a large percentage of its time as a warehouse 
holding cargo, rather than as a transportation vehicle 
delivering cargo. Introduction of the container has made it 
possible for an operator to load an entire ship in 24 hours, 
compared to the 5 - 8 days that may have been taken by 
conventional shipping. Similar savings are possible in the 
discharge process, the result being an enormous improvement 
in ship utilisation and in annual productivity. 
Many shipping lines have heavily committed themselves 
to containerisation as a means of lowering their operational 
costs. Johnson and Garnett(197l) examined the viability of 
this commitment by identifying the shipping economies which 
can be attributed to containerisation. Their findings are 
summarised in Figure 3. 
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In considering the economies of scale which may result 
from building large container ships, they found that whi 
economies did result these should not be exaggerated. 
savings tend to become more important on the longer trade 
routes, but must be weighed against reductions in service 
frequency (Figure 3a). 
Port cargo handling rates play a major role in 
determining the efficiency of shipping services. Johnson and 
Garnett(l97l,37) consider that "the growth in size of 
conventional general-cargo liners, and hence the achievement 
of economies of scale, has been effectively constrained by 
inefficient terminal handling methods". It in this 
crucial area that containerisation makes a major contribution 
towards reducing costs. Figure 3b shows, r a given ship 
size, the rate at which a ship's unit costs will decline as 
the cargo handling rate increases. Potential savings in a 
ship's capital costs from this quicker turnround are 
considerable. 
In tackling the question of optimum containership size, 
Johnson and Garnett concluded that ship size partly a 
function. of the frequency of service demanded; and, as service 
frequency is a function of route length, then optimum ship 
size may in part be regarded as a function of distance. A 
crucial element is the relationship between port costs and 
ship size, and the authors could not resolve whether or 
larger container ships involve higher port unit costs. Two 
relationships are shown in Figures 3c and 3d. It can bE~ seen 
that there is only an optimum ship size, in terms of the 
variables speci ed, should port costs se very dly as 
ship size increases (but the exact relationship between ship 
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size and port costs must be known before any definite ze 
may be suggested as being optimal). 
Load factors are a further variable determining unit 
costs. While low load factors increase the costs, rate 
of increase is less in the case of I ships, as their 
fixed costs form a smaller proportion of total costs (see 
Figure 3e). (2) As demonstrated by Figure 3f, unit costs are 
more sensitive to variations in the load factor over longer 
distances. 
Containerisation is just one example of the unitisation 
concept, (though the most elaborate), and other unitisation 
methods have their supporters. Indeed it s'eems as though for 
every article or report supporting containerisation, there are 
an equal number pointing out disadvantages, or the 
advantages of palletisation or some roll-on/roll-o cargo 
handling system. Miller (1970,190) feels that many operators 
may have entered the container system placing " ••• more. 
emphasis on haste rather than thoughtful development ••. lU f 
and in his comprehensive paper illustrated the tremendous depth 
of detailed analysis which must be completed before arriving 
at any firm conclusions regarding the "optimal" system. 
There have not been many detailed studies evaluating the 
economies of alternative shipping technologies. However 
one of the most detailed and thorough examinations found by 
the author was a study by Getz, Erichsen and .Heirung(1968). (3) 
They compared the construction, operating and cargo handling 
costs of two unitised cargo systems, pallets and cellular 
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containers. Although it must be noted that their study 
did not take into account the service characteris of 
the systems (for example, the time goods were in transit), 
some of their most relevant conclusions are lis 
(i) itA comparison of cost and capacity of ship 
shore-mounted gear shows that lifting equipment 
should be shipborne, both when handling loose 
cargo. and pallet loads. The most economical 
gear for containers are shore-mounted gantry cranes, 
due to their better utilisation ashore and their 
adverse effect on payload and stability when mounted 
aboard. The best cargo gear for pallets 
combined side door/side hatches and pallet 
no lifting gear ••• being required. 
The most economical system (is) door-to-door 
••• even port-to-port pallets giving less costs 
the port-to-port leg of door-to-door 
(This is in terms of shipping costs only) • 
••• for cargo originating at moderate and long 
distances from the ports, containers are 
advantageous, whereas pallet loads will be 
economic form of unit loads for cargo shipped 
from places within the port and its adjacent 
hinterland". (Getz, Erichsen and Heirung,1968,21). 
In arriving at their final conclusion the authors assumed that 
the internal movement of containers may have the of 
special lOW-cost unit trains. The minimum inland haulage, 
necessary to make container costs break even with the pallet 
costs, varied according to the round-trip length and whether 
the container was broken down before delivery to the consignee. 
(Assuming a round-trip distance of 14,000 miles, and no 
break-down of the container before delivery, a minimum internal 
haul of 204 miles was necessary for container to match the 
pallet system. It was further assumed that the contain(;!r 
ship called at only one port at either end while the pallet 
ship called at three). 
Although these findings do not neces apply to the 
New Zealand situation, the above points consideratioll@ 
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Perhaps Miller's statement to the fect "too much haste 
and not enough thought" has characterised the entry of some 
operators into the container system, contains an emant of 
truth. Ports may be rushing to invest in container facil 
for no other reason than the fear of being Ie behind. 
2.2. Impact of Shipping Developments on Ports 
Technological evolution in shipping has confronted both 
shipping companies and port authorities with new shipping 
dimensions. Viewed in retrospect, the extensive changes 
that have occurred within the shipping industry over the t 
two decades have been dictated in the main by the economic 
necessity to derive the benefits of economies of scale and to 
reduce fiidle-time" spent in port. The main characteristics 
of these changes are: 
(i) a very large increase in ship size, both in length, 
beam and draft, particularly in bulk carriers and 
tankers; 
(ii) the development of unit-load temsand specialist 
ships related to these systems; 
(iii) integrated transport systems where the sea and 1 
legs are treated as complementary parts of one system, 
the port being the integrating link. 
These three features have developed simultaneously and their 
combined effect on the physical characteristics of ports, as 
well as on the nature of port operations, has been marked. 
Reference to some New Zealand developments will illustrate 
I 
these effects. 
Impact on New Zealand Ports - Evidence of the impact of 
these shipping developments on New Zealand ports is ly 
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apparent. Traditionally these ports have concentrated on 
providing berths suitable for vessels ranging in size from 
the small coaster to the large general cargo vessel or even 
bulk carrier. In consequence, existing berths were mainly 
built for general use as opposed to being designed specifically 
for a particular type of vessel. The changing role of New 
Zealand ports, insofar as the provision of facilities is con-
cerned, is now clearly evident with the increased accent on 
design for individual vessels, commodities or trades. For 
example, many ports have built specialised facilities for oil 
tankers; a bulk cargo wharf, principally for the loading and 
discharge of fertiliser, has been completed at Whangarei; 
storage and related equipment to handle the export of wood 
pulp through Napier are being designed: bulk lucerne silos 
have been constructed at Picton; Nelson has installed special-
ised pneumatic loading facilities for a wood-chip trade; 
recent developments at Timaru include the provision of bulk 
handling installations with a storage capacity of 6,000 tons 
and maximum designed ship loading rates of 2,000 tons per 
hour; all-weather mechanical meat loading facilities have 
been built at Timaru and Bluff, and a specialised wharf to 
serve New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited has also been 
constructed at Bluff. This wharf is 650 feet in length and 
has a 4,120 foot approach. A bulk discharger has been 
installed which feeds a belt conveyor to silos ashore. 
Facilities for roll-on/roll-off vessels are now comnnn, 
with eight stern-loading berths having been built and several 
morebeing planned. Major developments have occurred at 
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Auckland and Wellington in keeping with their designation as 
New Zealand's container ports. 
been completed at Otago. 
A container terminal 
New Zealand's first Single Point Mooring Buoy, a 
also 
revolutionary development, commenced operations in July 1972. 
Located 1.3/4 miles offshore from Waverley, this system loads 
ironsand in slurry form aboard.special 70,000-ton tankers at 
rates exceeding 1,500 tons per hour. A second offshore 
ironsand concentrate loading system has been constructed at 
Taharoa. New Zealand Steel Limited intends to export 
1,200,000 tons of ironsand concentrate annually through this 
terminal. 
with the marked increase in vessel size, many New Zealand 
ports have major development programmes underway to increase 
their harbour and channel depths. The ports of Tauranga, 
Taranaki, Nelson, Otago and Bluff are all in the midst of 
such programmes: development dredging at Tauranga aimed 
at increasing the maximum permissible draught from 28~ 
to 32 feet to enable ships to uplift full log loads; following 
a disastrous storm in April 1968, a major dredging programme 
had to be commenced at Nelson as a matter of extreme urgency 
to fac itate the export of wind-thrown logs to Japan; Otago 
is improving its lower harbour channel depth to 33 (low 
water) to enable container ships of maximum Panama Canal 
dimensions to be berthed at practically all states of thl3 tide 
and weather i to accommodate larger vessels associated wi<th 
the aluminium smelter, a project to widen and deepen the 
entrance channel was necessary at Bluff. Similar devell:>pment 
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programmes are being considered at Lyttelton and 
Even Wellington, which enjoys a controlling entrance 
of 49 (chart datum), feels that it may have to 
entrance channel to accommodate the larger oil 
and ships anticipated to be in service 
near future. 
To berthage length can be expected to 
or even decrease, at most New Zealand ports as a re t of 
the widespread introduction of unitised handling 
which greatly increase the capacity of a single berth. For 
example a roll-on/roll-off berth may handle in excess of 
400,000 tons annually - the average annual throughput a 
conventional berth is 135,000 tons. These handl 
are leading to the review of wharf design standards, as ves 
requiring the use of high axle load plant will need to 
accommodated. Recently constructed wharves, such as 
Cashin Quay complex at Lyttelton, have been built to 
heavy design standards, providing for maximum axle 
from mobile plant of 50 tons. 
Whereas total berthage length may remain static, 
is little doubt that ports will be required to provide 
land areas adjacent to berths for the marshalling and 
aggregating of cargoes. Faster cargo movement between 
and shore will result in congestion, and a resultant 
reduction in handling rates, unless delivery to and 
loading area similarly increased. Many New Zealand 
are unable to handle unitised cargo at optimum rates of 
efficiency because of congestion on old-type finger and 
lack of ient off-wharf pre-assembly areas. 
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To maximise the benefits to be gained from ter 
cargo handling methods it is clear that good road and I 
access to the ports is also vitally important. The improve-
ment in the ability of inland transport to handle unit loads 
has been an essential factor in the success of the container 
system. (4) 
Impact on Port Systems - As well as affecting the 
physical characteristics of individual ports, shipping 
developments play an important role in influencing the 
structure of a country's port system. The planning of an 
optimal port system is complicated by the fact that little 
known about the theory of the forces influencing spatial 
arrangements of ports. Though it is generally that 
ports pass through certain phases of development, it 
difficult to predict where this development process may end. 
Rimmer has given this question considerable attention. 
He postulated on idealised-type sequence of port development, 
which although theoretical, does mirror some of the 
which have occurred within New Zealand's port system. Port 
development is seen as passing through the following s 
"The first phase consists of a dispersed pattern of 
seaports scattered along the coast serving limited 
hinterlands. Except for irregular visits of trading 
vessels, there is little interconnection between 
the ports. With the emergence of the main lines of 
(inland) penetration - phase two - the concentration of 
shipping services is intitiated, as some ports expand at 
the expense of others. Port concentration is accentuated 
as these ports develop as foci of feeder routes. The 
feeders continue to develop until these ports are linked 
together by the growth of landward connections (pha::::e 
3)." (Rimmer,1967a,89). 
In Phase 4, Rimmer sees the ports occupying central positions 
expanding by pirating the trade of neighbouring ports. 
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Similar trends can be recognised in the growth of New 
Zealand's port system.(S) The nature of the topography meant 
that early settlements were largely confined to coastal areas 
and many settlements depended upon their port as their only 
means of communication, both with overseas countries and the 
rest of New Zealand. High inland transport costs gave 
ports an element of local monopoly and consignments tended to 
move through that port closest to the shipper. As inland 
transport has become more efficient and relatively cheaper 
this situation has changed. Shipping 1 are now concerning 
themselves with the complete door-to-door movement of 
consignments and shippers often find that they can operate 
just as cheaply and conveniently through a relatively distant 
port asthrough a local one. 
Changes in the technology of both maritime and land 
transport are clearly both important factors in determining 
the structure of any port system. The increasing size and 
specialisation of ships, the use of capital-intensive auto-
mated handling systems and the trend to unitisation of cargoes 
have created a situation in which a fundamental aim of 
shipping industry is the minimisation of time spent in port. 
Robinson (1970) sees a move towards rationalisation of shippi 
movements through port networks, and the reduction in number 
of ports serviced, as inevitable. (6) 
A significant characteristic of unitised cargo handling 
systems the very high cost of the terminal and mechanical 
handling equipment. An obvious implication of this is 1:hat, 
in order to achieve acceptable unit costs for the port 
operations, berth throughput must be very high. vi l 
ports will be anxious to invest in these facilities for as 
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Garnett (1970,413) points out, " ••• the dominant factor 
determining the attractive power of a particular port (will) 
no longer (be) its proximity to a particular shipper, but 
whether or not it can cope with large vessels which 
economies of scale ••• ". The need for a country to control 
such investments, rather than permit a number of under=util ed 
facilities to be built, apparent. 
2.3. Port Investment Planning 
In 1960 Thorburn (1960,140) stated that IIlarge tments 
in harbours throughout the world appear to be made to a large 
extent intuitively and not on the basis of rational economic 
calculations. Practically all the investments made ••• are 
made on the basis of very imperfect investment calculations ••• ". 
The technological evolution in shipping since that date 
required very large investments in port facilities. This 
section bri~fly reviews some of the methods used to evaluate 
alternative port investments. 
The purpose of investment appraisal is to measure 
costs and benefits of a project in order to determine whether 
its net benefits are equal to those obtainable from other 
investment opportunities (Adler,1971,3). A number of 
mathematical methods have been developed specifically for the 
comparison of capital investment proposals (these methods are 
reviewed by Adler (1971,40-51». Practical applications of 
these techniques to port and shipping investment decisions 
are demonstrated by Brown (1971), Cambon(197l), Goss(1967a, 
1968,1971) and Mills(197l). While evaluation methods have 
been refined to the point where the discounted return on an 
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investment can be calculated to a fraction of a percent, these 
authors point out that because calculations must be bas 
upon data estimates.which are not nearly so accurate, this 
kind of precision is only illusory. 
Problems still to be resolved in evaluating port 
investments include: forecasting the volume of traffic likely 
to be generated by the provision of a facility - a vital input 
to the pricing analysis; selecting a method of depreciation 
which accurately reflects the decline in the economic value 
of an asset, choosing appropriate prices which will adequately 
value the benefits flowing from the services provided by the 
investment; defining the real costs and benefits. (7) 
General purpose port simulation programmes have been 
developed to compare the costs of a number of different port 
systems, and many of these programmes are reviewed by 
Agerschou and Korsgaard(1969). Robinson (1970) has formulated 
a computer programme to evaluate investment allocation and 
operational efficiency in an individual port, but notes 
further research is necessary before his method could be 
extended to the multi-port situation. Current research on 
multi-port investment allocation has been described by 
Gulbrandsen(1970,85-95). Solutions to the problem of 
mining through which of a number of ports cargo should move, 
the timing of investments, and the type of investments 
required in ports and inland transport systems in order to 
minimise transport costs, are discussed. 
Footnotes (1) Goss (1968,153) has shown that if the proportion of time 
spent in port by cargo liners (around 60 percent of their 
time), could be reduced to 20 percent, the cost of sea 
transport in a cargo liner could be reduced by 
18 and 35 percent, depending on the route length. 
Obviously, with such a high proportion of compl non-
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productive time in port, considerable improvements in 
ship productivity could be achieved even without 
containerised handling systems. 
(2) Container-shipping unit costs are particularly sensitive 
to reductions in load factors as capital is tied up in the 
containers themselves, which often have to be carried even 
empty to maintain a balanced flow of shipping 
(Johnson and Garnett,197l,46). 
(3) Similar comparative studies have been undertaken by 
Benford(197l), and Little(1970). 
(4) Despite the identificatfon of apparent trends, extreme 
caution is still necessary as the exact course shipping 
developments will take is still uncertain. With 
to predicting these developments Ordman(197l,1) commented 
that " ••• in the course of the last 20 years, the only 
reasonable certainty in forecasting has been that our 
forecasts will be seriously misleading ••. ". 
(S) A concise summary of the forces leading to these charges 
is presented in the Report of the New Zealand Ports 
Authority (1970,3). 
(6) Examples of this tendency towards port concentration are 
well documented (see Rimmer 1964, 1967a, 1972; Kenyon 
1970; Ogundana 1970). Forward(1970,193) sees Australia's 
general cargo trade as focussing increasingly on three 
container ports, at the expense of other ports that have 
been traditional ports of call in the past. 
(7) Goss(1967a) has pointed out that a discounted cash flow 
type of analysis often has to be rejected in the case of 
ports because their charging systems bear no relationship 
to longer short run average or marginal costs. Goss 
(1967a) and Garnett(l970) have suggested ways, based on 
a shadow price technique, by which these problems could 
be overcome. 
CHAPTER III 
INVESTMENT PLANNING FOR 
NEW ZEALAND PORTS 
From 1960 to 1969 capital expenditure at New Zeal 
ports, excluding the capital requirements associated with 
maintaining works and services, exceeded $109 million (see 
Table 1). (~) Although a significant proportion of this 
finance, (Fluctuating between 16 and 37 percent of the to ), 
came from harbour board income or reserves, largest 
proportion of it was from public loans. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Thorburn ( 60) in s 
examination of port investments found that many decisions 
had been reached intuitively and not on the basis of rational 
economic calculations. Similar conclusions were reported 
by Garnett(1970), Goss(1967a} and Mills(197l). This chapter 
will review those studies which have had an important bearing 
on the development of New Zealand ports, the objective being 
to examine the methods of investment evaluation followed. 
The degree to which the probable impacts associated with 
investment plans were considered in reaching important 
decisions are studied. 
3.1. Review of Shipping Studies 
A number of detailed studies have been conducted to 
determine whether the methods of assembling, loading, shipping, 
unloading and delivering overseas cargo could be improved or 
altered to the advantage of importers, exporters, shipping 
companies and others involved in New Zealand overseas trade. 
The conclusions of each study were, in principle, very similar. 
YEAR 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
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Table 1 
SUMMARY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AT 
NEW ZEALAND PORTS, 1969/1970 
Year Ended 30 September 
SOURCE OF FINANCE 
6,466,770 1,235,820 
6,476,584 2,111,714 
10,418,568 2,035,474 
7,813,484 1,946,032 
7,027,656 1,732,118 
9,996,520 2,294,546 
8,353,600 2,491,710 
10,633,294 3,066,929 
8,892,621 5,150,355 
8,027,239 2,983,704 
7,702,590 
8,588,298 
12,454,042 
9,759,516 
8,759,774 
12,291,066 
10,845,310 
13,700,223 
14,042,976 
11,010,943 
SOURCE: Local Authority Statistics, 1959/60 to 1969/70" 
Department of Statistics, Wellington. 
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They all emphasised the need for the faster turnround of 
ships on the New Zealand coast and improved efficiency in 
cargo handling. These studies have greatly influenced 
nature of investment at individual ports, and the overall 
allocation 'of investment between ports. 
The first of a series of investigations into the 
efficiency of current shipping practices was the " ining 
Report" issued in 1964 by representatives of the New Zealand 
Producer Boards and the British Conference Lines. (2) To 
implement their recommendations which centred on ising 
the loading and discharging of particular ships at no more 
than two ports, to reduce time spent by ships on the New 
Zealand coast - they urged the formations of an Exports and 
Shipping Council consisting of representatives of all parties 
directly interested in New Zealand's export trade. This 
Council was duly formed but has not been completely successful 
in securing the implementation of the Report's recommendations. 
The Report also suggested that a Transport Commiss should 
examine New Zealand ports and all road, rail, air coas 
shipping services, with a view to preparing a National Plan 
to guide future port development. A Transport Commissi.on 
was duly appointed in July 1965. 
Under its terms of reference, the Streamlining Report was 
confined to examining only the shipping link of the total 
transport system. A much broader investigationll, covering 
all the links in the handling and transport chain, was 
undertaken in 1967 by the Molyneux Committee. (3) This 
investigation, commissioned by the British Lines, 
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was prompted by the acceleration in the development of new 
cargo handling and transport techniques, the most important 
of these being the use of containers. The principal recommend-
ation contained in the Molyneux Report was that a limited 
container service should be instituted between New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom by 1971. Subject to certain qualifications, 
the Transport Commission accepted the Molyneux Report's 
conclusions and agreed that the introduction of a container 
service should be to the mutual advantage of the British 
Conference Lines and the New Zealand economy (Transport 
Commission,1967a,9) • (4) 
Many in New Zealand considered that it should not be 
left to the Conference Lines to decide whether a container 
service would be in the country's best interests. As it was 
felt that qualified staff capable of completing the necessary 
study within a suitable period were not available in New 
Zealand, the Government commissioned an independent company 
to study alternative transport systems for New Zealand's West 
European and United Kingdom trade. The Metra Consulting 
Group were engaged for this task and completed their report 
in April 1969. 
The major conclusions of the Metra Report may be 
summarised as follows: 
(i) "The containerisation of New Zealand's trade with the 
United Kingdom and Western Europe will have an 
economic advantage over conventional and palletised 
systems. 
(ii) The container service should be provided from ei 1:her 
Wellington or Wellington and Auckland together in 
New Zealand and London in the United Kingdom. 
(iii) Four ships of a capacity of 1,400 containers .•• would 
be able to carry 66 percent of Northbound traffic and 
81 percent of Southbound traffic. Thirty-one 
conventional ships would be required for the balance 
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of non-containerised traffic. 
(iv) The total new investment in four container ships, 
containers and New Zealand port facilities would be 
approximately $80 million". (Metra Report, 1969) 0 
Shortly before the release of the Metra Report, the 
British Conference Lines outlined their container 
in a brief brochure entitled "Towards Containers for New 
Zealand ll • . In their report the Lines concluded that they 
were convinced of the practicability and the advantages of 
containerisation in the New Zealand trade. The system 
proposed was for four container ships to provide a 14 day 
service calling at Southampton or London in England and at 
both Auckland and Wellington in New Zealand. Each vessel 
would carry 1,400 contai~ers, 1,100 being for re 
cargo and 300 for general cargo. The total investment 
involved in the service was estimated as being $107 million. 
The Transport Commission was charged with evaluating 
these proposals and published their findings in a lengthy 
report in May 1969 (Transport Commission 1969). Their 
provides a comprehensive summary of the Molyneux and Metra 
Reports as well as the proposals forwarded by the British 
Conference Lines, and evaluates the Lines' proposals in 
light of the Metra Report. The early introduction of a 
rt 
container service was recommended as being, in the long t:erm, 
in the national interest of New Zealand and Government was 
advised to give approval in principle to the Lines' proposals. 
ion of these Studies - Considerable controveJcsy 
surrounded the release of all these studies. The Metra Report 
has been criticised for basing some calculations on of 
rather dubious value, and it has been suggested that other 
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studies, being commissioned by the British Conference Lines, 
aimed at determining that system which would return 
greatest profit to the Lines. 
The Metra Report appears to have greatly influenced 
Government's planning in this area: the Minister of rt 
has suggested that " •.• possibly this report will have a 
greater impact on our transport system than any other 
document previously received in New Zealand the Government 
is particularly pleased with the report .•• This 
probably represents the most valuable $70,000 this or any 
Government has ever spent". (Hansard,1969,207-8). 
Unfortunately it appears as though some "findingsii have been 
attributed to this report concerning topics which were 
fact outside its terms of reference. For example the Minister 
of Transport has also stated that n ••• Metra has told New 
Zealand what system of moving its export and import goods 
would cost less than any other system while giving the s 
we require ••• "(Hansard,1969,208). A reading of the Report 
suggests that this statement is rather sweeping. In their 
report Metra state that "three types of shipping have been 
analysed1 they are conventional break-bulk, palletised and 
container" (Metra Report 1969,34). Certainly their study 
did indicate what shipping system would be the best of those 
examined, but as they examined only three bas systems it 
is unreal . (5) tic to conclude that the best system 1.S now known. 
Many of the objections which followed the of the 
Metra Report only served to demonstrate that the objecto:rs 
had not read, or understood, the report. Several ports 
performed calculations to demonstrate that they should b,e 
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included as one of the country's container ports; generally 
savings in internal transport costs were balanced against the 
increased cost of having the container ship call at an 
additional port. These calculations fai to into 
account the effect of increasing the number of ports of c 
on the efficiency of the total system. But the ensuing 
controversy did highlight one simple but extremely important 
fact: that the report's results would only be as valid as 
the data used was accurate. In this respect many harbour 
boards questioned the accuracy of port development capital 
costs estimated by Metra, and similar doubts were ed 
over the reliability of inland container movement costs. 
Inland cost estimates were obtained from road 
coastal shipping operators and the Railways Department, but 
in terms of the many "unknowns" - for example, the number of 
containers to be moved, length of haul and frequency of service 
fficult required - it would have been extremely 
groups to have derived accurate costings. Geddes ( 71) has 
since indicated that much uncertainty still surrounds 
manner in which railway container rates will be calculatedo 
The rating will be influenced by: (a) whether containers are 
, 
priced on a per ton or unit basis; (b) the volume and 
length of haul of the traffic offering; and (c) the charges 
offered by competitors for the same service. For these 
reasons the validity of the data Metra used to the 
costs of container aggregation must be in doubt. As thl; 
transport costs incurred in channelling cargo through a 
limi ted number of ports are a vi tal factor in determinin'g the 
economic viability of container systems, Metra's conclusions 
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must be viewed with some reservations. (6) 
3.2. The Role of the New Zealand Ports Authority 
During the period 1965 to 1969 the Transport Commission 
presented a number of reports seeking to rationalise port 
policies, but the need for a permanent statutory authority to 
control port development became evident and to this end the 
New Zealand Ports Authority was constituted in 1968. As 
outlined in Chapter I, the general functions of the Authority 
are to foster an efficient and integrated ports system for 
New Zealand, and to prepare and keep under review a national 
plan for the development of ports and harbours. The 
Authori ty' s aims are admirable as a si.tuation was developing 
similar to that seen by the Rochdale Committee in their 
review of port investment in Britain. In reviewing the 
existing system of controlling investment expenditure, the 
Rochdale Committee noted that: 
..... there was no control of projects financed out of 
reserves, and that for other projects (which required 
increased borrowing powers) there was no independent 
economic test of the need for a proposed development 
scheme, and no attempt to relate the proposals of one 
port to those of another; on the contrary, so long as 
a port's finances are sound, the scheme is technically 
unobjectionable, and the cost reasonable, there will be no 
case for withholding approval". (Mills,1971,121). 
The task confronting the New Zealand Ports Authority 
a vital and major one. That all port investment proposals 
should be carefully evaluated may appear to be self-evident, 
yet many organisations fail to do this, their investment 
decisions appearing to be arrived at on the basis of "hunch" 
or II intui tion" • While all business decisions call for i3. 
measure of intuitio~ this can never be a substitute for 
conclusions drawn from hard facts. 
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control over port investments is given by the require-
ment that all harbour board capital expenditure in excess of 
a certain sum must be referred to, and approved by, the 
(7) 
Authority, Since its inception the Authority has 
granted applications allowing harbour boards to raise loans 
to the value of $24,791,500 (see Table 2). In addition 
the Local Authorities Loans Board has referred a number of 
loan applications to the Authority for advice. (8) Clearly 
the formulation of a national ports plan is a very complex 
problem. But in the absence of such an overall port plan, 
one wonders at the criteria used by the Authority in granting 
these loan applications. As King (1971,108) has suggested, 
" ••• it is hard to see on what grounds the Authority can 
judge proposals ••• except on an ad hoc basis with reference 
only to the viability of the specific project concerned ll • 
No standard economic evaluations appears to be performed 
in judging these applications. 
Many harbour boards are concerned at the lack of a 
national plan which the Authority was set up to produce three 
years ago. An example of the frustration felt is provided 
by a recent comment by the chairman of the Timaru Harbour 
Board: " ••• the port of Timaru is entering into the most 
difficult period of its entir~ history. Difficult, because 
due to the lack of national research and co-ordinated planning 
the Board does not know which way it should develop." (9) 
There are fears that in an endeavour to attract trade larger 
ports will tend to duplicate expensive container and unit-load 
facilities, and as a result shipping companies will be in a 
position to playoff one harbour board against another. 
- 43 -
Table 2 
LOANS APPROVED BY THE NEW ZEALAND 
PORTS AUTHORITY, 1970/1972 
Dollars 
OF LOANS APPROVED(l) 
HARBOUR BOARD 1971 1972 
Auckland 5,500,000 
Bay of Plenty 750,000 300,000 
Marlborough 2,243,000 610,000 
Nelson 500,000 
Otago 1,200,000 
Southland 900,000 
Taranaki 2,400,000 1,430,000 
Timaru 355;000 35,500 108,000 
Wellington 4,810,000 3,650,000 
(1) Loan Applications considered in 1970 and 1971 totalled 
$9,808,000 and $6,785,000 respectively. The comparable 
figure for 1972 was not available. 
Years En e 
Wellington. 
Ports Authorit , For the 
72. Government Printer, 
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In reply, the Authority stresses that all current 
development conforms with the national interest as 
by the national port plan being formulated (Report of the New 
Zealand Ports Authority,1972,11). It points out that it 
full control of work undertaken from loan moneys, and 
addition enjoys the full co-operation of all harbour boards 
in prior consultations on any works proposed to be undertaken 
from revenue or reserves. 
The Authority has indicated that the national ports plan 
will be flexible. (10) In an era when technology is changing 
so rapidly the advantages of flexibility are obvious. 
Unfortunately, while a plan may be flexible, port investments 
are of a very fixed and long-term nature. Many port facilities, 
besides being immobile and having an almost infinite 
economic life, run the risk of rapidly becoming obsolete, and 
port investments, whether correct or incorrect, tie up 
valuable funds for many years. ' 
While evaluating port investments per se a difficult 
task, the Ports Authority must also ensure that port policy is 
co-ordinated with other internal transport modes. Develop-
ments within the railways system will have an important 
bearing on New Zealand's future port system. As the Ports 
Authority has no control over the actions taken by these 
other modes, their task is further complicated. 
3.3. Reaction to the Proposed Container Service 
Technological change is a continuing characteristic of 
modern society and the problems generated by such change 
continue to be among the most difficult of those confronting 
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society. While the introduction of new techniques may help 
increase the standard of living for society as a whole, 
De Salvo(1971) has demonstrated that " .•• efficiency in the 
use of resources does not necessarily imply equity in the 
distribution of resources...... Developments within New 
Zealand's overseas shipping service are anticipated to result 
in cargo being concentrated through a limited number of ports. 
Should this happen, some harbour boards would suffer a reduction 
in their total revenue receipts from the provision of works and 
services, and firms engaged in port-orientated activities may 
experience a reduction in business. The problem facing the 
Government is to find an acceptable compromise between the 
often conflicting objectives of achieving overall growth 
without threatening the security of any particular group or 
community. 
Much of the discussion which followed the publication of 
the British Conference Lines' container proposals, and the 
Metra Report's findings that containerisation would have an 
economic advantage over conventional and palletised systems, 
may be attributed to the fact that no associated study had 
investigated the internal ramifications of these proposals. 
Lack of specific information indicating the cargoes to be 
containerised and the method of aggregation was perturbing, 
and many harbour boards viewed their future with considerable 
concern. Exercises were performed to illustrate the extent 
to which they may suffer under the proposed schemes. For 
example, the Lyttelton Harbour Board predicted that should New 
Zealand's United Kingdom trade be containerised under the four-
ship two-port system, their port would lose approximately HI": 000 
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tons of cargo per annum. Should the container service 
extended to other trades they would lose an additional 150,000 
tons of cargo, resulting in a total revenue loss of approximately 
$300,000 per annum. Such a drop in revenue would be 
" •.• beyond the financial ability of the Board to carry without 
the necessity of increasing charges on residual cargoes. e." 
(Lyttelton Harbour Board,1969a,Appendix G). The Napier 
Harbour Board expressed similar fears concerning the impact of 
the proposed container service to the east coast ports of 
North America. 'They felt that the diversion of meat shipments 
through Wellington would seriously affect their revenue. To 
recoup these losses they anticipated that increased charges 
to shippers, in addition to a harbour district land rate, 
might be necessary (Anon. ,1970d). Similar sentiments were 
expressed by other harbour boards (see Northland Harbour 
Board 1969, and Otago Harbour Board 1969). 
Perhaps the fears held by ,many harbour boards can best 
be illustrated by a quotation from a speech made during 
Parliamentary Debates: "If a fully cellularised container 
service comes to New Zealand many of our ports will become 
ghost ports, and their wharves concrete cemeteries. 
loss of work at these ports will have a detrimental effect 
upon the men that service them and the towns they come from.1I 
(Hansard,1969,259). Even accepting the fact that a number 
of purely emotive and uninformed opinions have been expressed 
regarding this subject, the probable impact on certain New 
Zealand ports and their adjacent communities under the 
container system appears to be substantial. It is therefore 
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relevant to examine the extent to which this factor (which 
may be viewed as an extra "cost"), was considered during 
the decision-making process; both by the Transport Commission 
in their approval of the container system in principle, and 
by the New Zealand Ports AU,thori ty in their recommendation 
that Auckland and Wellington be developed as New Zealand's 
container ports. 
Port Impact as a Factor in Choice - Government's decision 
to agree in principle to the Britich Conference Lines' proposed 
container service, was based largely on the Transport 
Commission's evaluation of their proposals in the light of 
the Metra Report(Hansard,1969,1129). For approximately four 
years the Commission had studied the containerisation concept 
in general and the feasibility of its introduction into New 
Zealand's shipping service. As recorded in Hansard(1969, 
1132), the Commission also " ••• investigated the domestic 
situation and the social and economic problems that the 
adoption of the system might present to New Zealand". 
While the bulk of their report dealt with comparing the 
findings of the ~IDlyneux and Metra Reports with the Conference 
Lines' proposals, they did discuss the effect the diversion 
of cargo through Auckland and Wellington would have on other 
ports. Having noted that the exact impact could not be 
predicted until the manner in which particular cargoes were 
to be allocated between container and conventional ships was 
decided, they agreed that " ••• ports other than the container 
ports will suffer financial loss and disturbance in various 
degrees ••• " (Transport Commission,1969,40). While the 
Commission felt that the effects of loss of trade, both on 
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ports and their surrounding areas, would be "widespread", 
they considered such losses would not be so great as to 
justify abandoning the cellular container concept. No 
forecasts of the magnitude of these detrimental effects 
either in terms of reduced earnings or employment 
opportunities - were made, though the Commission did recommend 
that claims by harbour boards for compensation should be 
considered. 
The New Zealand Ports ~uthority supported the Transport 
Commission's recommendation (that a container service 
provided by four ships should serve Auckland and Wellington) 8 
and in turn recommended that Government establish New Zealand's 
first container ports at Auckland and Wellington. In their 
first annual report, the Authority stated that it had been 
" ••• charged with the responsibility for assessing the 
likely economic and social effects aggregation polic 
may have on ports. The Authority presently engaged 
upon a study of the implications of aggregation .•• giving 
priority to the ECNA sector which will be introduced 
earlier" (Report of the New Zealand Ports Authority,l970, 
IO) • (II) 
They subsequently reported that a preliminary study of 
the effect of shipping the East Coast North America trade 
through only Auckland, Wellington and Port Chalmers had 
indicated that ports from which trade was diverted would not 
be detrimentally affected to any major extent (Report of the 
New Zealand Ports Authority,197l,8). The details of their 
findings were not released. At the same time they reported 
that as the British Lines' container aggregation pattern was 
not known, it had II ••• not been possible to make an assessment 
of the likely effect of cargo aggregation on ports.iI(Report 
of the New Zealand Ports Authority,l97l,l2). 
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At the time Government accepted in principle the 
proposal that a limited container service should be commenced 
between New Zealand and the United Kingdom, no study had 
examined the domestic, social and economic implications of 
such a service. Though the Government was aware that non-
container ports would be detrimentally affected, it was im-
possible for them to balance this "cost" against the 
estimated transport savings offered by containerisation. 
3.4. South Island Meat Diversion Scheme 
Controversy similar to that which followed the 
announcement that a limited container service was to be 
commenced to the United Kingdom, had also been sparked off 
by previous shipping decisions. In October 1967 a joint 
statement was made by the New Zealand Meat Board and the 
Overseas Shipowners' Committee advising that all meat exports 
from South Island ports (except from Picton and Nelson) for 
discharge at London and Liverpool would be programmed for 
loading at the ports of Timaru and Bluff. Following this 
statement, and a deputation of protest from representatives 
of the Otago and Lytte1ton Harbour Boards, the Transport 
Commission was requested to investigate the proposal's costs 
and benefits. They were specifically requested to 
investigate " ••• the consequential detrimental effects upon 
the ports of Lytte1ton and Otago."(Transport Commission, 
1968a,1). Their findings are worthy of consideration in that 
they represent the first attempt made in New Zealand to 
quantify the probable impacts resulting from changing the~ 
structure of a distribution system. 
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Benefits predicted to result from the introduction of 
meat diversion scheme were savings in shipping costs, 
(resulting from the more efficient programming of ships), 
marketing benefits accruing from greater regularity of 
These benefits were valued at $555,000 per annum. 
Detrimental effects to the ports of Lyttelton and Otago, 
comprising the loss in harbour board revenue and the loss of 
watersiders' earnings, were estimated to be $333,000 per annum.(U) 
The impact of these reduced earnings on the respective local 
business communities was not evaluated. Their calculations 
led the Transport Commission to conclude that the 
inauguration of the meat diversion scheme was in the national 
interest, but, having regard to the intangible and variable 
factors affecting the scheme, recommended that it be 
reviewed after a six month trial period. 
In accordance with this recommendation, the Transport 
Commission again investigated t?e diversion scheme as it had 
operated between January and June 1968. Although both the 
shipping companies concerned and the Meat Board claimed that 
the scheme had operated successfully, and had in fact achieved 
better results than anticipated, the Commission found that 
it was unable to specify in monetary terms the benefits from 
the scheme. They were nonetheless satisfied that substantial 
benefits had resulted. Losses to the Lyttelton and Otago 
Harbour Boards proved difficult to determine as both ports had 
suffered a considerable reduction in total tonnage, in addition 
to that lost due to meat diversion. Gross revenue received 
by both Boards declined, as did the number of registered 
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waterside workers employed at the ports. Following this 
second investigation the Commission again found that " ••• the 
continuation of the meat diversion scheme is in the national 
(12) 
interest of New Zealand. II (Transport Commission, 1968b, 18) . 
Footnotes 
(1) This figure excludes investments made in private wharf 
facilities, such as at Tarakohe. 
(2) Although commonly referred to as the "Streamlining 
Report", the actual title is New Zealand Overseas Trade: 
Report on Shipping, Ports, Transport and Other service~. 
(3) This Committee's findings, published as New Zealand 
Overseas Trade - Report by the Container and Cargo 
Handling Committee, are commonly known as the 
"Molyneux Report if • 
(4) The qualifications included the number and location of 
container ports, and the fact that no container 
operation was yet in operation over so great a distance 
as 13,000 miles. 
(5) For example only the cellular container system was 
investigated, while pallets were assumed to be carried 
by conventional break-bulk ships. Modern unitised 
systems, such as side-door multi-purpose vessels, do 
not appear to have been evaluated. 
(6) It should also be noted that Metra did not consider the 
substantial investment required in the internal transport 
system to handle this container traffic. 
An example of information of dubious validity 
by Metra in their calculations concerns the average wages 
per annum per man employed at container terminals. 
Their estimate was $3,000(Metra 1969,Vo1.2,28), whereas 
the average income received by New Zealand's waterside 
workers in 1969 was $3,905 per annum. (Annual Repor1: of 
the Waterfront Industry Commission for the Year Ended 
31 December 1969,84,92). 
(7) As laid down in the New Zealand Ports Authority Act 
(1968,7) capital expenditure in excess of $250,000 in 
the case of the Auckland and Wellington Harbour Boards, 
$150,000 in the case of the Northland, Tauranga, 
Taranaki, Gisborne, Napier, Nelson, Lyttelton, Timaru, 
Otago and Southland Harbour Boards, and $50,000 in the 
case of any other harbour board must first be approved 
by the Authority. 
(8) As described in the Report of the New Zealand Ports 
Authority(1972,6), a number of harbour boards had been 
authorised by special empowering Acts, prior to the 
Authority being established, to undertake certain 
harbour works. Harbour boards are not required t,o 
obtain the Authority's approval for the expenditure 
/ 
(9 ) 
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of loan moneys authorised by these special Acts. But 
as these loans have to be sanctioned by the Local 
Authorit,:tes Loans Board (and the Authority is the Loans 
Board's adviser), the Authority is 11 able to 
evaluate such expenditure. 
Timaru Harbour Board, Statement of 
Accounts, Year En e 
(10) See Report of the New Zealand Ports Authorit~, For the 
Year Ended 31 March 1972(11). 
(11) ECNA - East Coast North America. 
(12) The Transport Commission themselves did not calculate 
the detrimental implications of the meat diversion scheme 
on the Otago and Lytte1ton Harbour Boards. Rather 
they discussed the consequences the Harbour Boards 
themselves predicted would occur. 
CHAPTER IV 
EFFECTS OF SHIPPING DEVELOPMENTS 
ON PORTS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIES 
In the previous chapter it was noted that the regional 
economic and social implications of recent shipping 
proposals have been the subject of much concern. Although 
the Government was aware that some ports and their 
associated regions would be detrimentally affected, no 
examination was made of these implications when evaluating 
the shipping services available to carry New Zealand's 
overseas trade. 
Following the Government's decision to approve of the 
container principle many organisations protested that non-
container ports would suffer a loss in trade and hence revenue, 
and that this loss would have adverse effects on the local 
economy. Under the container system some ports will 
undoubtedly lose a portion of their existing trade, but 
before one can comment on the ramifications this loss may 
have on the local economy, it is necessary to understand 
the actual role played by a port in the functioning of 
its local economy. In particular the additional revenue 
brought into an area due to the existence of a port must be 
known. 
While port impact studies on overseas ports are common, 
for example see the Port of Seattle Commission (1971) and 
Schenker (1967), no similar studies have investigated the 
impact of New Zealand's ports on their local economies. 
In this study the economic impact, in terms of income i:ind 
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employment, of the ports at Picton, Nelson, Lyttelton, 
Timaru, Oamaru, Dunedin and Bluff is investigated. 
4.1 Port Economic Impact 
Schenker(1967,127) notes that while the precise 
quantitative measurement of the economic impact of a port 
is impossible, a number of different aspects can be 
examined. Savings in transport cost can give those 
industries located near a port an economic advantage. 
Transport savings may even occur on commodities which are 
not shipped through the port sinqe other transport modes may 
reduce their freight rates because of potential competition 
from shipping. (I) 
The existence of a port produces widespread ramifications 
within the local economy and a distinction needs to be made 
between port-dependent and port-related activities. Port-
dependent activities would include those firms involved with 
the direct operation and maintenance of ports, commercial 
ship-building and repair, supplying shipping with provisions 
and equipment, and moving goods to and from ports. Port~ 
related activities would include these industries where 
location was determined by the existence of the port, and all 
trade and service functions generated by port-dependent 
activities. While port-related organisations such as banks, 
freight forwarders, shipping agents, and insurance companies 
derive much of their business from administering and 
servicing movements through a port, their level of activities 
would not be greatly affected if goods were moved into and 
out of the region by road or rail transport. On the other 
hand, the level of business of firms engaged in port-
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dependent activities would mirror any changes in the 
volume of cargo handled at the port. 
To enable objective comparisons to be drawn, it is 
essential that the approach adopted to determine a port's 
economic impact be consistent. Only the impact generated 
through the activities of harbour boards and waterside 
workers is examined, as it was impossible to gain access 
to the revenue and expenditure accounts of other port-
dependent activities. 
Di Income Generated - During the 1969/70 financial year 
revenue received-by the group of South Island Harbour Boards 
listed aboveexceeded $7.5 million (see Table 3). (2) This 
income was received from shipping firms, shippemand 
consignees for the provision of the necessary plant and 
services to facilitate the transfer of cargo from ship to 
shore, and vice versa. 
Table 3 
HARBOUR BOARD INCOME 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
HARBOUR BOARD 
t-1ar lborough 
Nelson 
Lyttelton 
Timaru 
Oamaru 
Otago 
Southland 
TOTAL 
INCOME (1) 
(Dollars) 
557,492 
561,588 
2,201,539 
997,159 
64,076 
1,716,998 
1,409,180 
7,508,032 
(1) This includes income from shipping services and 
general works, but does not include transfers 
from revenue funds or loans. 
SOURCE: Harbour Board Annual Reports and Statement 
of Accounts. 
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Payments made to waterside workers for stevedoring 
and wharfingering, together with guaranteed payments, are 
shown in Table 4. As the Waterfront Industry Commission, 
which adminsters payments to watersiders, altered the period 
covered by its financial year at the end of 1969, it was 
impossible to determine this income during the same period 
as used for harbour boards. To overcome this problem 
a forecast was made of estimated payments to watersiders 
during the year ended 30 December 1970. 
are also given in Table 4. (3) 
These forecasts 
Income and revenue received by these two groups is 
spent on the purchase of goods and services from other 
sectors of the economy. To predict the impact a reduction 
in watersiders' income or harbour board revenue may have on 
local business communities, it is necessary to examine 
their expenditure patterns. As the Government does not 
collect any statistics on personal spending patterns it is 
impossible to trace the flow of waterside workers' 
expenditure. However those business groups which received 
income directly from harbour boards can be determined. 
Method - To trace the flow of harbour board expenditure 
a record was taken of every payment made by each board 
during the 1970 financial year. At all ports except 
Lyttelton these details were abstracted from summary files 
listing all payments made during a particular month. These 
files generally gave the name of the firm or organisation 
to whom payment was made, the value of the payment, and a 
brief description of its nature, e.g. purchase of welding 
equipment, resealing of roads, chairman's honorarium, PAYE 
SHIPPING 
Table 4 
WAGES PAYABLE THROUGH WATERFRONT INDUSTRY COl-1MISSION, 70 
Dollars 
W.I-C. (1) FUND WAGE PAY~~NTS 
National 
COMPANY 
PORT PAYMENTS 
Port Unions' Administration Sundry TOTAL ESTIMATED (3) 
Stevedoring Fund Fund Payments PAYMENTS (2) PAYMENTS 
Picton 55,628 16,693 
Nelson 253,223 212,903 
Lyttelton 1,390,366 535,921 
Timaru 405,641 168,042 
Oamaru 29,135 5,882 
Otago 583,472 225,350 
Bluff 783,080 393,777 
TOTAL 3,500, 5 1,558,568 
(1) Waterfront Industry Commission. 
(2) Nine Months Ended 30 September 1970. 
(3) Year Ended 31 Decewber 1970. 
26,801 
61,099 
224,425 
139,030 
34,523 
235,084 
171,710 
892,672 
590 99,712 138,201 
5,958 533,183 569, 5 
21,883 2,172,595 2,577,067 
10,680 723,393 1,018,868 
436 69,976 100,073 
8,682 1,052,588 1,325,432 
3,672 1,352,239 1,577,247 
51,901 6,003,686 7,306,233 
SOURCE; Waterfront Industry Cowmission, P~nua1 Report and Statement of Accounts For Nine Months 
Ended 30 September 1970, Government Printer, Wellington. 
U"I 
-...l 
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tax. It was possible to distinguish payments made from 
the Loans Account and these made from the Cash Account. 
At Lyttelton this information was taken directly 
from ledger cards, with each card recording all payments 
made to a firm or organisation. 
was also stated. 
The reason for the payment 
In this way all those firms which received direct 
income from harbour boards, as well as the amount of this 
income, were identified. By recording every firm's 
address, the proportion of harbour board expenditure which 
is directed out of its local economy was able to be calculated. 
Table 5 summarises each harbour board's expenditure 
during 1969/70 under several broad groupings. The purpose 
of these groupings is to isolate those main sections of the 
business community which received business as a result of the 
presence of a port. Although the distinction between 
several groups is rather fine, the main recipients of the 
boards' revenue can be seen. (4) Wages and salaries are the 
most important single expenditure item at all ports (v.7hen 
capital expenditure is excluded), and repairs and maintenance 
also account for a large proportion of each port's 
expenditure. During the 1970 financial year several of the 
ports were heavily involved in major development 
programmes. For example, substantial capital expenditure 
was made by the Southland, Timaru, Lyttelton and 
Marlborough Harbour Boards. 
Not all of the revenue shown in Table 5 is injected 
into a particular port's local economy_ Some revenue 
EXPENDITURE 
ITEMS 
Wages, Salaries 
Travel 
Administration 
Fquipnent Hire 
Repairs, Maintenance 
Fuel, freight 
Gove:rnment 
Local Bodies 
Sub-total 
Capital Expenditure 
TOTAL 
Table 5 
DESCRIPTION OF HARBOUR BOARD EXPENDITL'RE, 1969/70 
Dollars 
HARBOUR BOARD 
MarlOOrough Nelson Lyttelton Timaru Oamaru 
99,378 300,475 1,070,706 309,962 33,392 
9,001 5,041 19,956 6,454 1,811 
78,892 36,113 153,565 46,659 1,926 
4,899 7,630 10,787 13,535 485 
30,975 110,673 290,454 102,521 2,627 
14,394 31,268 83,034 18,130 1,676 
40,113 59,058 244,972 64,475 664 
9,599 15,764 51,656 35,647 2,666 
287,251 566,022 1,925,130 597,383 45,247 
244,716 150,545 301,442 380,254 
531,967 716.567 2,226,572 977,637 45,247 
Otago Southland 
484,179 346,096 
14,082 33,833 
54,237 19,065 
85,431 
112 ,620 151,921 
59,718 28,482 
116,840 93,888 
53,188 .27,285 
894,864 786,001 
63,634 1,103,488 
958,498 1,889,489 
SOURCE: Derived from Harbour Board IYbnthly Surrma:ry of Payments and Ledger Accounts. 
TOTAL 
2,644,lB8 
90,178 
390,457 
122,767 
U1 
801,791 1.0 
236,702 
620,010 
195,805 
5,101,898 
2,244,079 
7,345,977 
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passes to other regions. By tracing the location of all 
firms receiving payments from the harbour boards, it was 
possible to estimate the amount of a harbour board's revenue 
which was initially directed into its local economy (see 
Table 6). By comparing Table 6 with Table 5 an indication 
of the revenue passing directly out of the various local 
economies can be obtained. Several immediate leakages were 
obvious. For example a proportion of the Nelson Harbour 
Board's expenditure passes directly to Wellington-based 
insurance and advertising firms; Southland pays engineering 
firms in Auckland; Timaru pays firms in Lyttelton for dredge 
(5 ) 
repairs. 
Direct Employment Generated - During the year ended 30 
September 1970, 2,667 people were employed at these seven 
ports as waterside workers or harbour board employees 
(see Table 7). When the employment opportunities provided 
by stevedoring firms, shipping companies, custo~s and 
forwarding agents, marine engineers, storage contractors 
and other port-dependent activities are considered, the role of 
ports in providing employment is seen as being quite 
significant. 
4.2 Generated Port Impact 
Sectors of the business community which received direct 
benefits as a result of harbour board activities were 
identified in Table 6. But the total impact on the various 
regional economies is much greater than this direct. impact. 
When money is injected into an economic system the income 
of that system increases not just by the yalue of that injection 
EXPENDITURE 
Table 6 
HA.RBOUR BOARD EXPENDITURE REMAINING 
WITHIN LOCAL ECONOMIES, 1969/70 
Dollars 
HARBOUR BOARD 
ITEMS Marlborough Nelson Lytte1ton -rrImaru Oamaru 
Wages, Salaries 99,378 300,475 1,070,706 3Q9,962 33,392 
Travel 8,127 4,809 19,128 4,918 1,729 
Administration 23,935 31,282 152,932 44,976 1,746 
Equipment Hire 4,899 7,630 10,787 12,760 485 
Repairs, Maintenance 20,066 100,642 289,678 63,036 2,627 
Fuel, Freight 14,394 30,635 83,034 18,110 1~_676 . 
Government 
Local Bodies 9,599 15,764 51,656 30,376 2,666 
Sub-total 180,398 491,237 1,677,921 484,138 44,321 
Capital· Expenditure 164,035 31,605 301,442 210,300 
TOTAL 344,433 522,842 1,979,363 694,438 44,321 
Otago Southland 
484,179 346,096 
13,070 33,562 
53,472 18,212 
85,431 
111,142 148,829 
59,718 28,482 
53,188 25,487 
774,769 686,099 
63,634 1,103,488 
838,403 1,789,587 
SOURCE: Derived from Harbour Board Monthly Summary of Payments and Ledger Accounts. 
TOTAL 
2,644,188 
85,343 
326,555 
1,992 
736,020 I 
C'I 
236,049 I-' 
188,736 
4,338,883 
1,874,504 
6,213,387 
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Table 7 
EMPLOYMENT AT SOUTH ISLAND PORTS 
1969/70 
PORT WATERSIDE WORKERS 
Picton (1) 30 
Nelson 101 
Lytte1ton 625 
Timaru 231 
Oamaru 44 
Otago 383 
Bluff 377 
TOTAL 1,791 
HARBOUR BOARD 
EMPLOYEES 
38 
123 
324 
75 
16 
178 
122 
876 
(1) Railway workers employed at the Cook Strait 
rail ferry terminal are not included. 
SOURCE: WaterfrbntIndustry Commission, }\nnual 
Report and Statement of Accounts, For the 
Nine Months Ended 30 September 1970; Local 
Authority Statistics, 1969/70. Department-
of Statistics, Wellinqton. 
TOTAL 
68 
224 
949 
306 
60 
561 
499 
2,667 
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but by some multiple of it. (6) The economic concept of the 
"multiplier" can be used to estimate the amount of secondary 
income and employment generated by the injection of this 
initial (or direct) income. The concept is extremely 
valuable in that it enables government to predict the effects 
on regional economies of measures involving the injection 
or removal of money into or out of a region. Here it provides 
a means of quantitatively assessing the total income and 
employment generated by some aspects of port activities. In 
turn the concept enables the repercussions of a decline in 
port activities to be predicted. , 
Application of the multiplier technique is only valid 
when the injected income may be treated as exogeneous. 
Income from port activities can be so treated. Shippers 
living outside the port area clearly bring income into the 
area when they use the port facilities. Shippers located 
within the port region also bring money into the area in 
using the port. As Schenker(1967,136) has demonstrated, 
" •.• if the other party to the transaction pays the shipping 
costs through the port, the shipper will include them in 
the price he quotes to the other party. In either case the 
port revenues are primary income.". 
Estimation of Iro.pact - Al though many impact models and 
techniques have been developed, the three most common 
approaches are: 
(i) Economic base-type analyses; 
(ii) Simple multiplier models; and 
(iii) . Regional input/output techniques. 
Collecting the original data required to produce a 
detailed regional input/output study is an extremely expe~sive 
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operation, and for this reason this approach could not be 
used. (7) 
Isard and Czamanski(l965) have shown that the aggregate 
multipliersderived from economic base models and input/output 
models are of the same order of magnitude for each of a 
number of regions. Their finding was supported by Billings 
(1969) who, although not suggesting that the economic base 
model could replace the input/output model, considered that 
they were capable of producing indentical aggregate results. (8) 
Impact studies involving the calculation of income and 
employment multipliers are very common - Garnick(1970) notes 
that virtually hundreds of regional impact studies have been 
produced during the present decade - but the author was unable 
to find any studies made of New Zealand situations. A 
variation of the economic base model. is used to derive 
employment multipliers for a number of South Island regions. 
Base Models - The economic base approach postulates 
that all economic activity in a region may be divided into 
two types: basic and non-basic. Basic activities produce 
goods and services for export to buyers located outside the 
region, whilst non-basic activities. provide goods and services 
used in the region. As basic activities are considered 
"city building" activities, the inference that an increase 
in basic activities will result in a growth of total economic 
activity and population. (9) 
An extensive literature has grown around the economic 
base model and its many variants. Tiebout(l962) reviewed 
much of the relevant literature, and Isard and Czamanski(l965) , 
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discussed some difficulties inherent in the approach and 
compared ratios derived in economic base studies. 
In many applications the diversion into basic and non-
basic categories is in terms of employment, the regional 
employment multiplier being given as the ratio between total 
and basic regional employment. Separating basic and non-
basic employment is very difficult, and an approach suggested 
by Thompson(1959) to help overcome this problem is adopted 
here. 
In order to estimate the percentage of employment in 
every industry classification which was sustained by receipts from 
a source external to the subject economy, Thompson (1969) 
devised a~pecialisation ratio wh~reby total employment in an 
industy could be divided into two components: (i) employment 
sustained by external receipts, and (ii) employment expected 
in that industry if it were self-suffi~ient relative to the 
benchmark economy. The specialisation ratio stated 
mathematically is: 
Specialisation ratio = ns - ~: : ~:(NS) 
ns 
where Ns and NB refer to total employment in the subject and 
benchmark economies respectively, and ns and nB refer to industy 
employment in the subject and benchmark economies. Thompson 
then used the ratios to separate employment by industry into 
basic and non-basic categories. 
This approach is used to calculate employment multipliers 
for a group of South Island regions, and is demonstrated 
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by reference to the Nelson region. From the employment 
figures given in Table 8 a set of specialisation ratios 
were calculated (see Table 9). A specialisation ratio of 
0.46 (calculated for Forestry . and Mining in 1962), indicates 
that 46 percent of this industry's total employment was 
sustained by external receipts, i.e. 155 people. The 
specialisation ratios, computed for each region's industrial 
groups (see Appendix I - XIII), were used to separate total 
employment into basic and non-basic employment. These 
estimate~ were then used to analyse changes in basic and non-
basic employment for a nine-year period, 1962 - 1970. 
The estimates of basic and non-basic employment over the 
period 1962-1970 are shown for the Nelson region in Table 10. 
YEAR 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Table 10 
ESTIMATED BASIC AND NON-BASIC 
EMPLOYMENT IN NELSON, .1962-70 
Basic 
1,307 
1,384 
1,397 
1,457 
1,444 
1,347 
1,477 
1,518 
1,672 
EMPLOYMENT 
Non-Basic 
8,829 
9,061 
9,303 
9,709 
10,281 
10,457 
10,307 
10,465 
10,753 
Relating Nelson's non-basic employment to its basic 
employment by simple linear regression produces a regr~ssion 
coefficient of 1.017. This means that for a given change 
in basic employment, non-basic employment changed by 1.017 
times that RIDount ~- a mUltiplier coefficient of approximately 
2.02. r, ~a8 equal to 0.69, but the 
Table 8 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS: NELSON 
1962/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
-_. 
Forestry, Mining 339 384 363 361 388 424 536 534 565 
Seasonal Manufacturing 447 474 514 483 525 642 582 606 587 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 361 391 375 408 432 415 400 391 428 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 59 70 77 81 76 69 53 63 87 
Building Materials 872 878 921 940 969 930 934 982 928 
Engineering, Metal 860 894 911 1,026 1,265 1,241 1,181 1,202 1,359 
Hiscellaneous 
Manufacturing 251 242 256 287 309 334 325 320 336 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 384 383 388 351 386 408 437 445 447 
Building, Construction 1,116 1,164 1,162 1,288 1,295 1,195 1,190 1,132 1,177 
Transport, m 
-....J 
Communication 1,003 1,014 1,042 1,069 1,102 1,103 1,102 1,124 1,197 
Commerce, Wool and 
Grain Stores 1,903 1,949 1,977 2,035 2,032 2,042 2,017 2,068 2,056 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 421 437 456 462 479 473 486 476 502 
Administration, 
Professional 2,120 2,165 2,258 2,375 2,467 2,528 2,541 2,640 2,756 
TOTAL 10,136 10,445 10,700 11,166 11,725 11,804 11,784 11,983 12,425 
Table 9 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS: NELSON 
1962/1970 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Forestry, Mining 0.4602 0.5070 0.5152 0.4765 0.5052 0.5047 0.5877 0.6067 0.6513 
Seasonal Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 0.2610 0.3350 0.3253 0.3554 0.3634 0.3349 0.3125 0.3274 0.3364 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Building Materials 0.4564 0.4476 0.4484 0.4394 0.4355 0.4441 0.4336 0.4389 0.3890 
Engineering, Meta1q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
sce11aneous 
Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 0.4167 0.4099 0.4124 0.3533 0.3808 0.3824 0.4165 0.4337 0.4139 0'1 Building Construction 0.1792 0.1967 ,0.1695 0.2019 o. 99 0.1381 0.1765 0.1458 0.2106 00 
Transport, 
Communication 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0386 
Commerce, Wool and 
Grain Stores 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0:0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Administration, 
Professional 0.1420 0.1316 0.1426 0.1448 0.1188 0.1040 0.0952 0.1064 0.1179 
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relative amount of variation in the dependent variable 
which was explained by the estimating equation was less than 
2 
50 percent (r = 0.48). The employment multipliers 
calculated for all regions are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 
SUMMARY OF REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT MULTIPLIERS 
REGION (I) 
EMPLOYMENT CORRELATION 
MULTIPLIER COEFFICIENT r2 
Blenheim 2.01 0.738 0.551 
Nelson 2.02 0.691 0.480 
Christchurch 2.00 0.010 0.000 
Timaru 2.00 0.856 0.733 
Oamaru 2.02 0.460 0.212 
Dunedin 2.02 0.062 0.003 
Invercargill 2.00 0.876 0.767 
(1) Regions correspond to employment districts. 
As is evident by the very low r2 values in Table 11, 
with only Invercargill having a value greater than 0.75, the 
regression equations derived do not significantly explain the 
variation in the dependent variaple (non-basic employment). 
Hence regional multipliers based on the economic base model 
can not be viewed with any degree of certainty and an 
alternative method is examined. 
Simple Econometric ~1ultiplier Models - These models 
permit certain variables to be made endogeneous and other 
items of importance, such as imports and taxes may be 
introduced. A comprehensive analysis of the methodological 
problems involved in the multiplier theory and in its application 
to actual processes of income development was undertaken by 
Hegeland(1966), and other main contributions on the regional 
income multiplier have come from Archibald(1967), Steele(1969) 
and (1971) • A brief summary of the model's principles 
is given in 
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the revenue received by ports was passed on 
completely to other groups the multipl would be infinite. 
But in reality the effect of an initial expenditure becomes 
progressively weakened because of leakages. This is because 
at each stage of spending a portion of the income is 
withdrawn from the regional spending stream. It is not 
automatically respent on goods and services within the 
economy under discussion. 
These leakages result from money being saved, being spent 
on the purchase of goods and services from other areas, and 
being removed through taxation; Therefore the amount of 
money passed on from group to group will become progressively 
smaller. The mul ier describes the relationship between 
the initial injection and the total economic impact generated. 
In an "open" economy, in which a portion of domestic 
demand is supplied from imports, and where neither labour, 
land nor plant are fully utilised, the income multiplier 
will be inversely related to the leakages out of the system. 
That is, 
K = 
where K is the income multiplier, c the marginal propensity 
to consume, and m the proportion of total demand which is 
met by imports. This formula is used to derive the income 
and employment generated through the activities of South 
Island harbour boards and waterside workers. 
Multiplier Calculation - Values representing the average 
propensity to consume are derived from the following national 
income outlay figures: private income $4,276 
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million, personal expenditure $2,829 million, net transfers 
$10 million, direct taxation $887 million, private savings 
$550 million (Monthly Abstract of Statistics, December 1971). 
From this an average propensity to consume of 66 percent 
ob tained. (10) 
There are no statistics available in New Zealand to 
indicate the level of inter-regional monetary flows. Such 
data is necessary to estimate the amount of an area's income 
which is spent on the purchase of goods and services from 
outside that region. In lieu of this data an approach 
suggested by Archibald(1967) is used to calculate regional 
import coefficients. 
In discussing the magnitUde of the United Kingdom's 
regional level of imports, Archibald(1967,27) considered that 
given the marginal propensity to import for the country as a 
whole, each region's import coefficient was unlikely to be 
less than 0.4. Given that regions were quite large, he felt it 
implausible that they should import more than three-quarters 
of their consumer goods. This then set the range of import 
coefficents. Assuming that regional "home produced ll output 
consumed in any region is proportion to the population 
of the region relative to the whole country, regional import 
coefficients may be derived. (II) 
In calculating import coefficients for the regions 
surrounding the South Island ports, the lower limit of the 
coefficient is set as 0.26 - the proportion of New Zealand's 
income which is spent on the import of goods and services. 
- 72 -
An upper limit of 0.70 is arbitrarily chosen. The possible 
range of import coefficients is therefore between 0.26 and 
0.70, and coefficients are calculated on the basis of two 
II benchmark II economies - the South Island and New Zealand 
as a whole. (12) In addition multipliers are derived for two 
values of c , the average propensity to consume - 0.66 and 
0.87. (13) 
These regional multipliers are shown Table 12 and 
illustrate the probable limits within which the actual 
multipliers lie. For example Nelson's multiplier is 
estimated to be between 1.27 and 1.43 and Southland's between 
1.29 and 1. 50. The Canterbury region seen as having the 
largest regional multiplier (1.73), while the smallest 
multiplier (1.27) , exists within the Marlborough, Nelson and 
Oamaru regions. This is to be expected as the degree to which 
income circulates ~ithin a region depends primarily upon the 
size of the region's economic base. The more goods and 
services that have to be imported, the more will be the 
,. 
leakages of money out of the region and the lower will be the 
multiplier's value. 
These multipliers enable estimates to be made of the 
maximum and minimum regional economic implications of any 
shipping proposal which may result in the revenue of some 
ports increasing at the expense of others. 
Generated Income - Applying the relevant regional 
multipliers to the initial expenditure injected by South 
Island waterside workers and harbour boards during 1969/70, 
it is seen 13 that ac s generate between 
Table 12 
REGIONAL INCOME MULTIPLIERS 
MINIMUM IMPORT LEAKAGE(I) MAXIMUM I~~ORT LEAKAGE 
REGION c = .66 c = .87 c - .66 c = .87 
Marlborough 1.29 1.39 1.27 1.37 ..... 
w 
Nelson 1.30 1.43 1.27 1.37 
Canterbury 1.47 1.73 1.32 1.45 
Timaru 1.30 1.43 1.29 1. 39 
Oamaru 1.29 1.39 1.27 1.37 
Otago 1. 36 1. 1.29 1.41 
Southland 1. 34 1. 1.29 1.39 
(1) Average propensity to consume. 
REGION 
Marlborough 
Nelson 
Canterbury 
Timaru 
Oarnaru 
Otago 
Southland 
Table 13 
INCOME GENERATED BY HARBOUR BOARD AND WATERSIDE 
WORKERS' EXPENDITURE, 1969/70 
INITIAL EXPENDITURE 
Excluding Including(l) 
Capital Capital 
425,452 670,168 
1,135,367 1,285,912 
4,502,197 4,803,639 
1,616,251 1,996,505 
5,320 145,320 
2,220,296 2,283,930 
2,363,248 3,466,736 
Dollars 
GENERATED INCOME 
Excluding Capital Includingcagital 
Maximum Minimum Maximum M1nimum 
591,378 540,324 
1,623,575 1,441,916 
7,788,801 5,942,900 
2,3 ,239 2,084,964 
201,995 184,556 
3,3. ,850 2,864,182 
3,544,872 3,048,590 
931,533 851,113 
1,838,854 1,633,108 
8,310,295 6,340,803 
2,855,002 2,575,491 
201,995 184,556 
3,471,574 2,946,270 
5,200, 4,472,089 
TOTAL 12,408,131 14,652,210 ,436,710 16,107,432 22,809,357 19,003,430 
(1) This represents waterside workers B total income and harbour 
board expenditure on the provision of works and services plus 
capital expenditure on harbour improvements, etc. 
-l 
,~ 
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$16 million and $19.5 million in revenue. The port of 
Lyttelton has the greatest absolute impact, generating 
at least $5,942,900 in revenue, and there is seen to be 
a substantial range in the amount of regional income 
generated by the respective ports. 
When capital expenditure injected in the process 
of port expansion and development schemes is taken into 
account, total generated revenue rises to between $19 
million and $22.8 million. Generated revenue within the 
Southland region increases from at least $3,048,590 to 
$4,472,089 - a 46 percent increase •. Similar large relative 
increases occur within the Marlborough and Timaru regions, 
reflecting the capital development projects underway at 
the ports of Picton and Timaru. 
Generated Employment - The impact of port activities 
is forcefully demonstrated when the employment implications 
of this generated revenue are considered. By dividing this 
generated revenue by the relevant average regional income, 
an estimate of the indirect employment generated by the 
port activities is obtained (see Table 14). 
Direct employment at these ports was earlier shown as 
being 2,667 during 1969/70 (made up of waterside workers and 
harbour board employees). This generated revenue is now 
seen as providing employment opportunities for at least 
7,786 people. Indirect employment varies from between 89 
and 97 within Oamaru, to between 2,872 and 3,765 within the 
Canterbury region. The inclusion of port capital 
expenditure sees i.l'1oirect employment increasing to at least 
Table 14 
EMPLOYMENT GENERATED BY HARBOUR BOARD AND WATERSIDE 
WORKERS I EXPENDITURE, 1969/70 
GENERATED EMPLOYMENT 
AVERAGE (1) 
INCOME 
ExcluaIrig Capital Including Ca~ital 
Maximum Minimum Maximum Mlnimurn REGION 
Marlborough 
Nelson 
Canterbury 
Timaru 
Oamaru 
Otago 
Southland 
TOTAL 
(Dollars) 
1,904 
2,069 
2,069 
1,992 
2,075 
2,005 
2,229 
311 
785 
3,765 
1,160 
97 
1,683 
1,590 
9,391 
(1) Average regional income during 1966/67 - the most 
recent year for which data was available. 
SOURCE: Incomes and Income Tax in 1966/67. Department 
of Statistics, Wellington. Generated employment 
calculated from generat income totals shown 
Table 13. 
284 489 447 
697 889 789 
2,872 4,017 3,065 
1,047 1,433 1,293 
89 97 89 
1,429 1,731 1,469 
1,368 2,333 2,006 
7,786 10,989 9,158 
~ 
0"1 
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9,158, and when the families supported by these employees 
are taken into account, an indication of the magnitude of 
the role these ports play in generating employment 
opportunities is obtained. 
Discussion - Although these mUltipliers were used 
specifically to calculate the regional economic implications 
of shipping policies, they are also relevant when considering 
the broader topic of regional development. 
A cornmon feature of depressed regions is the general 
weakness of the multiplier effect generated in their 
economies. The presence of a low multiplier means that 
attempts to boost industry or employment will be a tedious 
process, as any injection of capital into the region will 
result in a large proportion of it immediately leaking out -
often this purchasing power will be transferred to regions 
. . . .. . (14) 
experl.encl.ng hl.gh levels of demand and tl.ght labour markets. -
While the absence of substantial indirect effects is an 
obstacle to efforts aimed at invigorating depressed regions, 
the multiplier will only be strengthened by the progressive 
introduction of industries which are linked by flows of goods 
and services. 
The regional multipliers shown in Table l~ do indicate 
that the absolute impact of a particular investment proposal 
would vary markedly between the regions. HOvlever without 
a more detailed inter-industry study, conclusions cannot be 
made regarding the relative regional fects of such proposals. 
Similarly, to predict the relative importance of the 
individual role by South Island port in the 
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functioning of its local economy, an input/output study is 
required. 
4.3 Harbour Board Revenue by Cargo Form 
Chapter III demonstrated that many harbour boards fear 
that a decline in their level of trade may jeopardise their 
economic viability, as well as having serious repercussions 
on adjacent communities. The regional income multipliers 
previously derived enable the total economic impact of 
fluctuations in port expenditure to be estimated, but it is 
first necessary to understand how individual ports will be 
affected by trade aggregation or diversion proposals. The 
Transport Commission (1968a, 1968b) and numerous harbour 
boards have attempted to predict the ramifications of 
particular shipping systems on harbour board finances. 
Generally these exercises have only calculated the extent to 
which revenue obtained from wharfage may decline, and have 
not differentiated between different types of cargo. 
Method - To determine the amount of revenue accruing to 
harbour boards from handling particular types of cargo, within 
various trades, a systematic stratified sample was taken from 
harbour board Shipping Registers of all shipping which arrived 
at South Island ports during the 1970 financial year. For 
each ship selected, a record was made of payments 
received by the harbour board while that ship was in port -
not only for items paid for by the ship, but also those 
payments met by the shipper or consignee. As a large range 
of goods and services are provided by a port, revenue is received 
from a large number of sources (see Table l5). Numerous 
accounts had to searched to locate 1 payments made by 
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the selected ships to the harbour boards. (15) 
Table 15 
HARBOUR BOARD REVENUE SOURCES 
RELATED TO PROVISION OF WORKS AND SERVICES 
Berthage 
Pilotage 
Port Charges 
Launch Hire 
Fenders 
Moorings 
Wharfage 
Harbour Improve-
ment Rate 
Equipment Hire: 
Cranes, Tractors, 
Forklifts, Weigh-
br idge, Tallow Pump 
Wheat Augers, 
Meat Loaders 
Storage 
Water 
Electricity 
Ship's Telephone 
Garbage Collection 
Cleaning Berth 
Bonus Payments 
Overtime Payments 
Total cargo loaded or discharges by each ship was 
recorded and, by dividing total revenue received by this 
tonnage, the direct revenue accruing to each harbour board 
from particular trades and commodities was determined. Each 
harbour board I s revenue receipi:s by trade and cargo form, 
are listed in Appendix XIV to Appendix XX. The average 
revenue generated by the visit of various types of ships is 
also shown. A summary of the revenue received by the seven 
South Island harbour boards from each ton of cargo passing 
through their ports is given in Table 16. Receipts from each 
of the major types of cargo handled are shown. 
Riscussion - as might be anticipated, the revenue 
harbour boards receive from handling one ton of general cargo 
is much greater than that from liquid or dry bulk cargoes. 
This is because bulk commodities are loaded and unloaded by 
mechanical or automated methods, whereas the manual handling 
of (breakbulk) cargo incurs much higher stevedoring 
Table 16 
HARBOUR BOARD REVENUE DERIVED FROM HANDLING DIFFERENT CARGO FORMS 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
COASTAL TRADE OVERSEAS TRADE 
Dry Liquid Dry 
HARBOUR BOARD General Bulk Bulk General Bulk 
(dollars per ton) 
Marlborough 0.645 1.445 
Nelson 1.446 0.994 1. 1 0.608 
Lyttelton 1. 591 0.685 1.102 2.493 1.362 
Tirnaru 2.070 0.751 0.975 4.424 0.760 
Oarnaru 1.102 0.606 
Otago 2.030 1.669 1.468 2.704 1. 320 
Southland 1. 595 1.479 0.947 4.042 0.887 
(1) Cook Strait Ferries. 
n.o. - not obtainable. 
SOURCE: Harbour Bc_rd records: Shipping Manifests; Shipping Registers; 
Equipment Hire Receipts. 
Logs 
0.952 
1.078 
1.105 
ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF 
0.374(1) 
n.O. 
co 
0 
1.112 
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costs. Moreover cargo movement rates and ship turnround 
times are slow in comparison with those achieved by bulk 
commodities, and port charges are therefore correspondingly 
higher. (Berthage payments are assessed according to the 
length of time a ship spends in port). For example each ton 
of overseas general cargo moving through the port of Timaru 
generates $4.24 in harbour board revenue, whereas the 
corresponding revenue from dry and liquid bulk cargoes 
$0.76 and $0.96 respectively. 
at the other ports. 
Similar patterns are evident 
It is apparent that a decline in general cargo movements 
through a port will produce a much greater revenue loss than 
a similar decline in dry or liquid bulk movements. 
this general cargo trade which is increasingly being 
concentrated through a reduced number of ports. 
It is 
variations in the revenue'received from certain types of 
cargo between the harbour boards is mainly due to the 
different level of charges applying at each port. While 
charges levied on the ship are quite uniform, the scale of 
cargo charges - for wharfage in particular - does vary 
between boards. The higher revenue receipts from overseas 
general cargo at Timaru and Bluff are due to the all-weather 
mechanical loader hire charges. 
As most general cargo ships carried a variety of cargoes, 
it was difficult to isolate the revenue obtained from a 
particular commodity. (16) However revenue received by the 
Nelson Harbour Board from fruit exports could be isolated. 
In 1969/70 the revenue obtained trade was $1,745 
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per ton. These figures are significant in that they 
demonstrate the impact shipping improvements may have on 
total harbour board income. A new fruit shipping service 
from Nelson, provided by J. Lauritzen Lines, commenced in 
January 1971. This improved service enabled fruit loading 
rates, and hence ship turnround times, to be increased, but 
as port and cargo charges remained constant the revenue 
received per ton, and hence total harbour board income, 
decreased. Although in this case the reduction income 
was matched by a similar reduction in costs, Devos (1971) 
has shown that the introduction of some new shipping tech-
niques may cause a decline in a harbour board's net income. 
As harbour board charges often bear no relationship to their 
long or short run average or marginal costs, the economic 
viability of some projects, such as dredging to obtain deeper 
water, may be dependent upon substantial tonnages of cargo being 
diverted from other ports. 
These revenue per ton coefficients provide an accurate 
means of assessing the impact on harbour board finances 
produced by trade fluctuations. In turn the broader regional 
implications of these fluctuations may be determined. The 
coefficients permit quantitative comparisons in an area dominated 
by qualitative statements. 
Workers Income - Trade aggregation or diversion 
will also produce changes in the income received by waterside 
workers. Here again these changes will have ramifications 
on the local economy_ 
To deter'mine income waterside workers received from 
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handling different types of cargo, a study was made of the 
actual stevedoring costs incurred at the various ports. The 
Waterfront Industry Commission is responsible for the fixing 
of wharf handling charges at most South Island ports. (17) 
These charges are based on the actual costs incurred during 
preceeding periods, and the waterside labour costs incurred 
in handling certain cargoes were derived from working sheets 
containing these actual costs. By averaging the payments 
made to watersiders for unloading general import cargo, and 
loading meat and wool exports, an estimation of the income 
watersiders receive for handling one ton of overseas general 
cargo was obtained. (18) 
4.4 Containerisation of East Coast North America Trade 
The New Zealand Ports Authority concluded that the 
containerisation of New Zealand's East Coast North American 
trade would not "detrimentally affect" non-container ports 
to any major extent. They did not indicate the financial 
loss likely to be experienced by particular hctrbour boards. 
The derivation of the harbour board revenue coefficients 
enables this loss to be calculated. By multiplying the trade 
which would have been handled through each port, (had the 
container service not been introduced), by the relevant 
revenue coefficients, each port's total revenue loss is 
calculated. Table 17 indicates that while most trade is 
expected to be diverted from Lyttelton, Bluff may suffer the 
greatest financial loss, since it receives more revenue from 
each ton of cargo. Should South Island cargo be shipped 
through Wellington, Marlborough would receive a substantial 
Table 17 
CONTAINERISATION OF EAST COAST NORTH AMERICA TRADE: IMPACT 
ON SOUTH ISLAND HARBOUR BOARDS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIES 
1972/73 TRADE(l) 
ESTIMATES 
HARBOUR BOARD REGIONAL IJYI..PACT (2) 
HARBOUR BOARD 
Marlborough 
Marlborough (3) 
Nelson 
Lyttelton 
Timaru 
Otago 
Southland 
(Tons) 
520 
1,977 
28,065 
7,270 
17,755 
22,811 
REVENUE IMPACT 
(Dollars) 
752 
+ 29,320 
3,442 
- 69,966 
- 32,162 
- 48,010 
- 92,202 
" 
(1) Supplied by the New Zealand Ports Authority. 
(2) This takes into account the income lost by waterside 
workers, as well as the revenue lost by harbour boards. 
(3) Assuming that all South Island cargo was railed to the 
container terminal at Port Wellington, the Marlborough 
Harbour Board would receive "additional II trade, and 
hence revenue, as would the surrounding district. 
Maximum Minimum 
(Dollars) (Dollars) 
1,801 1,646 
+ 154,740 + 141,381 
7,947 7,057 
- 201,152 - 153,480 
56,595 50,054 
- 124,792 - 105,909 
- 173,546 - 149,249 
co 
.&::> 
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increase in both trade and revenue • 
.I 
Combining the revenue coefficients with the payments 
received by watersiders, the regional economic implications 
of this shipping service can be predicted. The handling of 
this cargo at Bluff normally generated between $150,000 and 
$170,000 into Southland's economy. (19) This revenue would 
be lost with the containerisation of this trade. Similarly 
between $150,000 and $200,000 would be removed from 
Lyttelton's surrounding community, although Marlborough's 
local payrolls would be increased by approximately $150,000. 
Actual Impact - The commencement of the ECNA container 
service towards the end of the study period afforded an 
opportunity to calculate the actual changes in both 
internal movement patterns and levels of harbour board 
revenue which resulted. Data vV'as obtained on the first 
four container shipments through Port Chalmers. The 
internal origin of the exports and the destination of the 
imports were obtained from manifests held by the Ota.go 
Harbour Board, and an account was made of all payments 
received by this Board as a result of this service. Eevenue 
received from port charges, cargo dues, hire of container 
handling equipment and plant maintenance was collected. 
Dividing total container cargo handled by total revenue 
received, a value of $3.828 - representing the revenue 
accruing to the Otago Harbour Board in handling one ton of 
container cargo - was derived. The effective gain to the 
otago Harbour Board is shown in Table 18, along with the 
revenue loss experienced by other ports. 
Table 18 
CCNTAINER MJVEMENTS 'IHRJUGH THE PORI' OF OTAOO 
Year Ended 31 December 1971 
TRADE DIVERI'ED 
THroUGH OTJl.ID (1) HARBOUR BOARD REGIONAL IMPACI' 'HARBOUR BOARD REVENUE D1PACT 'MaXlIltUm 
(tons) (dollars) (dOllars) 
Lyttelton 3,903 - 9,730 -16,832 
Tima.ru 1,157 - 5,118 - 7,318 
otago (2) 2, + 8,991 +13,666 
otago (3) 9,433 +36,111 +54,888 
Southland 2,024 - 8,181 -12 
(1) cargo carried on the first four container vessels called at Port Chalmers: 
Columbus New Zealand (26/6/71), Columbus Australia (19/9/71), Columbus New Zealand 
(9/11/71) and Columbus Australia (28/11/71). 
(2) Cargo Which might have been expected to move through otago. 
(3) 'lbtal container cargo. 
SOURCE: Container movement data collected from otago Harbour Board. 
Calculations based on previous Tables. 
r.'flnimum 
(dOllars) 
-12,843 
- 6,602 
+11,598 
+46,583 
-10,553 
co 
0'\ 
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The voyages of the first four container vessels 
attracted over 7,000 tons of cargo away from the ports of 
Lyttelton, Timaru and Bluff. Harbour board revenue lost 
at these ports ranged from $5,118 at Timaru to $9,730 
at Lyttelton. The removal of this money from their local 
economies is estimated to have effectively reduced income 
generated by up to $7,000 and $16,000 respectively. 
Conversely the Otago Harbour Board increased its revenue 
by approximately $25,000, with subsequent advantages to 
its local economy. 
Figure 4 illustrates the cargo diversion pattern which 
accompanied the introduction of this container service. (20) 
While similar volumes of export cargoes have been diverted 
from Lyttelton, Timaru and Bluff, the majority of container 
imports handled at Otago were destined for the Christchurch 
area. 
4.5 Comparative Port Impact 
Until specific proposals emerge for consideration, only 
general comments can be made concerning the degree to which 
the various ports may be affected by shipping trends. 
In predicting the impact the introduction of 
containerisation may have on South Island por's, the cargo 
aggregation pattern and transport mode used in this 
aggregation, will be extremely important. Another important 
factor will be the degree to which a port's cargo is suitable 
for shipment in containers. 
TONS 
3,000 
112 '000 ',000 
INWARDS 
2,100 tons of 
Empty Contoiners to 
Dunedin) 
OUTWARDS 
Figure 4 Container Shipments Through the Port of Otago: Origin 
f Exports and Dt'ltltination of Imports,· 1971 
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The proportion of the. South land's overseas 
trade which may containerised shown in Figure 5. 
It can be seen that at all ports except Lyttelton greater 
tonnages of exports than imports are suitable for 
movement in containers. Hence it would appear that even 
with the widespread introduction of containerisation many 
of these ports would continue to handle general cargo 
exports. Most of the exports shipped through Lyttelton, 
Timaru and Bluff during 1969/70 are suitable for container 
stowage, but the important log and timber trades through 
Nelson, Picton and Otago means that these ports do not 
stand to lose as great a proportion of their exports to 
container ports. 
Imports will be less affected by the advent of 
containerisation, or other unitised cargo handling systems, 
as the majority of imports are bulk products such as 
manures and fertilisers. Many of these South Island 
ports are now handling rapidly developing bulk trades which, 
it has been argued, will effectively counter-balance any 
adverse effects resulting from containerisation. Trade 
generated by the new aluminium smelter at Tiwai Point may 
exceed 300,000 tons annum, and Bluff may also be called 
upon to handle substantial forestry exports. The expansion 
of bulk grain shipments through Timaru will safeguard the 
future of this port, and timber and wood chip exports 
continue to increase through Nelson~· Lyttelton is 
preparing to commence a new trade in wood chipse 
Nonetheless all these non-container ports must stand to 
suf an absolute in revenue advent of 
550 -
500 -
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400 -
350 -
~ 
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containerisation. 
The impact of this loss on each port will be 
influenced by the proportion of total revenue each port 
derives from its various activities. As some ports 
receive large sums of revenue from endowments, in the form 
of interest or rent, the relative impact may vary. Table 
19 shows the various sources of harbour board receipts 
during 1969 and allows the relative importance of 
particular activities to be compared. Of the major 
export ports, Timaru and Bluff derive the greatest 
proportion of their total receipts from cargo handling 
activities, and may therefore stand to experience the 
greatest relative loss should trade decline. 
However it can be seen that whereas Timaru and Bluff 
levy a land-based harbour improvement rate, unrelated to 
their trade levels, Lyttelton and Otago 03tain their rates 
from a levy on cargo. Therefore a reduction in cargo 
levels at the latter two ports would produce not only a 
decline in their income from the provision of works and 
services, but also a decline in ~heir total harbour 
improvements rates. However it is obvious that income 
from works and services provides most of the working 
capital of all the ports, varying from 43 percent of total 
receipts at Oamaru to 96 percent at Picton. 
Even if general cargo is diverted away from certain ports, 
these ports must, at least in the short-run, continue to 
maintain and service the existing ities. Thus in 
Table 19 
SOURCE OF HARBOUR BOARD RECEIPTS, 1969 
Dollars ( 
RATES 
Harbour Levied PROVISION OF WORKS 
HARBOUR BOARD Improvement on Land AND SERVICES RENT INTEREST TOTAL 
Marlborough 534,639 14, 2 4,330 553,271 
(-) (-) (96) (3) ( \0 
a 
Nelson 52,754 120, 8 580, 5 73,340 27,760 8 ,167 
(-) ( ) (68) (9) (3) 
Lytte1ton 343,891 1,876,926 131,664 254,225 2,606,706 
(l3) (-) (72) (5) (10) 
Timaru 100,000 797,360 37,371 29,343 9 .074 
(-) (10) (83 ) (4) (3) 
Oamaru 6,900 12,773 32, 9,790 ,394 74,9 
(9) ( ) (43) (l3) (18) 
Otago 6,240 1,007,055 225,230 137,626 1,516,151 
(10) (-) (.66 ) ( ) (9) 
Southland 233,647 1,268,300 69,187 18,840 1,589,9 
(-) (10) (83) (4 ) (3 ) 
(1) Individual Items are expressed as percentages of the 
total. Thes e percentages .are shown brackets. 
SOURCE: Local Authority Statistics, 1969/70. Department of Statistics, Wellington. 
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the short-run it is realistic to consider most port costs 
as fixed, as these costs do not decrease with decreasing 
tonnage. Maintenance dredging, servicing of 
navigation aids and floating plant and maintenance of 
fixed structues must all continue if a port is to stay in 
operation. Hence in the short-run seems inevitable 
that a decline in tonnage following the introduction of 
. containerisation would necessitate port charges being 
increased. 
In addition to these fixed (short run) operating 
costs, ports must also meet fixed capital charges. 
Annual loan repayments are shown in Table 20, and it can 
be seen that during 1969/70 these boards paid over 
$3,000,000 in loan interest and principal repayments. 
The outstanding debt at 30 September 1971 for these 
ports totalled $37,743,570. Any substantial decline in 
total trade may necessitate harbour board rates· being 
increased. 
Employment Implications - With one of the main aims 
of the containerisation concept being to reduce the 
labour content required to transport goods, the advent of 
this system is likely to reduce employment rossibilities 
at these South Island ports. Although waterside workers 
are no longer employed on a casual basis and receive 
guaranteed payments when work is not available, the 
widespread introduction of containers will lead to 
redundancy.(2l)The Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
containers considered that redundancy should 
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Table 20 
HARBOUR BOARD PUBLIC LOAN INDEBTEDNESS 
AND ANNUAL LOAN REPAYMENTS, 1969/70 
Dollars 
HARBOUR BOARD 
REPAYMENTS MADE(l) 
DURING YEAR 
Marlborough 81,681 
Nelson 209,825 
Lyttelton 1,266,195 
Timaru 341,112 
Oamaru 8,703 
Otago 412,455 
Southland 797,078 
AMOUNT 
OUTSTANDING (2) 
1,252,571 
3,530,867 
10,677,239 
2,868,644 
163,461 
6,915,592 
12,335,196 
(1) Includes loan interest and principal repayments but does 
not include sinking fund payments. 
(2) As at 30 September 1970. 
SOURCE: Harbour Board Annual Reports and Statement 
of Accounts. 
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treated as a matter of urgency, and they recommended 
that the Labour Department should initiate and 
encourage retraining programmes for displaced wharf workers.(22) 
The employment impact at each port will also be 
influenced by the transport mode used to aggregate containers. 
Should coastal shipping be used, the detrimental impact on 
both harbour board employees and waterside workers would 
minimised. But current indications are that internal 
container aggregation will be performed exclusively by 
road and rail. 
4.6 Possible Shipping Developments 
The future role of many New Zealand ports will be 
largely determined by the type of shipping which emerges 
as best suited to meet the special requirements of the 
country's overseas trade. While it seems certain that 
general cargoes will increasingly be carried in a unitised 
form, the concentration of this trade through the two 
designated container ports, Auckland and Wellington, might 
not be as great as has previously been predicted. Some 
, 
recent developments and proposals within particular trades 
are reviewed. 
- Following the Bcitish Conference 
I decision in May 1971 to abandon their planned New 
Zealand/United Kingdom cellular container ship service, 
Associated Container Transportation, in conjunction with 
the Australian National Line/announced that they would 
modify their existing container service between Europe and 
Is at Wellington and Auckland. 
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Initially four container ships will operate the service, 
to be commenced in September 1972, and late in 1973 a 
fifth ship, the 41,000 ton "Remuera" will join the fleet, 
increasing the frequency of sailings from every 17 to 
every 14 days. It is estimated that this service will 
handle only 20 percent of the New Zealand/United Kingdom 
trade, leaving the balance to be shipped by other means. 
A supplementary refrigerated container service 
between Britain and South Island ports will be introduced 
early in 1973 by P. & o. (N.Z.) Ltd. Six of their 
conventional vessels now operating on this trade will be 
converted to handle a limited number of containers. Each 
ship will carry 26 containers on deck and will be equipped 
with its own travelling cranes and gantries to handle 
these containers. The service is designed primarily to 
be used in conjunction with the mechanical meat loaders 
at Timaru and Bluff. 
At a time when the four main British shipping lines 
trading to New Zealand are removing their conventional 
vessels from the service, another company, Hudsons Freight 
Services Ltd., is exploring the prospects for introducing 
conventional shipping between Europe, Australia and New 
Zealand. This is another illustration of the uncertainty 
currently prevailing within the shipping industry. The 
company feels that there is a lack of conventional cargo 
space on this trade and that the Conference system is forcing 
shippers into containerisation, irrespective of whether 
their cargo is suitable. Their service is envisaged as 
- 9S -
being complementary to the container services, catering 
for heavy or awkward cargoes. 
East Coast North America Trade - All of New Zealand's 
East Coast North America trade is now carried by two 
container services operated by Columbus Line and 
Associated Container Transport Ltd. Farrell Lines Inc. 
plan to have a regular IS-day service to New Orleans, 
Charleston, Philadelphia, Norfolk and New York in operation 
by mid 1973. Each of their four container ships will be 
equipped with a 70-ton conventional boom aft and a 30 ton 
crane forward, which will enable heavy-lift cargo and 
containers to be handled where shore-based container 
facilities are unavailable. 
West Coast North America Trade - The Columbus Line 
is considering introducing a full container ship service 
to the West Coast of the United States. Although final 
plans have not yet been decided, it is possible that three 
new vessels each carrying approximately 800 containers and 
maintaining a 24-day service might be introduced. Ports 
I 
serviced in New Zealand would be Auckland, Wellington and 
Otago (Port Chalmers). 
The Pacific Far East Line has announceQ that early 
in 1973 it will commence a LASH service between New 
Zealand (calling at Wellington and Auckland), and the 
west coast of North America. Preliminary indications 
are that two LASH ships would operate a 2S-day service 
between the two areas. Each ship \vill carry 334 containers 
a~:(1 49 light,ers :"18 'V'lell').s their own cranes q and are thus 
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GlCRiiffi~5l::i independent of shore equipment. 
Scandinavian Trade - A new service anticipated to 
commence towards the end of 1972 should result in 95 
percent of New Zealand's trade with Scandinavia becoming 
unitised or containerised. A consortium of shipping 
lines will replace the conventional freighters at present 
on the run with four multi-purpose part-container 
"Scandia" ships. Each ship will carry 200 containers 
with space for unitised loads, such as wool, and wet 
cargoes. Having their own handling equipment, the 
Scandia ships will also load conventional cargo and call 
at non-container ports, providing a more flexible service 
than full container ships. Ports of call will be 
Auckland, Lyttelton, Dunedin and Bluff, with occasional 
calls at Tauranga and Napier. 
Japanese Trade - The P. & O. Group is planning to 
introduce a second modern unit-load ship on the Japan run 
eqrly in 1973. A feature of these ships is that freight 
is loaded through two sideports. An outboard conveyor 
at each sideport fed with special pallets by forklift trucks 
working on the wharf. The pallets are conveyed 
automatically to an elevator which is pre-set to deliver 
the goods to one of four decks where the ship's own 
forklifts take the cargo to stowing positions. Provision 
is also made to carry S6 containers on deck, and a 25-ton 
crane makes the ship independent of shore facilities. 
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4.7 Summary 
In Chapter III some of the problems associated with 
technological change were outlined. With respect to the 
shipping industry one problem facing government is how it may 
weigh the benefits of a new system - which often can be 
quantified - against the wider socio-economic ramifications, 
which are often difficult to define let alone measure. 
While these ramifications are often recognised it is 
difficult to incorporate them in the overall decision-
making process. Because of this, alternative transport 
proposals are often evaluated only by comparing their 
likely transport costs, the best system being that which 
offers the lowest costs. 
Obviously the level of transport costs will be of 
critical importance in choosing between several 
alternatives. But they should not be the only factor taken 
into consideration. To help allow a wider viewpoint to 
be adopted, this chapter has demonstrated a method which 
permits some of these socio-economic effects to be 
measured. While only the detrimental spatial aspects 
associated with containerisation have been examined, the 
purpose was not to suggest that such technological 
advances not be introduced. Far from it. Many advantages 
will result from the adoption of this system, but in 
arriving at the decision to invest in a system having such 
widespread ramifications, both the advantages and 
disadvantages need to be closely examined. While many 
studies have highlighted the advantages, the disadvantages 
have frequently been glossed over as being relatively 
insignificant. 
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Footnotes 
(1) was presented during Commission of 
Inquiry into New Zealand Shipping (1971) which 
clearly demonstrated that this practice occurs 
within New Zealand. 
(2) The 1969/70 financial year covers period from 
1 October 1969 to 30 September 1970. 
(3) These recasts were based on the annual payments 
made to iders at each of the ports during the 
eight years. Equations representing 
curves fitting this data were derived and 
used to predict 1970 payments. 
It was not possible to merely factor the actual 
payments made during the nine months ended 30 
September 1970, as monthly payments fluctuate in 
accordance with the seasonal nature cargo 
movements. 
(4) Some of e groups need to be elaborated. 
Expenditure ated to the maintenance of port 
facil - the purchase of tools, paint and 
repairs to mechanical equipment - are included in 
"Repairs, Maintenance", and those activities 
financed out of loan revenue appear under the 
"Capital Expenditure" category. "Travel" includes 
payments for staff and board members' travel and car 
mileage lowances, as well as accommodation and other 
expenses incurred while on business trips. 
Entertainment expenses such as catering, floral 
decorations and hall hire are included in this group. 
"Administration" covers payments. made I office 
equipment supplies, as well as pro 
fees, journal subscriptions, donations to 
and authorised grants. Taxation and postal 
are the main payments under "Government" and payments 
to "Local Bodies" includes electricity, water, and 
other local body rates. Those payments made to 
other harbour boards for s~ipway hire, dredge hire 
etc., are included within this group. The 
remaining groups are self explanatory. 
(5) A substantial proportion of harbour board 
expenditure goes towards meeting annual loan 
on principal repayments. For example, during 
1969/70 approximately 30 percent of both the 
Southland and Otago Harbour Boards' annual 
expenditure went towards these loan requirements, 
and Lyttelton's loan payments accounted for 36 
percent of its total annual expenditure. In of 
these large amounts of income returned to the 
economy, an attempt was made to trace the flow of this 
money to determine the sum remaining in each port's 
local economy_ 
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board were selected and 
each loan determined by searching 
the loan • But due to the nature of many 
of the organisations investing these loans, 
was imposs to achieve the required spatial 
breakdown. Whi private investors previously 
provided the majority of port loan finance, it 
now increasingly common for commercial banks, 
insurance companies and, more recently the National 
Provident Fund, to be the dominant investors. 
Repayments to organisations are generally made 
to their offices, and it difficult to 
predict destination this money. 
The Local Authority Loans o·f the Reserve 
Bank admini loan repayments for many harbour 
boards, but they were unable to provide any further 
details of the spatial distribution of these 
repayments. 
To illus 
examples 
(i) 
from Well 
from 
North I 
5 percent 
the subsciptionpattern found, 
two harbour boards' loans are given: 
Board "Ali: 49 contributed 
area (78 of which came 
companies); 8 percent from other 
areas; 38 percent from local investors; 
the remainder of the South Island. 
(ii) Harbour Board liB": Shipping Company Provident 
Funds 13 percent; local bodies 27 percent, private 
local investors 25 percent; other South Island 
private tors 4 percent; insurance companies 
and savings banks 14 percent; trust orgarfis 
5 percent; o.ther organis percent. 
(6) This can illustrated by a simple example. 
Assume a shipping company watersiders $1,000 for 
discharging cargo from a The watersiders will 
spend some of this income on purchasing food or 
clothing, thus increasing the revenue received by 
people in these trades. They in turn will 
this money on purchasing other goods and 
thereby increasing the revenue received by other 
businesses. As the income moves round it 
generates further income. The income Itmul ier" 
is a figure showing the relationship between total 
generated income and the tial injection. 
(7) To overcome the high costs involved in performing 
input/output studies, attempts have 
made to apply adjusted national input/output 
coefficients to regional studies. As Garnick 
(1970,36) pointed out, Ii have produced results 
which were for the most part, distinctly wanting for 
purposes of fine grained structural analys .iI. 
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(8) llings(1970) measured the impact of defence 
spending within Arizona using the input/output 
and economic e models. He found that the 
aggregate income multiplier from the input/output 
model was only 6.5 percent larger than the 
corresponding economic base multiplier. The 
employment multipl were even closer together 
with the input/output multiplier exceeding the 
economic base multiplier by 47 percent. 
(9) Conversely a decrease in basic activities will result 
in a decrease of total economic activity and 
population. 
(10) Dividing private income by personal expenditure 
($4,276 million/$2,829 million) equals 0.66. 
(11) If the range of import coef ients was from 0.2 
to 0.7, this would mean that the country as a 
whole would have an import coefficent of 0.2 and an 
extremely small region one of 0.7. 
(12) For example, if a region in the South Island 
contained 11 percent of New Zealand's population 
its import coefficient would 0.64 (Le. 11 
percent of difference between 0.70 and 0.26). 
Should same region have 39 percent of t,he South 
Island's popUlation its import coefficient, when 
the South Island was the benchmark economy, would 
be 0.50. 
(13) When taxation is regarded as a leakage, a c value 
of 0.66 is obtained.' Assuming that taxation is 
returned to a region through Government spending, 
taxation is no longer a leakage in '\vhich case 
c would be equal to 0.87. 
(14) Attempts to stimulate the economy of an area having 
a low income multiplier are commonly likened to 
"trying to fill a bath with the plug out". 
(15) Ship charges including payments for berthage, port 
charges, pilotage, towage etc., were generally 
taken from harbour board Shipping Registers. Cargo 
dues were collected from original cargo manifests, 
or manifest summaries. The method used to 
determine payments made for equipment hire and other 
miscellaneous services such as berth cleaning, garbage 
removal and storage, varied from port to port. 
Frequently this information could only be 
obtained from original dockets or hire sheets. 
(16) Harbour board revenue receipts from some particular 
commodities were obtained. For example, revenue 
generated at Nelson from e~port of wood chips 
was $0.58 per ton, and wheat shipments through 
Timaru $0. per ton. 
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(17) Wharf handling charges are the charges made to the 
shippers or consignees of goods shipped through 
New Zealand ports, or to the owners of ships 
carrying the same, to cover the cost of handling 
the goods on the wharf. 
(18) Nelson is the only port in New Zealand where the 
Harbour Board provides a complete wharfingering 
service. The Waterfront Industry Commission is 
not responsible for setting wharf handling charges 
at this port and so details on average payments made 
to waterside workers had to be obtained directly 
from the Nelson Harbour Board files. 
(19) When the amount of revenue which the Southland 
Harbour Board stands ,to lose as a result of this 
one container service is realised, their comment 
that " ••• containerisation will have no effect on 
the harbour at Bluff for at least ten years •.• ", 
may be premature (Southland Times, 20 May 1971). 
Even though the cargo lost will be more than 
compensated for with the opening of the aluminium 
smelter at Tiwai Po a relative loss will 
nonetheless be experienced. It is this general 
cargo which generates most income per ton to the 
Board, as welL as providing greater employment 
opportunities. 
(20) South Island ECNA cargoes were also diverted through 
the container port at Wellington. 
(2l) Here it is assumed that a similar proportion of each 
port's total overseas trade will be containerised, 
none of the ports will be a container port, and that 
coastal shipping will not be used to aggregate 
containers. 
(22) Redundancy will also be a problem at the container 
ports of Auckland and Wellington. Industry sources 
believe that approximately 300 watersiders at 
Wellington and 400 at Auckland will become redundant 
as container services increase (Dominion, 2 October, 
1972). 
CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF CARGO AGGREGATION PROPOSALS 
The ability to predict the effects that changes in the 
transportation system will have on particular sectors of the 
economy enables a comprehensive evaluation to be made of 
transport proposals. An essential task of such analys is 
to predict the impact of these changes on total distribution 
costs. 
New Zealand is gradually beginning to accumulate a 
detailed body of knowledge illustrating the distribution costs 
incurred in her overseas trade. A general study describing 
these costs was in 1967 (Transport Department, 1967) , and 
since then the Ministry of Transport has issued several 
bulletins which investigate the movement costs of individual 
commodities in greater depth (Ministry of Transport,1970a, 
1970b,l970c). These studies, while valuable in pointing out 
areas of inefficiency in the country's distribution system, 
have tended to be retrospective. Local research in this field, 
while describing what has and is occurring, and suggesting 
ways by which the system might be improved, has not attempted 
to predict the chanqes in transport costs which miqht result. (1) 
S.everal recent proposals aimed at lowering New Zealand's 
overseas freight bill, or at least reducing its rate of annual 
increase, have involved the concentration of cargo through a 
limited number ports. Examples include the diversion of 
South Island meat bound the United Kingdom through Timaru 
and Bluff; the channelling of fruit shipments through Nelson 
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and Napier; the Lines' two-port container proposal; 
the suggestion wool exports be handled at only two ports 
in both the North and South Islands~ and the recent decision 
to concentrate the shipment of meat through Napier. 
Following a review of overseas cargo movements at 
South Island the period 1960 to 70, a technique 
is demonstrated which permits transport proposals to be 
evaluated in terms 
(i) their effect on total movement costs and; 
(ii) their system-wide repercussions. (2) 
5.1 Overseas Cargo Trends at South Island Ports 
The magnitude composition of imports handled at South 
Island ports during period 1960 to 1970 is summarised in 
Figure 6. Several common trends are evident. Following the 
establishment of Point oil refinery 1964 there 
was a sharp reduction in the number of overseas 
calling at South Island ports. With the increased distribution 
of oil and motor spirit products' by coastal tanker, there was 
~ 
a corresponding decline in the level of total overseas imports. 
This loss has been somewhat compensated by the substantial 
increase in fertiliser imports through some ports, though this 
I 
trade has fluctuated in accordance with farming demands. 
Several other factors have affected individual ports. The 
establishment of a motor assembly plant at Annesbrook led to an 
increase in the import of motor vehicle parts through Nelson, 
while trade at Timaru received a boost as a result of the 
Benmore hydro-electric scheme. Increased industrial activity 
within the Southland province led to a rise in the of 
Bluff's imports, though an upsurge in fertiliser consumption 
6.0.0,0.0.0 NELSON 
4.0.0,0.0.0 
2<;).0,.0.0.0 
.0 
6.0.0,.0.0.0 TIMARU 
4.00,.0.0.0 
2.0.0,.0.0.0 
19&.0 1965 197.0 
Figure 6 
OTAGO FF 
1960 1965 1970 196.0 
Cargo Trends: Overseas Inwards, 1960/70 
Key 
~ 
~ 
Other 
2 Motor Spirit> 
3 Manures 
IE 4 Iron & Steel 
1965 1970 
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Throughout 
major import 
reflected 
petroleum 
have been 
exports (see 
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factor accounting for this 
Lyttelton has remained the Is 
and the decline in trade at Otago has 
changing distribution pattern of 0 and 
.. 
's 
(3) The bulk of Timaru's imports 
and manures. 
have been evident in the of 
7) • Nelson's export trade has grown 
steadily, both the increased production 
within and the much greater of this 
fruit being loaded into overseas Over 30 per-
cent of movement through Port Nelson in 1963 
was transh to Wellington .. Harbour developments, allowing 
vessels to load more deeply, and the construction of cool 
stores adj to the wharves, resulted in this percentage 
dropping to less than 1 percent by 1970. The commencement of 
the timber trade with Japan, initially in and more 
recently wood chips, led to a sudden in total 
exports, and this trend is expected to continue - although 
this pattern would be altered should a pulp mill be established 
within the district. The opening of a cool store at Spring 
Creek enabled fruit exports through Picton to greatly increase 
- this trade more than doubled in 1964. 
have declined as more of Nelson's 
then shipments 
through its own 
port, althou,gh changes have occurred as a result of seasonal 
fluctuations. The resumption in 1969 of log trade with 
Japan saw a marked upsurge in Picton's , and the recent 
granting of timber cutting rights should ensure this trade 
a number of years. ton's export trade 
600,000 N SON PICTON LYTTELTON 
400,000 
200,000 
o 
Key 
600,000 BLU ~ ~ Fruit MAR,U OTAGO 
= 3 Timber 
4 ~Iea\ 
400,000 ~:~:}~f:~:~ 5 Wuul 
c=J 6 Chips 
200,000 
o 
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Figure 7 Cargo Trends: Overseas Outwards, 1960/70 
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has increased throughout this despite the 
diversion of a portion of its meat trade through the port of 
Timaru. This diversion meant a 40 in meat 
exports in 1968 as compared with the previous year. Wool 
exports have remained increases been recorded 
in shipments of other agricultural commodities - peas and 
beans, hides and skins and tallow. with the installation of 
mechan meat , Timaru's exports grown 
substantially, ass 
Wool exports have 
of grain in 1969 1 
r a by the export of logs. 
seasonal conditions and the export 
rise in year's 
unavailability level. Drought with 
grain for export, a sharp line in Timaru's 1970 
exports. The meat divers cherne similarly affected Otago's 
level of exports, although the commencement of log shipments 
in 1969 led to a substantial rise in total trade. Additional 
meat shipments through Bluff followed the installation of its 
meat loaders, though increased production within the Southland 
province contributed towards rise. shipments 
in 68 and 1969 helped boost overall as did 
export of sawn timber and sawn 
timber to Japan in 1970. 
to Japan, and native and exotic 
In summary, diversion of meat through Timaru 
Bluff and the exploitation of resources have been the 
two main influencing export s at the various 
during this period. While increases in agricultural products 
in general have been recorded, in particular commodities 
has been subject to fluctuat 
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In view of the necess to reduce time ships 
on the New Zealand coast, there will be continued pressure to 
concentrate the shipment certain commodities at a restricted 
number ports. this provided by 
South Is meat scheme, the s concentration 
of meat shipments through , and suggestion that wool 
exports be handled at only two ports in North and South 
Islands. 
A important in choosing the ports through 
which cargoes may be , are internal transport 
costs incurred in the moving of cargoes to and from such 
ports. To determine port combinations which will minimise 
these inland transport costs, under a of situations, a 
model required. The nature of the problem is such that a 
model capable of evaluating the implications of a number of 
policy decisions, such as varying the number of ports through 
which shipping is to be tted, is required. In cia.di tio!), , 
the model to be capable of assessing the various 
port combinations have the physical capac to handle increased 
cargo movements. 
The model chosen is a of network based on 
the out-o algorithm developed by Fulkerson 
(1962) • algorittm problem determining the 
minimum cost route between two points in a capacitated network. 
It assumes that associated with each link are three values: 
(1) A cost parameter 
moving one unit of 
(2) capacity 
of 
the co 
commodity along 
indicat 
the 1 
incurred in 
link. 
maximum 
The algorithm 
satisfied by an 
such an optimal 
lIin-kilteril~ 
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parameter, indicating 
which must move along 
of 
by defining conditions which must be 
"circulation" in ,"Then 
is determined, 1 arcs are 
such a circulation does not t, some arcs 
will be out-of-kilter and the algorithm s such an arc 
and tries to flows to bring it into ter. More 
detailed descriptions of the algorithm are provided by Ford 
and Fulkerson (1962,162-169) , Durbin and Kroenke(1967), and 
Gauthier(1968,105~108)o An outline of algorithm is given 
in Appendix B. 
s (1969) Sinclair (1970) have 
demonstrated thm's appl in evaluating the 
impact of al fruit marketing , and King 
e t • a1. (19 71 ) us the algorithm to determine the optimal flows 
of coal in the Great Lakes area under a variety of supply 
and demand conditions. 
Here the gorithm is used to internal 
transport incurred in aggregated wool and meat exports 
at a variety port combinations. ity of the ports 
to handle th increased trade is also considered. 
In a ew of the economic pos of the farming 
industry in New Zealand, the Agricultural Production Council 
found that 1960/61 and 1970/71 costs incurred in the 
marketing of wool (from farm gate to mill) I increased by 31 
percent whi the price of wool 1 33.6 to an estimated 
23 cents In 1960/61 costs amounted to 
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17 percent of the greasy-on-mill-floor price - the 
figure in 1970/71 was 30 percent. Over half of 
cos resulted from freight rises (Agricultural Production 
Council,l97l,34). 
The depressed nature of the wool industry has led to a 
number of its facets being closely examined and both the Wool 
Flow Advisory Committee(1968) and the Ministry of Transport 
(l970b) have investigated the wool distribution system. The 
Institute were commissioned by the Wool Board to 
study wool marketing and they found that distribution costs 
New Zealand wool sold at auction formed approximately 23 
of the total cost to overseas mills, and were 
equivalent to 37 percent of the farmers net proce~ds for 
growing the wool(Battelle,197l,44). 
Each of these studies outlined many of the problems 
contributing to the high cost of wool distribution. Some of 
contributing factors were £ound to be: 
(i) Handling problems and inefficiency in stowage resulting 
from small and variable lot sizes and weights; 
(ii) Fragmented sources of wool supply, with many concerns 
all contributing wool for a single shipment; 
(iii) Lack of co-ordination between many sections of the 
industry; 
(iv) Uncertainty regarding the amount of wool to be 
shipped and frequent changes in ship programmes, 
(v) Inadequate load-out points from some dump stores which 
hinder despatch rates and in turn prevent ships from 
being efficiently loadedo Delays in moving wool to 
ports are often increased by traffic congestion; 
(vi) Berth congestion and unsuitable vessels. 
An illustration of the complex pattern of wool movement from 
grower to export port provided in Figure 8. The many 
organisations involved in the distribution system, allied with 
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~--------------14 )I 
WOOL I 12 )I 
MERCHANTS 13~)I'---------------~ 
, L. 
2 
10 II 
AUCTION E9 • 90 
BROKERS 8 - ITTril 3~ a 40 BROKER/DUMPERS 7b < 
15b 
6b 
17 18 ;;JII IL 
WOOL I 
COMMISSION 19 I 
4 
~----------------------6 )I 
0) 140--------, 
70 
150 
160 
NON-LOCAL 
DUMP I 
ISTORES 
22 
ERSEAS PORT 
Source: Ministry of Transport(1970b, 
8 Major Flow Patterns of New Zealand's Wool Exports, 1968/69 
Flow 
Nurrber 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4a 
S 
6 
7 
7a 
7b 
8 
9 
90. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
l4a 
lSa 
lSb 
l6a 
1Gb 
17 
18 
19 
20 
IDENTIFICATION OF :F.J:.OO NUMBERS IN FIGURE 8 
Explanation 
Grower I s WOOl (Greasy) Exported for london Auction 
Purchases fram Growers of Wool (Greasy) by Merchants 
G:rower's w::>ol (Greasy) - Sold at Auction by Brokers 
WOOl (Greasy) From G:rowers to Scourers Prior to Auction 
Wool (Scoured) From Scourers Prior to Auction 
Wool (On Sheep i s Back) to Freezing Works Prior to Killing 
Wool (Slipe) From Freezing Works to Brokers and Dump Stores 
Wool (Slipe) Fram Freezing w:>rks to Scouring W:>rks 
w::>ol (Scoured) From Scouring Works to Dump Store for Export 
Wool (Scoured) Fram Scouring Works to Broker/Dumpers for Export 
Wool (Greasy) to Scourers After Auction 
Wool (Greasy) to Dump store After Auction 
Wool (Scoured) to Dump store After Auction 
Merchants' Sales of Wool at Auction 
Merchants' Pw:chases of Wool at Auction 
Merchants' Exports of Wool (Greasy) to Dump Stores 
Merchants i w::>ol to Scouring Works Prior to Export 
Grower's Wool to Scouring Works Prior to EKport for london Auction 
Grower I s Wool (Scoured) to Dump Store Exported for london Auction 
Post-Auction WOol (Scoured) to Dump Store fur Export 
Post-Auction Wool (Scoured)-. to Brbker/Dumpers for Export 
Merchants' Wool (Scoured) to Dump Store for Export 
Merchants' W:>ol (Scoured) to BrokerjDumpers for Export 
Sales of Wool Ccmnission Stockpile at Auction (Greasy & Scoured) 
Purchases of WJol Ccmnission Stockpile at Auction (Greasy &SOOured) 
Wool Sent by Brokers Direct to Ship's Side (Greasy and Scoured~ 
Wool Sent by Broker/Dumpers Direct to Ship I s Side (Greasy and 
Scoured) 
21 Scouring Works Direct to Ship's Side 
22 Non-Local Dump Stores to Ship I s Side (Greasy, Scoured, Slipe) 
23 Dump Stores to Ship I s Side (Greasy, Scoured, Slipe) 
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the large range of marketing options available to the 
grower, means that control over this sector is difficult to 
achieve. A further hindrance to efficient movement 
frequent requirement that shipments be made as soon as 
possible after a wool sale. 
the 
The fragmented nature of the internal distribution system, 
combined with the other factors listed in the preceeding 
paragraph, often result in low" levels of productivity on the 
waterfront. Table 21 indicates that despite the greater use 
being made of mechanical handling equipment, wool loading rates 
at New Zealand1s ports have not risen appreciably between 1965 
and 1970, although costs continue to increase. (4) These 
low loading rates in turn mean slow shipping turnaround. The 
inability of the distribution system to despatch sufficient 
quantities of wool to the ports, to allow faster loading, is the 
major reason for this low productivity. 
Table 21 
WOOL LOADING RATES AT SELECTED NEW 
ZEALAND PORTS, 1965/1970 
Bales per Gross Gang Hour 
NEW 
YEAR "ZEAIJ\ND 
1965 50 59 49 43 52 45 
1966 48 62 46 47 51 45 
1967 48 63 46 41 52 46 
1968 50 60 56 41 58 49 
1969 55 62 58 50 57 51 
1970 53 63 51 49 61 49 
SOURCE: 
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of the above studies suggested ways in which the 
wool distribution system might be improved, (for example through 
sembly of wool wharf sheds, the introduction of dense 
baling, larger lot s and increased use of unit loads) , 
but appears as though a major spatial re-organisation of 
the system is required. The New Zealand Wool Board feels that 
substantial freight savings could theoretically be achieved 
if ships were able to load a full cargo at only one or two 
ports, thereby reducing the number of days spent on the New 
Zealand coast. This could only be achieved by stockpiling 
wool at selected ports in large quantities, and this in tUrn 
may require a re-organisation in the present number of wool 
selling centres. 
The Wool Board has suggested reducing the number wool 
selling centres from eight to possibly four, with only two 
main wool loading ports in each Island. Though Battelle 
(1971,44-47) discus this topic at some length, and made a 
conservative estimate of the cost benef of a two auction 
centre/two port system, they stressed that their analys was 
" ••• very simple and (their) cost figures used ••• merely rough 
estimates since no analysis is possible without a 
thorough study of all factors involved. lI • 
Using the network analysis technique outlined , 
internal transport costs associated with various wool movement 
schemes are derived, and the system repercussions of these 
aggregation schemes calculated. 
Data - Estimates of average wool production 
--------------------
each South county were by multiplying 
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county sheep numbers by average wool production per sheep 
(see Appendix XXI and XXII). prevent distortions 
occurring, due to drought and other seasonal conditions, sheep 
returns and wool production were averaged over a three year 
period. The results from calculations are I ted in 
Table 22. These production estimates represent the volume 
of wool which must be transported from country to selling 
centre and then to port of shipment. 
The link costs entered into the model were road and rail 
wool transport charges (see Appendix XXIII), and average port 
handling costs, wharfage dues and harbour improvement rates 
(Appendix XXIV). (5) Data supplied by the New Zealand Wool 
Board indicated the distance travelled by the "average" bale 
within each county moving from farm to county railhead, or 
farm to selling centre. Transport rates were based on these 
distances. Dumping, scouring and selling charges were not 
included. 
As indicated by Figure 8, wool may pass through an 
extremely complex distribution system before being shipped 
overseas. Wool movements were generated from all South Island 
counties to wool selling centres, and from these centres to 
export ports, under a variety of distribution policies. For 
example, the effects of limiting the number of export ports, 
or reducing the number of selling centres, or varying wool hand-
ling costs were evaluated. (6) The wool network contained 202 
links and 60 nodes and 184 different distribution systems were 
generated. 
COUNTY 
Marlborough 
Awat.ere 
Kaikou:r:a 
Waimea 
Golden Bay 
Buller 
Inangahua 
West.1and 
Amuri 
Cheviot 
Waipara 
Ashley 
Rangiora 
Gyre 
Oxford 
Malvern 
Paparua 
Waimairi 
Heathcote 
Mt. Herbert 
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Table 22 
ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE WOOL PRODUCTION 
WITHIN SOUTH ISLAND COUNTIES 
1967/1970 
BALES 
25,715 Akaroa 
11,874 Wairewa 
8,593 Ellesmere 
Ashburton 
18,781 Geraldine 
3,196 Levels 
558 MacKenzie 
2,311 Waimate 
6,962 
Wait.aki 
18,908 Waihemo 
11,083 waikouait.i 
24,141 Peninsula 
11,579 Taieri 
3,71 Bruce 
5,328 Clut.ha 
7,988 Tuapeka 
26,844 Maniototo 
5,333 Lake 
161 Vincent 
367 
1,889 Southland 
Wallace 
5,177 
3,520 
14,631 
84,962 
22,725 
14,729 
26,076 
38,117 
34,620 
8,789 
6,739 
1,562 
16,981 
25,595 
51,335 
39,337 
2,283 
13,659 
24,484 
217,729 
91,733 
SOURCE: Ca1cu1at.ed from data contained in - Sheep Returns, 1968, 1969 
1970, Department. of Statistics; Annual Revir: of the Sheep 
Industry 1968/69, 1969/70, 1970/71, New Zea and Meat and 
Wool Boards' Economic Service. 
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_D_i_s_c_u_s_s_i_o_n ______ R_e_s_u_l_t __ s - Table 23 illustrates the transport 
costs incurred in moving wool from South Island counties to 
selling centres, and then to ports. Should shipping economics 
favour only one port of call in the South Island, the 
channelling of wool through Otago would result in internal 
transport costs being minimised (assuming that wool from the 
north of the South Island could be shipped through Wellington). 
While this ranking is the same as that computed by the Otago 
Harbour Board (1971,20) the absolute differences between the 
ports selected are not the same. Otago's calculations 
indicated that the cost of aggregating wool exports at Timaru 
was six percent greater than through their own port, while 
Table 23 shows this difference .as only being three percent. 
Inland transport costs are reduced when wool is aggregated 
at two South Island ports. Timaru/Bluff is the port 
combination minimising these costs, being more than $65,000 
less than the next best port combination, Lyttelton/Bluff. 
This ranking not altered with the inclusion of Wellington 
(see Table 23). 
More realistic estimates of the costs of alternative 
distribution systems are obtained when wool handling costs at 
the various ports are entered into the analysis. Allowing 
wool to be exported through all South Island ports was found to 
cost $3,084,271, with the respective port hinterland's outlined 
in Figure 9. When shipments through Picton and Nelson are 
prohibited total costs increase to $3,234,994 (see Table 24), 
and Lyttelton's hinterland is increased through the addition of 
Awatere. counties (see 10). 
PORT COMBINATIONS 
One Island Port 
lington 
Lyttelton 
Wellington 
Wellington 
All Ports 
Wellington 
Lyttelton 
Timaru 
Otago 
Bluff 
Table 23 
TRANSPORT INCURRED IN MOVING WOOL 
COUNTY TO 
1967/1970 Production 
COST PORT COMBINATIONS 
", (Dollars) 
Two South Island Ports 
Lyttelton 
,566 Lyttelton 880,544 3,6 ,681 Bluff 
98,150 Timaru 
1,960 3,124" 722 Otago 
5,160 Timaru 
8 ,959 3,0 , 8 
Wellington 
3,701 Lyttelton 
796,409 3,2 ,028 Otago 
ington 
Lytte1ton 
Bluff 
,566 Wellington 
244,051 Timaru 
,267 Otago 
190,764 Wellington 309,462 1,9 ,662 Timaru 
Bluff 
CARGO COST 
(Bales ) (Dollars) 
405,264 
534,846 2,592,789 
439,8 
500,226 2,404,9 
439,884 
500,226 2,584,752 
514,381 
425,729 2,339,188 
59,566 
5,698 
534,846 2,584,3 
59,566 
380,318 
500,226 2,396,489 
98,150 
341,734 
500,226 2,567,009 
98, 
416,231 
425,729 2,321,445 
Present Wool Selling Centres 
Figure 9 Simulated Wool Movements: Shipping Possible 
Through all South Island Ports 
Table 24 
TRANSPORT COSTS INCURRED IN MOVING WOOL FROM COUNTY TO SHIP 
1967/1970 Production Estimates 
PORT COMBINATIONS CARGO COST PORT COMBINATIONS 
(Bales) (Dollars) 
One South Island Port Two South Island Ports 
Lyttelton 940,1 5,000,727 Lytte1ton 
940,110 4,351,992 Otago 
Otago 940,110 4,361,073 Lytte1ton 
Bluff 940,110 4,875, 8 Bl 
Timaru 
Wellington 47,6 Otago 
Lyttelton 892,418 4'1 988 ,898 
Timaru 
lington 59,566 
Timaru 880, 4 4, 1,523 
Wellington 
Wellington 98,150 Lyttelton 
Otago 841,960 4,267,513 Otago 
Wellington 125,160 Wellington 
Bluff 814,950 4,670,495 Lyttelton 
Bluff 
All Ports 
Wellington 47,692 Wellington Timaru Lyttelton 170,963 Otago Timaru 221,229 
Otago 190,764 Wellington Bluff 309,462 3,234,994 Timaru 
Bluff 
CARGO COST 
(Bales) (Dollars) 
405,264 
534,846 3,885, 3 
439,8 
I-' 500,226 3,802,546 I-' 
VI 
439,884 
500,226 3 814,288 
553,7 
386,392 3,646,563 
47,692 
392 192 
500,226 3,878,6 
47,692 
392,192 
500,226 3,790,717 
59,566 
380,3 
,226 3,783,819 
59,566 
380,318 
500,226 3,616,094 
Present Wool Selling Centres 
Figure 10 
TIMARU 
OTAGO 
Simulated Wool Movements': Shipping Possible 
Through \.Jellington. Lyttelton, Timaru, Otago 
and Bluff 
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The inclusion of port costs the flow of wool 
through Wellington. When only costs incurred in moving wool 
to the ports were examined, shipments from the Golden' Bay, 
Waimea, Marlborough, Awatere and Kaikoura counties were seen to 
move to lington (Table 23) Wool from Kaikoura moves 
south when port costs are included, to Wellington's 
handling costs being higher than those ~t-. Lyt.telton or Timaru. 
It is not possible to compare this optimal wool movement 
pattern with the sting pattern, as the nature of existing 
wool flows from counties to sell 
known. However the entage of 
centre under the optimal and 
compared. (7) 
s 
centres and ports is not 
sold at each ling 
movement patterns may 
Table 25 suggests that would be more ficient, in terms 
of minimising transport costs, if some of the wool now being 
sold at the Christchurch and Dunedin sales were diverted to 
Timaru. In addition some wool the north of the South 
Island should be sold at Wellington in preference to Christchurch. 
Table 25 
WOOL SALES BY SELLING CENTRE 
PERCENTAGE OF SALES 
CENTRE 
Wellington 5 
Christchurch 26 18 
Timaru 16 24 
Dunedin 25 20 
Invercargill 33 33 
SOURCE: 
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When all wool shipments are concentrated through only 
one South Island port, Timaru offers a very slight saving over 
Otago (see Table 24). However should wool shipments be 
permitted through Wellington, then Otago/Wellington would be 
the least cost port combination. 
Under a two port loading system Timaru/Bluff would offer 
savings of more than $150,000 over the next cheapest 
combination (Lyttelton/Bluff). This ranking is not altered with 
the inclusion of Wellington. The derived port hinterlands 
under the Wellington/Timaru/Bluff and Wellington/Lyttelton/ 
Otago .port systems are shown in Figures 11 and 12 respectively. 
The distribution systems pres in Table 24 all assume 
that the number of wool selling centres may be reduced according 
to the number of ports through which shipment permi tted .. 
For example, the Timaru/Bluff shipping proposal assumes that 
there will be only two South Island wool selling centres - located 
at Timaru and Bluff. If it was decided to reduce the number 
of wool shipment ports but retain the present number of 
selling centres, total system costs would increase as the 
advantage of tapering rail rates with distance would not be 
so marked. For example, the cost of moving one bale of wool 
from Waipara to Timaru would be $2.98 (Waipara to Christchurch 
$1.22 plus Christchurch to Timaru $1.76), whereas if the 
movement had been direct, the cost would have been $2.61 -
a saving of $0.37. 
Selling centre hinterlands (where wool must be sold 
through the nearest centre) are Figure 13. These 
hin c1if. 
Present Wool Selling Centres 
Figure 11 Simulated Wool Movements: Shipping Possible 
Through Wellington, Timaru and Bluff 
WELLINGTON 
Present Wool Selling Centres 
STEWART 
ISLAND 
Figure 12 Simulated Wool Movements: Shipping Possible 
Through Wellington, Lyttelton and Otago 
Present Wool Selling 
Figure 13 Simulated Wool Movements: Shipping Possible Through 
Wellington, Lyttelton, Timan!. Otago and Bluff With 
Wool Sold at Nearest Auction Centre 
LIB 
derived (see Figure 10). Wool from Clutha is now sold at 
I 
Invercargill while Ashb)llrton wool is diverted from Timaru to 
, 
Christchurch. Under t~ese restricted conditions, system costs, 
when wool may be through ports, increase from 
$3,234,944 to $3,2 ,202: through Timaru/Bluff from $3,646,563 
to $3,883,588; and through Wellington/otago from $4,267,513 to 
$4,491,823. 
Har:bour improvement ru tes were included in the previous 
analyses and to test the sensitivity of port combinations to 
changes in port costs several combinations were examined with 
these rates removed (The harbour boards at Nelson, Lyttelton 
and Otago levy a improvement rate on cargo passing 
over their wharves). As shown by Appendix XXV the exclusion 
of this cost does no't af rankings of the various port 
combinations. Under the two-port system Timaru/Bluff remains 
the cheapest port combination, although if all wool was handled 
through only one South Island port, Otago would replace Timaru 
as that port. 
The ab ity of the wool tribution system to handle 
the increased movements which would result from concentrating 
wool shipments through a limited number of ports, was examined. 
The volume of wool sold and shipped during a peak month 
(January), 'VTas calculated, and this amount then forced through 
a wool network with capacity constraints (These constraints 
were placed on the various ports and dump stores). The effects 
of these capacity constraints on movements through selected 
port combinations are shown in Table 26. 
Table 26 
PORT AND DUMP STORE CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS TO WOOL MOVEMENTS 
Bales per Month 
MAXIMUM THROUGHPUT WOOL UNABLE TO BE HANDLED 
PORT COMBINATIONS Port DumE Store 
One-Port Loadins 
Lytte1ton 77,500 92,500 
Timaru 95,000 91,,250 
Otago 65,000 102,5 
Bluff 117,760 7 760 
Two-Port Loading 
Timaru 66,758 66 758 
51,002 51,002 
Timaru 51,736 51,736 
Otago 65 000 57,500 
Lytte1ton 47,167 47,167 
Otago 65,000 57,500 
Lytte1ton 51,736 51,736 
Bluff 66,024 66,024 
A total of 117,760 bales of wool were generated 
through the distribution system. 
Port 
40,260 
22,760 
52,760 
8,524 
,093 
SOURCE: Port and Dump Store capacities were taken from 
Wool Flow Advisory Committee ( 68, 48-67). 
Dump Store 
25,260 
26,5 
15,260 
I-' 
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Under a one~'port loading system only Bluff would have 
the capacity to dump and load all the wool presented during 
January. Dumping facilities at most of the ports would be 
unable to handle the increased flow, even if worked to their 
maximum capacity. Under the two~port system Lyttelton/Bluff 
and Timaru/Bluff would have sufficient port and dumping capacity 
to handle the extra requirements, but severe port congestion 
would occur at Otago. Dump stores would not create bottlenecks, 
as occurred under one-port loading. 
This simple capacity execise can only be viewed as 
approximating the actual system, as the values reflecting both 
dumping and port capacity appear to be much higher than those 
achieved in reality. Moreover, any diversion of wool through 
a reduced number of ports would be accompanied by investments 
in new handling facilities which would increase the system's 
capacity.(8) The network analysi~ technique is a powerful tool 
in that it permits capacity constraints to be considered, but 
a detailed study would be required to determine appropriate 
throughput capacities for all the system's many facilities. 
This section has shown Otago to be the port minimising 
internal transport and port costs should shipping developments 
require all South Island wool being exported through one port. (9) 
Under a two-port system Timaru/Bluff would be the cheapest 
combination. System repercussions which are estimated to 
accompany these diversion schemes are presented in Table 27. 
The selection of Otago as the sole South Island wool export port 
would result in that port's revenue increasing by over $350,000, 
with corresponding losses being by the other ports. 
Table 27 
IMPACT OF WOOL AGGREGATION SCHEMES ON SOUTH ISLAND 
HARBOUR BOARDS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIES 
ONE-PORT LOADING 
OPTIMAL Revenue Imeact 
HARBOUR BOARD THROUGHPUT (1) HarbOur Board Region(2) 
(Tons) (Dollars) (Dollars) 
Marlborough 7, 5 10,267 28,690 
Nelson 3,381 5,886 13,591 
Lyttelton 23,153 57,720 - 165,945 
Timaru 34,035 0,571 - 264,960 
Otago 29,348 + 391,085 + 954,481 
Southland 47,610 - 192,440 - 360,717 
(1) Tonnage handled by ports to minimize internal transport costs? 
(6.5 es = 1 Ton). 
(2) This takes into account income lost by waterside workers, 
as well as the revenue lost by harbour boards, and represents 
maximum revenue or loss experienced by each region. 
SOURCE: Harbour Board revenue receipts per ton and regional 
income multipliers from previous calculations. 
TWO-PORT LOADING 
Revenue Im12act 
Harbour Board Region 
(Dollars) (Dollars) 
10,627 28,690 
5,886 13,591 
57,720 - 165,945 
+ 376,867 + 663,172 
79,357 - 206,271 
+ 240,276 + 452,256 
I-' 
N 
I-' 
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A two-port system would increase the revenue received by 
Timaru and Bluff by over $250,000 and $310,000 respectively, 
with consequent advantages to their local business 
communities. 
Future Developments - The large scale use of containers 
for the transport of wool was not evaluated, as industry 
representatives are not necessarily convinced that the 
container concept will enable transport costs to be stabilised. 
Many view the 12-bale strapped unit as a cheaper method of 
handling wool. (10) Since wool is a low value high volume 
product, the advantages offered by containers are much less 
than in the case of a relatively high value low volume product 
(such as cartoned meat and dairy produce). While wool will 
move in containers where it forms a minor proportion of the 
total trade (for example the ECNA trade), other trades may 
justify a method of shipment more suited to the nature of 
the product. (11) 
5.4 Evaluation of Alternative Meat Distribution Systems 
Although detailed costings of frozen meat movements have 
been made, as was the case with wool, most research in this 
field has tended to be retrospective. The cost of transport-
ing meat from freezing works to overseas markets has been 
studied by the Ministry of Transport(1970a) and internal 
movement patterns determined. No attempts have been made to 
use this detailed information to compare the costs of 
alternative distribution schemes, or to calculate the effects 
of such schemes on internal meat movement patterns. 
Reference to the South Island meat diversion system illustrates 
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the degree to which changing transport technology can 
influence commodity movement patterns. 
The need to faster meat loading rates, so that 
the amount of idle time ships spent in port could be 
minimised, encouraged the Southland and Timaru Harbour Boards 
to install all-weather mechanical meat loaders during the 
mid-sixties. With the construction of these facilities a 
trial South Island meat diversion system was commenced. 
Following a study by the Transport Commission in October 1968 
this scheme was allowed to continue on a permanent basis. As 
a result of this ion meat loading rates at these two ports 
have been substantially increased and a marked re-orientation of 
meat movements within the South Islqnd has occurred (see Figure 
14). Large volumes of meat processed within the Otago 
region are shipped through Timaru and Bluff, while Timaru 
also draws meat from the Canterbury region. 
uncertainty similarly surrounds the type of shipping which 
may carry New Zealand's frozen meat products in the future. 
Many in the industry have welcomed the introduction of 
containers, and some have suggested that this form of transport 
is essential if the industry is to remain competitive in 
certain markets. The ECNA trade is now ly containerised 
and a limited service will soon commence to the United 
Kingdom. However there are many advocates of the palletised 
system and some shipping companies have recently purchased 
new mUlti-purpose shipping (see Chapter IV). A meat industry 
spokesman was recently reported as stating that lamb exporters 
may be forced to boycott container unless freight 
A 
............ ~~ 
Major Roods 
Major Railways 
Previous Port 
Hinterlands 
Figure 14 
TONS 
120,000 
100,000 
50,000 
25,000 
Origin, Volume, and Port of Shipment of 
South Island Export Meat, 1969/70 
IDENTIFICATION OF FREEZING WORKS IN FIGURE 14 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Freez Works 
Nelson Freezing Co. Ltd. 
N.Z. Refrigerating Co. Ltd. 
North Canterbury Sheep Farmers 
Co-operative Freezing Co. Ltd. 
4. (2) Thomas Borthwick & Sons (A'Asia) 
Ltd. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Canterbury Frozen Meat Co. 
N.Z. Refrigerating Co. Ltd. 
Canterbury Frozen Meat Co. Ltd. 
N.Z. Refrigerating Co. Ltd. 
Canterbury Frozen Meat Co. Ltd. 
Waitaki Farmers' Freezing Co. Ltd. 
N.Z. Refrigerating Co. Ltd. 
South Otago Freezing Co. Ltd. 
Southland Frozen Meat Co. Ltd. 
Southland Frozen Meat Co. Ltd. 
Alliance Freezing Co. (Southland) 
Ltd. 
Ocean Beach Freezing Co. Ltd. 
Location 
Stoke 
Picton 
Kaiapoi 
Bel t 
Islington 
Fairfield 
Smithfield 
Pareora 
Pukeuri 
Burnside 
Ba1c1utha 
Mataura 
Makarewa 
Lornevi11e 
Ocean Beach 
rate s were reduced. (12) (Freight rates are calculated per 
container rather than by weight, resulting in carcase 
shipping rates in containers effectively being 28 percent 
higher than that charged by conventional services). With 
further streamlining of internal cargo movements being 
considered (and it was recently announced that additional meat 
exports will be diverted through Napier) , is important that 
the internal ramifications of these schemes be carefully 
evaluated. Transport costs incurred in the aggregation of 
zen meat exports at certain South Island ports are 
examined. 
Data - Meat production figures were ~~~~~~~~~~~-----
obtained from all Suuth Island freezing companies for the 
period 1960/61 to 1969/70. To eliminate distortion resulting 
from seasonal factors, meat production the 1970/71 season 
was forecast on the basis of these previous trends. Forecasts 
were made for .each individual freezing works as although the 
South Island's meat production has been increasing at a steady 
rate, regional growth rates have been uneven. 
Inland transport and port charges were collected from 
transport operators and harbour boards respectively (see 
Appendix XXIV and XXVI). 
The procedure followed was similar to that used in the 
wool movement analysis. Frozen meat tonnages from each 
freezing works were generated through a network representing 
the meat distribution system so that movement costs to ports 
would be minimis The network cons ted of freezing works, 
I railwcty 1 and ports, th network so constructed 
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that meat from each works could move to any port (a total of 
154 links and 42 nodes). 
- Transport costs incurred 
moving the South Island's predicted meat production from 
freezing works to export port are given in Table 28. When 
shipment is possible through all ports the total cost is 
$1,256,847, and as the number of ports are reduced the 
internal transport costs naturally rise. Should meat 
exports be aggregated at only one port, Bluff - despite its 
relatively isolated location - would be the most favourable 
port. This is to heavy concentration of meat 
production within its hinterland (during 1969/70 the Southland 
province produced over 42 percent the South Island's total 
meat exports). 
Calculations made by the Otago Harbour Board (1971, 20) 
suggested that if meat had to be exported through only one 
South Island port, total "ton-mi1es il would be minimised when 
meat was exported through Otago. Their findings are compared 
with the results from Table '28. (see Table 29). 
Table 29 
AGGREGATICN OF FroZEN MEAT Nr ONE PORI' 
PORI' 
Lytte1ton 57,032,489 (56%) (1) 4,494,947 (19%) 
Timaru 42,096,710 (15%) 4,048,206 (7%) 
Otago 36,575,136 - 3,990,896 (5%) 
Bluff 43,835,340 (20%) 3,788,328 -
Wellington 117,109,538 (220%) 9,142,892 (141%) 
(1) The cost of aggregating cargoes 
cost at the least-cost port. 
expressed as a percentage of the 
PORT COMBINATIONS 
No South Island Port 
Wellington 
One South Island Port 
Lyttelton 
Timaru 
Otago 
Bluff 
All Ports Included 
Picton 
Nelson 
Lyttelton 
Timaru 
Otago 
Bluff 
Table 28 
TRANSPORT COSTS INCURRED IN MOVING FROZEN MEAT 
FROM FREEZING WORKS TO PORT 
1970/71 Production 
CARGO COST PORT COMBINATIONS 
(Tons ) (Dollars) 
Two South Island Ports 
272,978 9,142,892 Lyttelton Otago 
Lyttelton 
272,978 4,494,947 Bluff 
272,978 4,0'48,206 Timaru Otago 
272,978 . 3,990,896 Timaru 
272,978 3,788,328 Bluff 
Wellington 
Lyttelton 
Otago 
5,780 Wellington 4,333 
53,341 Lyttelton 
56,796 Bluff 
37,991 Wellington 
114,737 1,256,847 Timaru 
Otago 
Wellington 
Timaru 
Bluff 
CARGO COST 
(Tons ) (Dollars) 
106,567 
166,411 2,920,996 
I-' 
120,250 N 
152,728 2,083,767 0"\ 
120,250 
152,728 3,084,129 
13.4,554 
138,421 2,185,658 
10,113 
9.6,454 
166,411 2,877,212 
10,113 
110,137 
152,728 2,039,983 
10,113 
110,137 
152,728 3,010,671 
10,113 
124,441 
138,424 2,112,199 
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Whereas the Otago study found that the movement of meat 
to Bluff was 20 percent more "costly" than through own 
port, this study has shown that choice Bluff as the 
only meat exporting port would in fact be 5 percent cheaper 
than Otago. One reason which may account for these different 
findings is that two years were compared (the Otago 
study considered 1969 meat ~ovements) • 
that the calculation of ton-miles 
But the main reason 
not accurately 
reflect actual transport costs. Ton-miles assume that the 
relationship between distance and costs will be linear (with 
one mile being the same as 
charges, taper markedly with 
next), whereas rail costs, and 
stance. (13) 
Under a two~port meat loading scheme the combination of 
Bluff and Lyttelton will of slight savings over the Bluff 
and Timaru combination. Allowing shipments through Wellington 
does not alter these rankings, though the difference in cost 
between the two best combinations is reduced (see Table 28). 
The introduction of port costs into the analysis alters 
the ative costs of some port combinations (see Table 30). 
Bluff retains its position as the cheapest single-port through 
which to concentrate meat shipments, whi Timaru displaces 
Otago as the second choice. This is on account of the 
savings port charges shippers through Timaru would enjoy. 
Whereas the Lyttelton/Bluff combination incurred the 
lowest internal aggregation costs, the Timaru/Bluff combination 
results in the lowest overall costs ($4,258,481 as against 
$4,411,259). Such a finding would be anticipated as these 
are all cal meat loaders. 
Table 
- TRANSPORT COSTS INCURRED IN MOVING FROZEN MEAT 
FROM FREEZ WORKS TO SHIP 
1970/71 Production 
PORT COMBINATIONS CARGO COST PORT COMBINATIONS CARGO 
(Tons) (Dollars) (Tons) 
No South Island Port Two Is Ports 
Wellington 272,978 ,080, 6 lington 10, 
Lytte1ton 96,4 
One South Island Port Otago 166,4 5, 6,B1.u I-' 
tv 
ton 272,978 7,183,781 00 ington , 3 
Timaru 272,978 ~,19:J-,083 Lyttelton ,137 
Otago 272,978 6~750,704 Bluff 152,728 4,4 ,259 
Bluff 272,978 6,021,288 Well 10, 
110, 7 
All Ports Included Otago ,728 5,456,437 
Picton 5,780 Wellington 10,113 
Nelson 4,333 Timaru 124,441 
53 1 Bluff 138,424 4,258,481 
56,796 
Otago 37,991 
Bluff 114,737 31'631,140 
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To take into account any likely in the pattern 
of production, forecasts of regional meat production in 
1974/75 were made. (14) When these new production figures 
were generated through the distribution tem no change in 
the rankings of the various port combinations occurred 
(see Table 31). Production increases within the Southland 
area were of such magnitude that the relative advantage of 
Bluff as the sole port increased. Timaru remained 
the second cheapest port followed by Otago and Lytte1ton. 
The two-port combination saw the position of the Timaru/ 
Bluff combination strengthened, followed as previously by 
Lyttelton/Bluff. 
Future internal meat movement patterns are uncertain. 
Although containers will increasingly used for the shipment 
of meat, especially packaged meat, their widespread 
introduction to the South Island may be delayed by the presence 
of the mechanical loaders at Timaru and Bluff. Much ef rt 
was spent in attempting to compare the relative costs of 
aggregating meat at these loaders and at container ports. 
Details on container stowage rates were obtained from shipping 
companies but it proved impossible to obtain even approximate 
container freight charges from the lways Department. 
Geddes (197l) suggested that the introduction of containers may 
reduce railway costs by up to 30 , but he also 
indicated that a railway freight structure for the 
movement of conta had still to finalised. 
This section has shown that the concentration of all 
South Island meat through would minimise 
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Table 31 
COSTS INCURRED IN MOVING FROZEN MEAT 
FROM FREEZING WORKS TO SHIP 
1975 Production Estimates 
PORT COMBINATIONS CARGO COST 
(Dollars) 
No South Island Port 
Wellington 282,552 12,477,233 
One South Island Port 
Wellington 10,790 
Lytte1ton 271,762 7,293,050 
Wellington 10,790 
Timaru 271,762 6,265,335 
Wellington 10,790 
Otago 271,762 6,625,966 
Wellington 10,790 
Bluff 271,762 5,628,854 
South I 
Wellington 10,7~0 
Lytte1ton 102,157 
Otago 169,605 5,750,756 
Wellington 10,790 
Lytte1ton 116,851 
Bluff 154,911 4,559,112 
:We11ington 10,790 
Timaru 116,851 
Otago 154,911 5,462,987 
Wellington 10,790 
Timaru 129,693 
Bluff 142,069 4,391,669 
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inland transport and port costs of a one-port meat loading 
system. Under a two-port system Timaru/Bluff would be the port 
combination producing the lowest internal distribution costs 
($152,778 cheaper than the Lyttelton/Bluff combination). System 
repercussions which are anticipated to accompany these meat 
aggregation schemes are shown in Table 32. Under the· lloptimal" 
one-port system, which would see shipments concentrated through 
Bluff, the Southland Harbour Board's annual revenue from the 
meat trade would exceed $1.1 million, and over $2 million in 
revenue would be generated within its surrounding region. The 
Timaru Harbour Board would suffer the greatest absolute revenue 
loss from this scheme ($251,266 per annum). 
The two-port system, with meat being exported through 
Timaru and Bluff would produce similar benefits to the Timaru 
and Southland regions. Such a diversion system would generate 
approximately $1 million in revenue within the two regions.A 
corresponding loss of $382,316 and $267,020 would be experienced 
by the Canterbury and Otago regions respectively. 
The approach developed and demonstrated in this 
section is shown to be capable of calculating both the 
internal transport costs associated with various shipping 
proposals, and their resultant regional implications. No 
conclusions as to the "optirna1 11 port system may be reached 
without a similar examination of shipping costs, but the 
method does allow decision-makers to predict the internal 
ramifications of shipowners' proposals 
Table 32 
IMPACT OF MEAT AGGREGATION SCHEMES ON SOUTH ISLAND 
HARBOUR BOARDS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIES 
HARBOUR BOARD 
Marlborough 
Nelson 
Lyttelton 
Timaru 
Otago 
Southland 
OPTIMAL 
THROUGHPUT (1 ) 
(Tons) 
5,780 
4,333 
53,341 
56,796 
37,991 
1 ,737 
ONE PORT LOADING 
Revenue Impact 2 
Harbour Board Region ( ) 
(Dollars) (Dollars) 
8,352 
7,544 
..., 132,979 
- 251,266 
- 102,728 
3,377 
23,339 
17,417 
382,316 
442,153 
267,020 
,076,816 
(1) Tonnage handled by ports to minimize internal transport costs. 
(2) This takes into account income lost by waterside workers, 
as well as revenue lost harbour boards, represents 
the maximum revenue gain or s experienced each region. 
SOURCE: Harbour Board revenue per ton regional 
income multipliers from previous calculations. 
TWO-PORT LOADING 
Revenue Impact 
8,352 
7,544 
132,979 
+ 550,527 
2,728 
+ 559,5 
23,3 
, 
382,316 
+ 968,764 
267,020 
,053,131 
I-' 
W 
i'V 
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Footnotes 
(1) The Metra Report is an obvious exception, though this 
was performed by an overseas firm. 
(2) That is, the implications to ~articular sections of the 
transport system will be demonstrated. 
(3) Please note that in editing this section a small error 
was discovered in Figure 5. Lyttelton's level of 
manure imports in 1968 should have been shown as 152,623 
tons. The "other" tonnage should be reduced by this 
corresponding amount. 
(4) Themain exception to this trend is at Bluff, where a 15 
percent increase in wool loading rates occurred between 
1965 and 19~0. 
(5) The advantage in using average wool loading costs per ton, 
as against wharf handling charges is that average costs 
include both ship and wharf operations. 
Many harbour boards have criticised the wharf handling 
charges set by the Waterfront Industry Commission, some 
even claim that they discriminate against those ports 
which have installed modern facilities. For example, 
it is argued that wharf handling charges at ports which 
load and unload direct ships side are often lower than 
at those ports working through an adjacent transit shed. 
The point which is often ignored, but which is covered 
by the use of average costs, is that the rate at which 
cargo is kept up to the hook is a crucial factor in 
determining the level of charges. If a port which loaded 
wool direct ships side was able to deliver cargo to the 
hook at similar rates to those achieved by a port working 
through a transit shed, th~ first port would naturally 
enjoy lower wharf handling charges. 
The relationship between wool loading rates per gross 
gang hour and average cost per ton was tested at those 
New Zealand ports which exported more than 5,000 tons of 
wool during 1969/70. A correlation coefficient of 
-0.82 was obtained, suggesting, (as would be anticipated) 
that average wool loading costs per ton decrease as loading 
rates increase. Therefore the average costs per ton, 
together with wharfage and harbour improvement rates, 
can be ass~~ed to reflect the efficiency of various 
ports. 
(6) Although results were derived for a large number of port 
combinations, in general only those involving one-port 
or two-port loading are discussed, as this was the number 
the New Zealand Wool Board suggested as being the most 
advantageous. 
(7) Existing wool movements through a port are assumed to 
represent the amount of wool sold at the centre adjacent 
to that port. This enables wool sold at each centre to 
be expressed as a percentage of total sales. 
- 134 -
(8) As Battelle (1971,46) noted, " ••. a probable effect of 
handling wool at only two ports would be to develop 
specialised machinery at those ports with a corresponding 
increase in productivity, a factor which would further 
reduce costs ••• ". As well as handling equipment, 
investment might be needed in additional wharf side 
transit sheds to enable full utilisation to be made of 
this equipment. The complete distribution system must 
be examined as irrespective of the suitability or 
efficiency of certain facilities, the system itself will 
only be as efficient as its weakest link. 
(9) Assuming that some wool may also be shipped through 
Wellington. 
(10) This opinion was conveyed in submissions made by the 
New Zealand Wool Board to Royal Commission on containers, 
June 1972. 
(11) The Japanese and Continental trades may merit another form 
of shipment. 
(12) Reported in the New Zealand Herald, 16 September 1972. 
(13) In this situation it would be cheaper to move a certain 
tonnage of meat over longer distances, than it would be 
to move a larger tonnage oyer smaller distances. 
(14) These forecasts were based partly on historical trends, 
and partly on discussions with staff attached to the New 
Zealand Meat Board and New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' 
Economic Service. 
CHAPTER VI 
COASTAL SHIPPING AND CONTAINER AGGREGATION 
In their survey of the coastal shipping industry, the 
Commission of Inquiry into New Zealand Shipping (1971,220) 
found that " •.. the coastal trade as it exists in New 
Zealand at the present time, a proper subject for concern. 
We do not think it can continue in its present form for 
very long ••• II • It is apparent that the future role 
of coastal shipping in New Zealand's transport system is un-
certain. A review therefore made of coastal cargo 
trends during the period 1960 to 1970, and factors 
contributing towards these trends are discussed. The 
feasibility of introducing a coastal feeder system to 
aggregate containers, and the arguments supporting the 
location of a container port in the South Island are also 
studied. 
6.1 Coastal Cargo Trends 
The tonnages of coastal cargo received at South Island 
ports during the period 1960 to 1970 are shown Figure 
15. (1) This Figure would appear to suggest that far from 
being in a depressed state the coastal Shipping industry is 
experiencing increased activity, the traffic handled at most 
ports having steadily increased over the period. However 
when motor spirits and petroleum products are excluded from 
these totals a very different impression is obtained. Apart 
from Picton, which a rail ferry terminal, only Lyttelton 
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has experienced an increase in general cargo coastal inwards 
traffic. Other ports (in particular Nelson), have witnessed 
static, and in some cases sharp reductions in the level of 
their general cargo trade. 
A similar pattern is evident for the coastal outwards 
trade (see Figure 16). Substantial annual increases have been 
recorded at Picton, and Lyttelton's trade, though subject to 
fluctuations, has risen slightly. with the shipment of serpentine 
to the North Island during the mid-sixties Nelson gained addition-
al coastal cargo, but with the cessation of this trade the port's 
tonnage has steadily declined. Traffic through the remaining 
ports has generally been static, even at Otago which is linked 
with Auckland and Wellington by a modern roll-on/roll-off coastal 
service. The shipment of wheat and grain products forms the basis 
of the trade through Timaru, Oamaru and Bluff. 
In comparison, the volume of freight and motor vehicles 
carried by the Cook Strait rail ferries has increased 
dramat~cally (see Table 33). (2) 
YEAR 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Table 33 
TRENDS IN COOK STRAIT RAIL FERRY AND 
RAIL/AIR CARGO MOVEMENTS, 1963/1970 
Manifest Tons 
MOTOR FREIGHT 
VEHICLES (1) TRAFFIC 
107,370 103,561 
186,810 250,979 
227,960 311,057 
256,980 371,777 
303,450 492,043 
330,335 564,646 
380,335 689,979 
445,275 835,586 
TOTAL 
TRAFFIC 
210,931 
437,789 
539,017 
628,757 
795,493 
894,981 
1,070,314 
1,280,861 
(1) Passengers' Motor Vehicles plus Lorries and Trade Cars. 
SOURCE: Marlborough Harbour Board and New Zealand Railways. 
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During the last few years there has been increasing 
pressure for New Zealand to formulate a rational transport 
policy. Frequent recommendations have been made that "each 
mode of transport should carry the traffic to which it is 
best suited so that economic resource cost will be minimise~'. 
In view of the two preceeding Figures it would appear that 
the only commodities suited to the inherent advantages of 
coastal shipping are motor spirits and petroleum products 
and some bulk agricultural produce. (3) Even the introduction 
of modern roll-on/roll-off vessels handling general cargo in 
a unitised fashion, and providing regular and frequent services, 
have been unable to stern the diversion general cargo to the 
Cook Strait rail ferry service. coastal shipping interests 
have often urged that s should be taken to allocate freight 
or trades to the different transport modes, according to their 
inherent advantages, but as noted by the Commission of Inquiry 
into New Zealand Shipping (1971,221)., it is most unlikely that 
the Government would ever direct a shipper to use a particular 
transport mode. 
Discussion of Trends - Despite statements seeking to 
suggest otherwise, the introduction of the Cook Strait rail 
ferry service has had a serious effect on New Zealandts other 
coastal shipping services (Commission of Inquiry into New 
Zealand Shipping 1971,220). (4) Referring to e 34, total 
inter-island freight increased from 1,490,408 tons in 1964 to 
2,371,103 tons in 1970, an overall increase of 50 percent or 
approximately 9 percent per year. (5) But while freight handled 
by the rail rries increas by 193 percent (32 percent per 
year), inter-island movements by other shipping services 
remained at virtually a constant level (a 5 ent increase 
over the s year period) , 
Table 34 
TRENDS IN INTER-ISLAND FREIGHT MOVEMENTS, 1964/1970 
Manifest Tons 
COOK STRAIT RAIL FERRY CONVENTIONAL COASTAL 
YEAR Motor Vehicles Freight Total Freight SHIPPING FREIGHT TOTAL FREIGHT 
186,810 250,979 437,789 1,052,619 1,490,408 
i-' 
w 
1965 227,960 3 ,057 539,017 1,045,652 1,584,669 00 
1966 256,980 371,777 628,757 1,120,242 1,748,999 
1967 303,450 492,043 795,493 1,176,045 1,971,538 
1968 330,335 564,646 894,981 1,124,825 2,019,806 
1969 380,335 689,979 1,070,314 1,090,188 2,160,502 
1970 445,275 835,586 1,280,861 1,090,242 2,371,103 
SOURCE: and Railways ; Harbour Board Annual 
, Trade Statis Shipping Manifests. 
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The point of debate is whether this phenomenal growth 
in rail traffic resulted from new trade generated by the 
advantages of the service being offered, or trade diverted 
from conventional forms of coastal shipping. Motor 
vehicle movements increased by 82 percent during the period, 
while those carried by the rail ferr increased by 138 
percent. While some of this growth in rail ferry movements 
may be due to freight capture, a substantial portion of the 
increase must be due to new traffic being generated by the 
service. 
When motor vehicles are removed from total freight 
movements, a similar picture prevails. Total inter-island 
freight (excluding motor vehicles), increased by 32 percent, 
while the comparable figures for the rail ferries and 
conventional coastal shipping are 232 and 4 percent respectively 
An analysis of coastal cargo being handled at South Island 
ports during this period shows the type of commodities which 
have been diverted to rail. In general, higher-value goods 
have switched to rail and more bulky and seasonal agricultural 
products have been retained. The very nature of these 
products makes it more difficult for shipping companies to 
provide the type of service necessary to recapture the lost 
trade. Many of the remaining coastal movements tend to be 
both seasonal and unbalanced (see Table 35), and this in turn 
makes the provision of regular shipping services difficult. 
The majority of coastal exports through Bluff, Timaru and 
Oamaru are grain or grain products, with 87 percent of Bluff's, 
80 percent of Oamaru's, 84 percent of Timaru's coastal 
- 140 -
exports in 1969 coming within this category_ 
Table 35 
DIRECTION OF INTER-ISLAND FREIGHT HOVE~1ENTS, 1969 
Manifest Tons 
DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT (1) 
PORT North to Soudi SoutFi to Nortn 
Nelson 39,000 24,268 
Lyttelton 363,451 364,672 
Timaru 9,487 60,956 
Oamaru 3,026 30,396 
Otago 51,142 49,651 
f 32,792 43,993 
(1) Motor Spirits and Oil Products are Excluded. 
SOURCE: Harbour Board Trade Statistics and Shipping Manifests. 
There are many and varied reasons to explain why the 
Railways Department has attracted this inter-island freight 
from coastal shipping operators. (6) Problems facing shipping 
compan - for example, port congestion, port labour shortages, 
industrial disputes, inadequate port facilities and escalating 
operating costs - all combine to disrupt the service 
frequency and reliability offered by this mode. Irregular 
and unreliable services have resulted in many shippers being 
attracted to rail, despite their often having to pay higher 
ight costs. 
The lways Department have paid close attention to 
their customers requirements and have concentrated on providing 
regular and frequent services - enabling inventory costs to 
be kept to a minimum. Freight forwarding firms have worked 
in close conjunction with Railways to provide a convenient 
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and reliable service. Bulk tonnage contracts a.nd wagon 
leasing agreements have led to the Railways concentrating on 
the line-haul operation, with the forwarding companies 
accepting responsibility for freight solicitation, 
consolidation, and door-to-door delivery. Rimmer (1972b) 
has shown that lias the forwarding companies are able to blend 
cargo to obtain the maximum weight/cubic ratio of the rail 
wagons, they are able to offer even cheaper rates than the 
Railways operating in their own rightll. Such has been 
the success of these a,greements with freight forwarding 
companies that over 35 percent of the freight traffic 
carried by the rail ferries is provided by such bulk tonnage 
contractors. 
6.2 Future Coastal 
The recent introduction of the third Cook Strait rail 
ferry, and the decision to purchase a fourth seems certain 
to make further inroads into the present coastal shipping 
services. (7) Freight forecasts corr-piled by the Railways 
Department demonstrated the need for the introduction of these 
additional vessels. A held by many harbour boards 
and shipping operators is that these rail forecasts ~vere 
based on the assumption that rail would continue to attract 
freight away from conventional shipping. While the 
Railways agreed that their forecasts were based on historical 
patterns of freight movements, they claimed that the majority 
of this freight was not captured but generated. In addition 
they pointed to the large amount of freight declined on account 
of insufficient capacity to carry it as further demonstrating 
the need for extra ferries 
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Rail forecasts suggest that the total demand for 
inter-island movement via the Cook Strait ferries will reach 
1,439,000 deadweight tons by 1975, in comparison with the 
507,281 tons carried during the year ended 31 March 1970 
(see Table 36). 
Table 36 
COOK STRAIT FERRY FREIGHT FORECASTS 
Deadweight Tons 
YEAR 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
FREIGHT FORECASTS 
623,000 
769,000 
947,000 
1,167,000 
1,439,000 
SOURCE: New Zealand Railways Department. 
While a substantial increase in freight demand is 
forecast, it must be noted that the predicted annual rate of 
increase is less than that actually experienced during the 
past six years - between 1964 and 1970 the annual increase 
was 42 percent; the predicted increase between 1971 and 
1975 is 33 percent per annum. However the absolute rate of 
increase is much greater and there are definite limitations 
to the validity of a forecast which only considers developments 
within one section of a transport mode and then assumes that 
these trends will apply to the mode as a whole. (8) 
Objections by coastal shipping operators and harbour 
boards to the expansion of this rail ferry link have often 
been regarded as parochial or representing sectarian interests 
rather than the interests of New and as a whole. While 
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most harbour boards would agree with the Commission of 
Inquiry into New Zealand Shipping (1971,222) that " ••• to 
try to maintain ships on an uneconomic basis simply in order 
to keep minor ports alive would be unwise ••• ", the opinion is 
often voiced that coastal shipping services are being 
rendered uneconomic through devious r~te-cutting practices 
by the Railways. 
Criticism has been levelled at the Railways for their 
policy of "charging according to what the tra ic will bear", 
and instances where the rail charges between ports were less 
than the charges between inland areas separated by smaller 
distances have been noted. (While acknowledging the 
existense of such rates, the Railways stress these were still 
economic) . By virtue of their protected position - which 
gives them a virtual monopoly over the majority of intra-
island freight movements - together with the size of their 
organisation, the Railways are able to contest innovations 
by coastal shippers which they fear may undermine their 
(9) 
existing level of operations. While this competition is 
beneficial to the areas concerned, those areas not served by 
, 
coastal shipping, or where existing services are in jeopardy, 
are placed in a relatively unfavourable position. 
A policy of basing charges on the level of marginal or 
incremental costs is economically sound, as once an investment 
has been made (for example, in a new rail ferry), the recovery 
of anything more than incremental costs is worthwhile. The 
national interest requires maximum utilisation of the 
Railways vast capacity - allowing f costs to be spread 
, .. 
volume of t,raff But Ie this policy of 
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setting charges above incremental costs according to the 
alternatives available to the shipper may be beneficial 
to the mode concerned, .at least in the short-run, it is not 
necessarily advantageous to the whole transport industry. 
Destructive competition that aims through temporary reductions 
in price to secure long-run monopoly profits will only harm 
both the shipper and the consumer. 
It appears as though a situation has been reached where 
coastal operators are reluctant to invest in the modern 
shipping they realise is required for the New Zealand coastal 
trade, because of the Railways concentration on long-haul 
inter-island movements. A pertinent development is that 
within six months of the takeover of the Union Steamship 
Company Limited by Tasman Union Limited in December 1971, the 
combined shipping fleets of the Union, Holm and Anchor 
Companies had been reduced by a third. The reluctance of 
coastal operators to invest in modern shipping, further 
strengthens the Railways position as they have an obligation 
to en~ure that adequate transport facilities are provided. 
6.3 South Island Container Port 
The unanimous opinion of the Molyneux Report, the 
British Conference Lines' container investigations, and the 
Metra Report was that New Zealand's container service should, 
in the first instance, be limited to two ports, Auckland and 
Wellington. Their opinions were shared by the Transport 
Commission and the New Zealand Ports Authority. Emotive and 
parochial comments abound on this subject and while several 
ports have spent much e in assembling evidence purporting 
- 145 -
to support their particular claim - to be the South Island 
container port - the issue remains clouded. 
Confusion has stemmed from two separate issues being 
discussed at once. While some South Island harbour boards 
have vigorously attacked the location of both container 
ports in the North Island, on the grounds that this would 
have disastrous results for the South Island, they are often 
equally opposed to the suggestion that a South Island 
container port be located at any port other than their own. 
An examination of these two issues, the evidence supporting 
the need for a South Island container port and its desirable 
location, would form the basis of a complete study in itself. 
However attention will be focussed on the three reasons most 
frequently mentioned as supporting the need for a South 
Island container port. 
Internal Transport Costs - Quite detailed studies have 
compared the costs of moving all the South Island's exports 
to Wellington with the costs of centralisation at one South 
Island port. The Otago Harbour Board (1971,7) found that the 
transport of South Island meat, wool, hides, fruit and cheese 
would involve an annual transport haul of 193 million ton-miles 
to Wellington as opposed to a total of 62 million ton-miles 
to Otago. These findings have been used as evidence supporting 
the need to construct a South Island container port. 
A false assumption made in these calculations is that all 
South Island produce would be containerised. This was never 
suggested as advantageous, either by the British Conference 
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Lines or in the Metra Report. Furthermore it is dangerous 
to reach conclusions on the merits of particular systems 
based on a comparison of small portions of each. It is 
necessary to calculate the operating costs of moving 
containers through (not just to), a South Island port. A 
feature of the cellular container system is the very high 
cost of terminal facilities and therefore, in order to 
achieve acceptable unit throughput costs, terminal throughput 
must be very high. A South Island container port would 
naturally decrease internal transport costs, as well as 
benefitting the port concerned, but it has not been 
demonstrated that a sufficient level of cargo throughput 
could be achieved to lower total system costs. For example 
it seems certain that container handling charges at Wellington 
would need to be increased, due to the reduced level of 
utilisation, and additional costs would be incurred by the 
container ship operators. 
Regional Development - Submissionson this subject have 
implied that the absence of a container port in the South 
Island will " ... act as a disincentive for further industrial 
development in the area" (Lyttelton Harbour Board, 1969a), and 
conversely that " ••• the establishment of a ••. container 
port would be a practical and painless way now of taking a 
positive step to help reduce excessive drift to the North" 
(Otago Harbour Board,1971(9). Unfortunately the way in which 
a container port would reduce this "excessive drift" is not 
suggested - though the implication is that indu$1\:trv will be 
attracted tn locate ne~r ~ container port. 
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Under the British Conference Lines i original container 
proposals a provincial shipper usirig the container service 
would not have to pay more in total transport because his 
goods were carried in containers through Auckland or 
Wellington, instead of being shipped directly through his 
nearest port. He would be charged no more for internal 
transport than if he had shipped through his nearest port. 
Hence the absence of a container port would not have faced 
South Island shippers with increased freight charges, in 
comparison with their North Island counterparts. Some time 
savings may accrue to the shipper located close to a 
container port. 
Both Ogandana(1970) and Forward(1970) consider that along 
with the tendency for trade to be concentrated through a 
reduced number of ports there may result a similar concentration 
of manufacturing. The only empirical study found by the 
author on this subject was by Johnson and Garnett{197l,202) , 
who after investigating the impact of the introduction of 
containerisation on British business firms, concluded that 
" •.. there is no evidence 6f firms siting themselves in a 
locality because of the proximity of a container terminal ••. 
It is difficult to see how a Scottish industrialist would 
suffer in the absence of container terminal in Scotland.". 
In Chapter IV estimates of the income harbour boards and 
watersiders may lose should cargo be diverted away from their 
port were presented. This represents a real loss to the local 
economy but must be balanced against the savings inherent in 
the new system. The tendency to assume that large-scale 
industrial complexes {which are often located adjacent to 
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ports where deep water and suitable industrial land coincide, 
will follow the establishment of a container port, is at 
present unfounded. 
Internal Transport Congestion - It is generally assumed 
that South Island containers will move to and from the 
container port at Wellington via the rail system. (The 
choice of mode used to aggregqte containers will be discussed in 
the following section). The Christchurch/Picton railway 
line passes through some very difficult terrain where slips 
and derailments are not uncommon. As many submissions have 
pointed out, there is a danger in relying completely on this one 
link for the assembly and distribution of all South Island 
containers. (A schematic outline of the South Island rail 
system (Figure 17), illustrates the degree to which containers 
would be concentrated over a single stretch of track. Line 
sections which need upgrading to accommodate I.S.O. containers 
on normal deck wagons are shown). The ability of this single-
track line to handle the increased tonnages of goods has also 
been questioned. 
The Railways Department have countered these fears by 
stating that the Christchurch/Picton railway line has 
ample capacity to meet all future demands. Should an increase 
in capacity be required there would he many simple means of 
achieving this (for example, through an increase in locomotive 
power, increased wagon loadings, etc.). While they concede 
that severe climatic conditions are regularly experienced 
around some areas of this track, they feel that they have 
modern equipment readily available to deal with any 
ruption. 
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- 149 -
Both the Lyttelton and otago Harbour Boards have 
published studies showing why they should be the South Island 
container port. Lyttelton, having already invested large 
amounts of capital in a bulk handling complex claims it 
could complete the construction and purchase of facilities 
necessary to accomodate containers for as little as $1.5 
million, and Otago claims that it has the lowest container 
development costs of any South Island port. The Otago 
Harbour Board has also assembled data suggesting that the 
internal freight costs incurred in reaching its port would 
be less than for any other port. It also feels that the 
location of Port Chalmers within 250 miles of all South 
Island freezing works (excluding those at Nelson and Picton), 
would be to its advantage. This is because the time from the 
> 
commencement of loading frozen produce into a container to 
entry into the refrigerated stack of the container terminal 
(or ship), should not exceed 48 hours. As Haughey(1970,109) 
has demonstrated, this would exclude Lyttelton as a possible 
location because under the. present rail system it would 
take at least 48 hours to transport meat from freezing works 
south of Dunedin to Lyttelton. (10) 
Understandable concern has been expressed by some South 
Island harbour boards who feel their existence might be 
threatened with the introduction of containerisation. Many 
submissions have been made stressing the urgent need to locate 
a container port in the South Island, but no sUbstantive 
evidence has been presented to show that such a port would 
reduce the overall cost of transporting New Zealand's overseas 
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trade. In view of the uncertainty surrounding the type 
of shipping likely to serve New Zealand in the future 
(outlined in Chapter IV), investment in a third container 
port is unwarranted. The continued introduction of 
containers seems inevitable but there are now more multi-
purpose and semi-container ships entering the New Zealand 
service. Unlike full container ships they can load 
containers at non-container ports, therefore providing a 
much more flexible operation. 
6.4 Method of ion 
The impact of containerisation on New Zealand ports will 
be dependent upon the transport mode selected to move 
containers to and from the container ports. Some of the 
possible methods which may be used to move containers are 
illustrated in Figure 18. 
It has frequently been suggested that the aggregation 
of containers by coastal feeder ships would offer transport 
savings over other modes, in addition to alleviating the loss 
suffered by provincial ports under the container system. 
A former Minister of Marine commented that as export trade 
will be concentrated at a few ports, it would II ••• be logical 
to expect that a larger volume of coastal trade will be 
handled by non-exporting ports as they clear shipments to 
and from shipping terminals". (Anon.,1969a). Shipping 
executives saw coastal feeder ships as a possible means of 
connecting South Island importers and exporters with the 
container terminal at Wellington (Anon.,1970e) I and many 
others have felt this system would be both desirable and 
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feasible. (11) 
Two main issues are involved in deciding on the mode 
to be used to transport South Island containers to 
Wellington: the ability of the railway system to handle 
the increased traffic, and the relative economics of rail 
and coastal shipping. 
Rail Capacity Restraints - Aronis(1970) has demonstrated 
that calculating the capacity of a railway system is a very 
complex task. Although the Railways Department have not 
indicated what the physical capacity of any particular 
stretch of track might be, they have stated that increased 
rail movements within the South Island could easily be 
handled by existing facilities. During the year ended 
31 March 1969 the Morrinsville/Frankton section of railway 
carried the heaviest density of traffic of any single line 
section. Traffic densities on various rail sections, 
together with an index figure to ease comparison are shown 
in Table 37. 
Table 37 
DENSITY OF RAIL TRAFFIC 
Year Ended 31 March 1969 
RAILWAY SECTION 
Morrinsville/Frankton 
North Island 
South Island 
Christchurch/Picton 
TRAFFIC DENSITY 
(Gross Tons/Route Mile) 
3.,948 
2,085 
892 
1,252 
SOURCE: New Zealand Railways Department. 
INDEX 
100 
53 
23 
32 
The relatively low traffic density within the South 
Island is immediately apparent and the Railways Department 
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feels that much more traffic could be carried on the 
Christchurch/Picton line simply by running more trains. (12) 
The maximum number of containers which would have required 
transport to the South Island under the Conference Lines' 
container proposal would have been approximately 310 a 
fortnight. Assuming 50 containers per container train, 
only an additional six trains a fortnight would have been 
necessary_ With the third Cook Strait rail ferry designed 
to carry 52 20 foot containers on railway wagons, and 10 
20 foot containers on trailer units, the fortnightly 
potential of this single ferry would approach 1,000 20 foot 
containers on railway wagons per fortnight. (13) 
Rail capacity restraints, either on the Cook Strait 
ferries or on the Christchurch/Picton line, do not appear 
likely to hinder the movement of South Island containers to 
and from Wellington. The disadvantage of concentrating 
the bulk of the Island's exports and imports over this single 
line is difficult to quantify, although the potential 
danger is apparent. 
Feasibili of a Coastal Feeder Service - None of the 
reports which investigated the feasibility of the container 
system were very specific as to how containers would be 
transported within New Zealand. The Metra Report, the 
only study made in New Zealand with access to road, rail 
and coastal shipping cost data, concluded that " ••• whilst 
on some routes coastal container ships can give rise to 
savings over rail, there does not appear to be a sufficient 
volume of trade on enough routes to justify their use". 
(~1etra Report,1968 e 41). Even when a high level of 
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containerisation was examined, and a container port was 
situated at an extreme location in the country, Metra found 
that the load factor on a coastal feeder service did not 
rise above 40 percent. But Metra did not consider the 
possibility of carrying containers on the existing roll-onl 
roll-off shipping services. Had this been considered a 
much greater load factor would have resulted. 
Several studies have considered the most appropriate 
type of vessel for a container feeder service. In a 
comprehensive survey of types of ships in service overseas 
which might be suitable for the aggregation of containers 
in New Zealand, Waters(197l,15} decided that " ••• national 
container ports should be serviced by small cellular 
container ships of the "MINHO" and "HUSTLER" types ••• ", 
although he did not discuss the cost of operating such 
vessels. A study by A.D. Little (Inc.) looked specifically 
at the possibility of instituting waterborne feeder services 
to move containers to and from major "express" ports. In 
examining United States North Atlantic ports, assuming New 
York was the major container port, they found only modest 
potential for such a service. The extra time and handling 
cost involved in moving from an inland point to a feeder 
port, and then by water to the main port, made the system 
unattractive. 
In light of A.D. Little's very detailed study, some 
comments can be made regarding the feasibility of a New 
Zealand coastal feeder service: 
(i) Shipowners will control the internal movement of 
containers within New Zealand and in selecting a transport 
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mode they will only be concerned with the economics of the 
operation, not the regional implications of their choice. 
Shipping lines have suggested that while a coastal feeder 
system may be appropriate for the movement of South Island 
goods through Wellington, it would be more economical to 
use rail witnin the North Island. (14) It is doubtful 
whether a coastal operator would be prepared to invest 
in a specialised feeder system for only the South Island 
trade, especially as there will be continued pressure to 
locate a container port in the South Island. 
(ii) Rail transport has a real advantage over other 
forms of transport during the introductory phase of 
containerisation because it enables small numbers of 
containers to be hauled from different sources without a 
large increase in operating costs. While the rail system 
is very large, its individual units are readily adaptable 
to non-containerised cargoes, and so its load factor may be 
controlled. In comparison a coastal feeder system consists 
of a few large transportation units. Ship costs cannot be 
. (15) 
readily reduced in proportion to cargoes available. 
(iii) Much I of the South Island's exports require 
refrigeration. Speed of transport is therefore critical. 
The stockpiling of containers at feeder ports, necessary 
to speed ship turnround, would require further investment 
in refrigerated plant (such as clip-on units). This 
investment would not be required to the same extent by rail 
transport. Special container trains are now being run on 
direct service, without shunting and remarshalling halts, 
to and from the container ports. 
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In view of the uncertainty surrounding the introduction 
of containers into the New Zealand trade, combined with the 
heavy investment made by the Railways in container movement 
facilities and the pressure from some quarters for the 
establishment of a third container port in New Zealand, 
it is unlikely that a shipping operator would purchase a vessel 
specifically for a coastal feeder service. Although some 
containers may be moved by the existing coastal fleet it 
seems certain that only a small proportion will be handled 
by this mode. While the Railways have stressed that 
"as a matter of national interest full use must be made of 
existing transport facilities to ensure that capital investment 
is not wasted", exactly the same reasoning may be offered 
by harbour boards to promote the continued use of their 
facilities. This point serves to illustrate the real 
need for effective control to be exercised over all sectors 
of the transport industry. 
Footnotes 
(1) The ports at Greymouth and Westport are excluded. 
(2) This Table is derived from Appendix XXVII. Motor 
vehicles are each assumed to represent five manifest 
tons, and one deadweight ton is taken as equalling 
1.6 manifest tons. (This ratio was derived by 
averaging the ratio between manifest and deadweight 
tons over the three years 1968 to 1970). 
(3) In addition, bulk coal shipped from Westport and 
Greymouth, and bulk cement shipped from Portland, 
Tarakohe and Westport must be added. 
(4) For example, see the statement by the Minister of 
Transport (Hansard,1969,1330): "I wish to quote some 
figures which I think will prove that coastal shipping 
has not suffered from the modernising and the 
efficiency of the railway system". The Minister then 
compared tonnages moved by coastal shipping in 1957 
with comparable tonnages for 1969 (excluding certain 
bulk products). But while the total coastal trade 
did increase over this period, since 1964 inter-island 
trade carried by conventional shipping ha.s remained 
virtually static. 
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(5) The tonnages carried by conventional coastal shipping 
services are listed in Appendix XXVIII. 
(6) A large number of submissions presented to the 
Commission of Inquiry into New Zealand Shipping dealt 
with this subject. 
(7) The third ferry, the "Arahanga" entered service late in 
1972 while the fourth ferry designed almost wholely for 
the carriage of freight is due for delivery in April 
1974. 
It has been reported that since August 1972 the Railways 
Department's weekly capacity for shipping rail waggons 
across Cook Strait has more than doubled - from 630 
waggons each way to 1,300 each way (The Press, 12 
December 1972). 
In August 1972 the ferry timetable was rearranged to 
increase the 21 sailings a week to 25. This meant 
that waggon capacity rose to 750 each way a week. 
With the advent of the "Arahanga" which is primarily a 
freight vessel, the capacity of the ferry service was 
increased to 1,300 rail waggons each way a week. 
(8) Here is surprising that in reaching their decision 
regarding the ordering of the fourth Cook Strait ferry, 
the Transport Advisory Council did not request that 
a forecast be made of total inter-island traffic. 
(9) During the Commission of Inquiry into New Zealand 
Shipping the commercial manager, New Zealand Railways 
was asked: 
"In effect, your policy is that once the traffic goes 
by rail you do your best to ensure that it always 
goes by rail by regulating your charges as 
necessary? ••• Yes". 
The ability of the Railways to compete is further 
bolstered by their receiving loans at very low 
interest rates. For example it is noted in the 
Report of the Railways Department,(1972} that: 
lilt is Government's policy that railways should 
operate on a commerical basis in the long term 
but because of the short-term financial problems 
facing railways, finance by way of interest-free 
loans is being provided in order to permit the 
department to carryon its day-to-day operations 
and to continue with the planned development 
programme.". 
(10) This factor has now been removed as with the increase 
in container traffic special container trains are 
being run on direct service without shunting and 
remarshalling halts to and from the container ports. 
For example, New Zealand's first long-distance container 
crane left Invercargill at 7.p.m. and the containers 
had been unloaded at the Wellington Container Terminal 
by 7.30.a.m. the following morning 
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(11) The Northland Harbour Board(1969), stressed the dire 
regional consequences which would result if such a service 
was not introduced, but while claiming that this service 
would offer transport savings, felt that a form of 
protection would be necessary_ King (1971,107) 
considered that it would be feasible to run a small 
container ship on a coastal feeder service, but as is 
common with much literature on this subject did not 
progress further than raising the possibility. 
(12) The capacity of the line could further be improved 
by the introduction of special container trains, the 
easement of grades and curves, improved signalling 
systems or by increasing locomotive power. 
(13) The exact potential would depend on the scheduling of 
sailings. 
(14) The costs to shipping lines of aggregating containers 
using the alternative modes could be determined by using 
the network method demonstrated in Chapter v. 
(15) A.D. Little's study estimated that the fixed costs of 
feeder ships formed over 80 percent of the service's 
total annual costs. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Within New Zealand there is general agreement that 
some form of transport planning is necessary. ~ihi1e this need 
is appreciated, and some broad transport objectives have been 
formulated, much uncertainty surrounds the degree to which 
recent transport proposals within the shipping industry will 
in fact satisfy these objectives. 
The approach commonly adopted towards transport planning 
in New Zealand corresponds to what Burns (1969) has termed the 
"bottleneck" approach. Comprehensive planning requires that 
future activities be predicted in both time and space. The 
bottleneck approach removes this necessity since the time is 
the present and the place is the physical location of the 
bottleneck. Under this system planners concentrate on removing 
obvious bottlenecks to the efficient movement of goods, and 
make marginal improvements to certain transport policies and 
regulations. Although there are many organisations within New 
Zealand to identify and correct these bottlenecks, a big 
deficiency in this approach is that there is often a long 
period between the perception of a bottleneck and the imp1e-
mentation of a corrective solution. 
This study demonstrates an approach whereby transport 
planners may progress from a bottleneck-type approach, to a 
position where the system-wide repercussions of alternative 
projects may be incorporated in the decision-making process. 
7.1 Summary 
Rapid changes in shipping technology are placing ports in 
an uncertain position. New facilities are required to accommo-
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date modern container and unit-load vessels, and should these 
not be provided a port may see its traditional cargo diverted 
elsewhere. But in constructing these very expensive 
facilities, often with little or no guarantee that they will 
be fully utilised, ports run the risk of losing financial 
stability. Port investment decisions must be co-ordinated 
on a national basis, and made with an awareness of likely 
developments not only within the shipping industry but also 
within internal transport systems. 
With the rapid development of unit-load cargo handling 
methods there will be increased pressure to concentrate 
cargoes through a reduced number of ports. As well as 
altering the physical nature of ports, these developments will 
have widespread implications for the overall spatial 
development of a country's port system. 
The New Zealand Ports Authority was set up in 1968 to 
co-ordinate investment in New Zealand's ports, but as yet has 
not brought down its national plan. In evaluating 
alternative container shipping proposals the Ports Authority 
acknowledged the likelihood that their introduction may 
threaten the economic viability of some New Zealand ports. 
But the Government made no examination of internal 
ramifications in approving of the container principle; indeed 
the Metra Report, which greatly influenced the Government's 
decision, stressed that the sole criterion they used to determine 
the transport system most advantageous to New Zealand's 
economy was that of transport cost. No account was taken 
of other considerations which may be relevant to the choice of 
a rt system. 
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This study calculated the economic impact, in terms of 
income and employment generated, of the ports at Nelson, 
Picton, Lyttelton, Timaru, Oamaru, Dunedin and Bluff. During 
the 1969/70 financial year these ports injected over $5 
million into their local communities, and when waterside 
workers' incomes and port capital expenditure are included 
this value increases to over $14 million. Employment as 
waterside workers or harbour board employees for 2,667 people 
were provided at these seven ports. 
A series of regional' multipliers were derived to allow 
the total impact of these ports to be assessed. Applying the 
relevant multipliers to the initial expenditure injected, it 
was estimated that these ports generated revenue between 
$16 million and $19.5 million during 1969/70. This generated 
revenuewas calculated to provide employment for at least 
7,786 people. 
Revenue coefficients, indicating the revenue each port 
received from handling particular trades and commodities, 
were calculated. Coefficients for general cargo, which is 
handled by break-bulk methods, were much greater than for 
dry and liquid bulk cargoes, which are handled mechanically. 
For example the movement of one ton of general cargo through 
Timaru was found to generate $4.24 in harbour board revenue, 
whereas the revenue generated in handling one ton of dry bulk 
cargo at Nelson was only $0.61. 
These coefficients enabled various cargo aggregation 
proposals to be evaluated in terms of their financial 
implications to The ted concentration of the 
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South Island's East Coast North America trade through the 
container port at Wellington, was shown to reduce the South 
Island harbour boards' revenue by over $240,000 per annum. 
Generated revenue removed from the local economies would 
exceed $465,000. 
A transport model, based on network analysis methods, 
was formulated to enable the internal' transport costs of a 
number of cargo aggregation schemes to be determined. 
Alternative meat and wool distribution policies were modelled 
to estimate their associated transport costs. 
Internal transport costs incurred in shipping wool 
exports through only one South Island port (Otago) were shown 
as being $4,267,513, and the cheapest two-port combination 
(Timaru/Bluff) would cost $3,616,094. Should the South 
Island's meat exports be aggregated at only one port, Bluff -
despite its relatively isolateqlocation ~ would be the most 
favourable port. Under a two-port meat loading scheme 
the Timaru/Bluff combination would offer slight internal 
transport savings over Lyttelton/Bluff. The system-wide 
implications of such distribution policies were assessed. 
The future role to be played by New Zealand's coastal 
shipping industry is uncertain. Sharp inroads into the 
traffic traditionally carried by coastal shipping operators 
have been made by the Cook strait rail ferries. A situation 
has been reached where coastal operators are reluctant to 
invest in the modern shipping they realise is required for the 
New Zealand coastal trade, because of the Railways 
concentration on long-haul island movements. 
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The feasibility of a coastal container feeder service 
was examined, as it has frequently been suggested that such a 
service would offer transport savings (over road and rail), in 
addition to alleviating the loss suffered by provincial ports 
under the container system. In view of the uncertainty surround-
ing the introduction of containers into the New Zealand trade, 
combined with the heavy investment made by the Railways Depart-
ment in container facilities, it is considered that a coastal 
feeder service would not be an economically viable proposition. 
Future developments within New Zealand's port system will 
be largely determined by the type of shipping which emerges as 
best suited to the country's trading requirements, although 
there is the possibility that the Government may increasingly 
take into consideration a wider range of factors when evaluating 
shipping proposals. General cargo will tend to be handled by 
unitised methods, although the concentration of this trade through 
Auckland and Wellington might not be as great as has been predict-
ed. Many provincial ports will in the future be called upon to 
handle predominantly bulk cargoes. 
Port investment decisions should not be reached without 
an awareness of developments accruing within all transport 
modes. Of paramount importance is the need to formulate a series 
of policies to co-ordinate the use and development of all 
components of New Zealand's transport system, so that the 
resources devoted to transport are channelled into the most 
productive areas. In formulating such policy, it is vital 
that objective studies be made of the total costs incurred 
within each transport mode in performing certain tasks. Without 
such studies it is impossible for New Ze~land to formulate a 
rational transport policy. 
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Appendix I 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS BLENHEIM 
62/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
---
Forestry, Mining 54 74 65 64 60 75 84 71 88 
Seasonal Manufacturing 235 203 210 204 226 227 302 284 286 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 86 91 97 103 115 92 1 124 III 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 185 217 204 188 210 237 182 201 221 
Building Materials 138 162 161 155 148 144 142 136 138 
Engineering, Metal 412 428 432 470 529 7 540 577 606 
ce11aneous Manufacturing 159 2 161 167 173 179 173 177 182 
P01.>ler, Water, Sanitary 
Services 183 220 191 131 136 131 9 149 144 
Building, Construction 749 743 736 729 794 848 853 832 816 
Transport, Communication 848 835 864 892 943 929 959 976 1,009 I-' 
Commerce, Wool and ...., co 
Stores 961 1,007 1,007 1,014 1,078 1,061 1,046 1,053 1,075 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 254 276 261 273 290 288 301 330 364 
Administration, Professional 911 953 969 986 1,038 1,081 1,085 1,069 1,112 
TOTAL 5,175 5,371 5,358 5,376 5,740 5,839 5,937 5,979 6,152 
SOURCE: Prices, Wages, Labour, 1962/1970: Department of Statistics, Wellington. 
Appendix II 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS: CHRISTCHURCH 
1962/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Forestry, Mining 532 547 578 596 566 726 728 712 603 
Seasonal Manufacturing 2,009 2,025 2,398 2,305 2,349 2,387 2,457 2,676 2,644 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 2,192 2,260 2,345 2 f 324 2,343 2,454 2,485 2,508 2,520 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 7,883 8,000 8,294 8,330 8,406 7,745 7,734 8,471 8,598 
Building Materials 3,450 3,562 3,834 4,062 4,180 3,962 3,953 4,272 4,288 
Engineering, Metal 10,825 11,496 11,802 12,416 13,076 12,675 12,532 13,238 14,241 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 4,880 5,081 5,035 5,330 5,701 5,383 5,584 5,881 5,938 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 2,260 2,300 2,282 2,255 2,243 2,344 2,450 2,378 2,529 
Building, Construction 5,873 6,064 6,508 6,779 6,595 6,086 5,629 5,674 5,915 I-' 
Transport, Communication 7,997 7,925 8,141 8,301 8,381 8,449 8,349 8,268 8,693 -..J I,D 
Commerce, Wool and 
Grain Stores 15,281 15,868 16,488 16,853 16,985 16,989 16,880 16,868 16,899 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 3,373 3,440 3,473 3,603 3,490 3,563 3,564 3; 634 4,030 
Administration, Professional 13,456 13,840 14,548 14,990 15,628 16,479 17 035 17,639 18,740 
TOTAL 80,011 82,408 85,726 .88,144 89,943 89,242 89,380 92,220 95,638 
SOURCE: Prices, Wages, Labour, 1962/1970. Department of Statistics, Wellington. 
Appendix III 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS: TlMARU 
1962/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Forestry, Mining 14 12 9 16 14 16 18 17 23 
Seasonal Manufacturing 440 457 425 453 467 504 569 5 598 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 318 321 321 293 280 283 283 268 272 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 621 665 735 779 830 744 702 780 841 
Building Materials 468 487 553 519 564 480 457 491 473 
Engineering, Metal 731 765 839 901 910 894 890 933 944 
ce11aneous Manufacturing 3 155 167 186 187 208 188 194 200 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 210 2 218 204 198 196 206 222 253 
Building, Construction 947 937 958 983 1,025 954 882 1,034 1,545 
Transport, Communication 1,309 1,324 1,394 1,391 1,442 1,331 1,303 1,271 1,295 I-' 00 
Commerce, Wool and 0 
Stores 2,467 2,478' 2,592 2,685 2,698 2,636 2,584 2,600 2,521 
Domestic And Persopal 
Services 654 678 705 691 712 697 758 709 711 
Administration, Professional 1,894 1,942-- 1,998 2,103 2,148 2,171 2,225 2,140 2,113 
TOTAL 10,226 10,435 10,914 ,204 11,475 11, 11,065 11,233 ,789 
SOURCE: Prices, Wages~abour, 1962/1970. Department of Statistics, Wellington. 
Appendix IV 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS: OAMARU 
62/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 69 1970 
Forestry, Mining 36 35 33 37 27 48 36 34 25 
Seasonal Manufacturing 184 186 184 8 201 192 234 277 276 
, Drink Tobacco 212 218 205 209 209 2 206 202 209 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 4 470 433 394 441 419 5 459 447 
ding Materials 126 148 149 6 143 136 134 152 142 
Engineering, Metal 364 361 391 406 404 379 377 352 360 
J.l;1iscel1aneous Manufacturing 43 39 38 43 43 44 38 41 41 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 241 286 355 298 2 270 269 264 249 
Building, Construction 1,443 1,786 1,878 1,585 1,543 1,413 9 1,061 768 
Tr anspo.rt Communication 587 590 6 624 639 613 556 579 571 
Commerce, Wool and f-' 00 
Grain Stores 786 863 874 895 871 8 842 856 814 I-' 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 197 224 241 278 286 262 256 253 250 
Administration, Professional 781 789 8 813 825 823 3 856 843 
TOTAL 5,411 5,995 6,211 5,926 5,906 5,711 5,030 5,386 4,995 
SOURCE: Prices, Wages, Labour, 1962/1970. Department of Statistics, Wellington. 
Appendix V 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS: DUNEDIN 
1962/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Forestry, Mining 534 483 553 530 549 .650 747 663 580 
Seasonal Manufacturing 755 806 745 800 812 859 856 810 806 
, Drink, Tobacco 1,608 1,708 1,722 1,822 1,807 1,853 1,932 1,930 10 944 
es, Clothing 
Leather 3,449 3,470 3,520 3,661 3, 8 3,225 2,904 3,036 3,083 
Building Materials 1,255 1,205 1,255 1,196 1,239 1,191 1,143 1,191 1, 3 
Engineering, Metal 4,301 4,422 4,651 4,908 4,928 4,851 4,762 4,890 5,091 
ce11aneous Manufacturing 1,676 1,6 1,734 1,725 1,769 1,710 1,768 1,827 1,858 
PoitJer, Water, Sanitary 
Services 937 938 928 965 964 965 983 995 1,003 
Iding, Construction 3,603 3,657 3,740 3,627 3,724 3,903 3,694 3,353 3,684 
Transport, Communication 4,556 4,521 4,489 4,458 4,433 4,392 4,2 4,226 4,386 I-' Commerce, Wool and Grain 00 
Stores 7,651 7,717 7,987 7,983 7,887 7,772 7,846 7,862 7,846 tv 
Domes and Personal 
Services 1,776 1,832 1,906 1,994 2,033 2,062 2,164 2,188 2,147 
tration, 
Professional 7,915 8,240 8,398 B ,·644 9,065 9,469 9,417 2,700 10, 0 
TOTAL 40,016 40,663 41,632 42,213 42,758 42,902 42,470 42,671 43,711 
SOURCE: Prices, Wages, Labour, 1962/1970. Department of statistics, Wellington. 
Appendix VI 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS: INVE RCARGI LL 
1962/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Forestry, Mining 636 595 637 630 647 710 678 7 671 
Seasonal Manufacturing 1,365 1,469 1,343 1,320 1,350 1,373 1,367 1,379 1,501 
, Drink, Tobacco 320 336 325 351 9 332 296 318 3 
, Clothing 
Leather 241 247 2 228 230 227 246 263 285 
Building Materials 986 974 1,010 966 9 893 852 926 983 
Engineering, Metal 1,785 1,833 1,993 2,181 2,248 2,199 2,149 2,264 2,339 
1aneous Manufacturing 680 713 753 828 850 8 781 796 3 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 637 585 5 563 590 685 7 1 777 
ding, Construction 1,678 1,949 2,483 2,6 3,3 3,,403 3,492 2,612 2,363 
Transport, Cornmuncation 2,490 2,455 2,462 2,487 2,522 2,454 2,486 2,456 2,486 !-' co 
Commerce, and w 
Stores 4,430 4,470' 4,582 4: , 7 4,792 4,698 4,621 4,736 4,696 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 905 1,004 1,019 1, 7 1,185 1,212 1,397 1,360 1,375 
Administration, Professional 3,22! 3,396 3,4 3,602 3,569 3,718 2...!686 3,762 3,964 
'rIOTAL ,381 20,026 20,892 21,642 22,684 22,723 22,785 22,330 22,568 
SOURCE: Prices, Wages, Labour. 1962/1970. D~partment of Statistics, Wellington. 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 
I 
Textiles, 
Leather 
Building 
Engineering, 
.Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
~::'ml!er, Water, Sanitary 
Services 
Building, Construction 
Transport, Communication 
Commerce, 
Grain Sto res 
Domestic Personal 
, 
TOTAL 
Appendix VII 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS: NEW ZEALAND 
1962/1970 
EMPLOYMENT 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
,940 
22,9 
15,228 
38,593 
28,3 
70,110 
33,819 
13,441 
55,351 
68,456 
,345 
22,985 
737 
40,250 
29,275 
75,842 
35,996 
13,689 
56,940 
68,639 
11,381 
23,126 
15,580 
41,201 
31,062 
80,562 
37,796 
14,022 
59,516 
70,317 
11,531 
23,427 
16, 
42, 
32, 
85,6 
40,436 
13,974 
63,248 
71,755 
,480 
24,6 
571 
43 3 
,881 
89 8 
42,4 
,376 
64,380 
73,664 
12,410 
25,273 
16,493 
41,429 
,662 
86,820 
41,899 
15,026 
61,813 
73,328 
13,054 
26,172 
16, 5 
39 998 
31,595 
86,272 
42,264 
15, 0 
59,068 
73,278 
,578 
27, 3 
711 
43,963 
33, 6 
91 2 
44, 3 
15 
59, 
72,991 
,654 
28,295 
17,252 
45 046 
34,2 
97,536 
46,831 
15,813 
61,276 
76,055 
120,3 4,550 129,289 133,785 137, 8 137,812 138,650 0,987 142,859 
27,038 28, 28,775 29,993 30,694 30,929 31,853 32,275 33,211 
___ . __ 3 572 9~561 125, 3 131,950 135,934 138,822 8,015 
6 ,641 637,929 662,188 689,766 7 ,033 709,828 712,891 7 ,796 758,087 
SOURCE: Prices, Wages, Labour, 1962/1970. Department of sties, Wellington. 
I-' 
00 
"'" 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 
Forestry, Mining 
Manufacturing 
Food Drink, Tobacco 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 
Materials 
EngineeringI' 
sce11aneous Manufacturing 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 
, Communication 
Commerce, Wool and 
Stores 
Commerce, Wool and 
Grain Stores 
Domestic Personal 
Services 
tration, Professional 
Appendix VIII 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS$ BLENHEIM 
62/1970 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966· 1967 1968 1969 1970 
0.0000 
0.1764 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
O.OObO 
0.3770 
0.3752 
0.3184 
0.0 0 
O. 63 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0475 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.4727 
0.3 6 
O. 54 
0.0000 
o. 49 
0.0000 
0.0000 
O. 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.4031 
0.3438 
0.3391 
0.0000 
0.1004 
0.0000 
0.0000 
o. a 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0 
0.000 
0.0000 
o. 79 
0.32 
0.37 
0.0000 
0.1465 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.12 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
o. 4 
0.3451 
.3680 
0.0000 
o. 83 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0843 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
o 0000 
0.0610 
o. 
O. 77 
0.0000 
0.1181 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2766 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
O. 00 
0.0000 
o. 77 
0.4 7 
0.3608 
0.0000 
0.1196 
0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.2328 0.1955 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
O. 00 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1745 
0.4279 
0.3975 
0.0000 
0.2382 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
o. 
0.3885 
0.3855 
0.0000 
0.2582 
0.0000 
I-' 
00 
U'l 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 
Forestry , 
Seasonal Manufacturing 
Drink, Tobacco 
Textiles, 
Leather 
Engineering, 
Power u Water, Sanitary 
Services 
1ding Construction 
Transport Communication 
Stores 
Domestic Personal 
Services 
p~dminis 
Professional 
Appendix IX 
SPECIAL Is ATION RATIOS: CHRISTCHURCH 
62/1970 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0839 0.0885 0.1228 0.0977 0.0943 o. 5 
0.3211 0.3099 0.2906 O. 8 .3110 0027 
0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.000 0.0060 0.0000 
0.1389 0.1 3 0.1001 o. 55 O. 10 o. 9 
0.0869 0.0756 0.0244 0.0278 0.0535 0.0000 
0.2000 0.2048 0.1814 0.1831 0.1703 o. 10 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0 0.0000 0.0000 
o 0000 0.0000 0 .. 0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0,,0000 (L 0000 
0.1477 o. 71 0.1198 
0.3124 0.2867 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.1214 0.1209 
0.0460 a 0371 0.00 
0.1939 0.1703 0.1870 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
I-' 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 00 0"1 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 
GROUP 
, Mining 
Manufacturing 
Drink, Tobacco 
sce11aneous 
Power, Water, Sanitary 
Services 
1 Q Construction 
rt, 
Communication 
Cowmerce, Wool and 
Stores 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 
Administration, 
Professional 
1962 
0.0000 
0.1318 
0.2013 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0275 
0.1283 
0.1857 
0.3073 
0.0333 
Appendix X 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS: TIMARU 
1962/1970 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS 
I963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
0.0000 
0.1751 
O. 63 
0.0105 
0.0185 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0064 
0.1503 
0.1751 
0.3171 
0.0345 
0.0000 
0.1035 
0.1994 
0.0762 
0.0741 
0.0000 
0.00 
0.0000 
0.0000 
O. 64 
0.1763 
0.3220 
0.0184 
0.1 
0.0000 
0.00 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1603 
0.1877 
0.2909 
0.0333 
o 0000 
O. 99 
O. 64 
O. 90 
0.0603 
00 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1755 
O. 94 
0.3034 
0.0112 
0.0000 
0.2123 
0.0883 
.1263 
0.0000 
o 0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1352 
O. 7 
0.3013 
0.0193 
0.0 0 
o 28 
0.0954 
0.00 
0.0000 
0.0000 
o. 59 
0.1649 
0.3443 
0.0315 
0.0000 
0.2735 
0.0448 
o. 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1248 
0.1212 
0.1685 
0.3005 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2609 
0.0822 
0.0540 
0.000 
o 00 
0.00 
0.0316 
0.3780 
0.0857 
0.1174 
0.2700 
0.0000 
I-' 
00 
-..J 
Appendix XI 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS: OAMARU 
1962/1970 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
I Mining 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2992. 0.2816 0.3261 
, Tobacco 0.3679 0.3211 0.2878 0.3349 0.3445 0.3697 0.4320 0.39 0.4545 
Clothing 
o. 27 0.1957 0.1085 0.07 o 1859 0.2052 0.07 0.2963 0.3356 
s 0.0000 0.0000 000000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
I Metai1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1aneous 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
POilJer u Water I Sanitary 
0.5062 0.4 5 0.6254 0.5940 0.5620 o. 81 0.5948 0.5720 0.5823 
, Construction 0.8294 0.6943 0.69·65 0.6 o. 94 o .6433 0.5503 0.5881 0.47 
, 
ation 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0128 0.0454 0.0392 0.0701 0.0760 0.1226 I-' 00 
I Wool and 00 
Stores 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Domestic and 
Pe Services 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0755 0.1119 0.0534 . 0.0469 0.0672 0.1280 
tration, 
siona1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Appendix XII 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS: DUNEDIN 
1962/1970 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
--,-
Forestry, Mining 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Seasonal Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
, Drink, Tobacco 0.3607 0.3882 0.4053 0.4304 004250 0.4355 0.4617 0.4694 0.4630 
Textiles, Clothing 
Leather 0.2551 0.2455 0.2491 0.2726 0.2531 0.2081 D. 94 0.1499 o. 95 
Materials 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
, Metal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
cellaneous 
Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Power, Water Sanitary 
Services 0.0608 0.0640 0.0496 o. 78 0.1006 0.0580 0.0671 0.0995 0.0857 
ding, Construction 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0405 0.0447 o 0000 0.0 1 ...... 00 
Transport, Communicat- \.D 
0.0209 0.0305 0.0143 0.0144 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 
Commerce, Wool and 
Grain Stores 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 
and Personal 
Services 0.0090 0.0759 0.0447 0.0752 0.0895 0.0887 0.1169 0.1362 0.1025 
Administration, 
Professional 0.0891 0.1068 0.0988 0.1076 0.1199 0.1247 0.1152 0.1281 0.1483 
Appendix XIII 
SPECIALISATION RATIOS: INVERCARGILL 
1962/1970 
SPECILISATION RATIOS 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Forestry, Mining 0.4434 0.3916 0.4097 0.4127 0.4219 0.4282 0.3717 0.4519 0.4694 
Seasonal Manufacturing 0.4564 0.4935 o .4460 0.4295 0.4074 0.3977 0.3767 0.3901 0.4257 
Food Drink, Tobacco 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 
, Clothing 
Leather 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0903 0.0544 0.0210 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
aneous 
Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pov;rer I Water, Sanitary 
Services 0.3325 0.2581 0.2088 0.2167 0.2203 0.2905 0.3243 0.3617 0.3822 I-' 
Building, I.D 
Construction 0.0000 0.0 6 0.2364 0.2548 0.3816 0.4058 0.4456 0.3036 0.2277 0 
Transport, 
Communication 0.1293 0.1185 0.0967 0.0917 0.0694 0.0428 0.0563 0.0945 0.0869 
Commerce, Wool and 
Stores 0.1391 0.1215 0.1065 0.0899 0.0870 0.0594 0.0400 0.0925 0.0918 
Domestic and Personal 
Services 0.0564 0.1185 0.1070 o. 85 0.1713 0.1774 ·0.2634 0.2713 0.2735 
Administration, 
Professional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Appendix XIV 
REVENUE RECEIVED BY TRADE AND CARGO FORM 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
PICTON 
SHIPS IN (1) TOTAL TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED 
TRADE AND CARGO FORM SAMPLE CARGO REVENUE snip Cargo 
(tons) (dollars) (doIlars/snip) dOllars/ton) 
Overseas - General 18 18,569 26,832 1,490 1.445 
Overseas - Logs 3 5,295 5,041 1,680 0.952 
Coastal - General 8 7,014 4,527 565 o. 5 
Cook Strait Ferry(2) 219 320,916 120, 8 548 0.374 
(1) Total Shipping Arrivals - 1,028. (Cook Strait Ferry Arrivals - 994). 
(2) Information on these ferries was in the form of Weekly summaries of Wharfage. A sample 
covering 12 weeks was taken. Pilotage and port charges are payable every six months 
and an estimate of the weekly component was made. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information obtained from the Marlborough Harbour Board. 
I--' 
\0 
I-' 
Appendix XV 
REVENUE RECEIVED BY TRADE AND CARGO FORM: NELSON 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
SHIPS IN (1) TOTAL TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED 
TRADE AND CARGO FORM SAMPLE CARGO REVENUE snip Cargo 
(tons) (dollars) (dollars/ship) (dollars/ton) 
Overseas - General 46 119,180 213,411 4,639 1.790 
Overseas, - Wood Chips B 136,087 78,973 9,871 0.580 
Overseas - Logs 21 150,399 162,166 7,722 1.078 
!-' 
1.0 
Overseas - Fruit 9 52,993 86,347 9,594 1. 629 IV 
Overseas - Dry Bulk 4 5,475 7,128 1,782 1.302 
Coastal - Liquid Bulk 76,185 75,739 6,311 0.994 
Coastal - General 40 8,482 12,262 306 1.446 
(1) Total Shipping Arrivals - 390. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information obtained from the Nelson Harbour Board. 
Appendix XVI 
REVENUE RECEIVED BY TRADE AND CARGO FORM LYTTELTON 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
SHIPS IN(l) 
SAMPLE 
TOTAL TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED 
TRADE AND CARGO FORM CARGO REVENUE ship 
(tons ) (dollars) (dollars/ship) 
Overseas - General 153 183,010 150,757 2,982 
Overseas - Dry Bulk 4 36,472 49,672 12,418 
Coastal - General 42 33,719 53,646 1,277 
Coastal - Dry Bulk 5 6,081 4,1 833 
Coastal - Liquid Bulk 4 34,219 37,709 9,427 
Roll-on/Roll-off(2) 
(1) Total Shipping Arrivals - 1,024 (Excluding roll-on/roll-off ships - 568). 
(2) Not obtainable. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information obtained from the Lyttelton Harbour Board. 
Cargo 
(dollars/ton) 
2.493 
1.362 
1.591 
0.685 
1.102 
.... 
\.0 
w 
Appendix XVII 
REVENUE RECEIVED BY TRADE AND CARGO FROM TIMARU 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
SHIPS IN (1) TOTAL TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED 
TRADE AND CARGO FORM SAMPLE . CARGO REVID~UE ship Car~o 
(tons) (dollars) (dollars/ship) (dollars/ton) 
Overseas - General 54 51,450 202,965 3,758 3 .. 945 
Overseas - Meat Loaders 25 86,817 408, 2 16,353 4.709 I--' \0 
~ 
Overseas - Dry 3 32,981 25,074 8,358 0.760 
Coastal - General 24 8/1777 18,165 756 2.070 
Coastal - Dry 8 9,796 7,352 919 0.7 
Coastal - Liquid Bulk 3 19,023 18,547 6,182 0.975 
(1) Total Shipping Arrivals - 223. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information obtained from Timaru Harbour Board. 
Appendix XVIII 
REVENUE RECEIVED BY TRADE AND CARGO FORM OAMARU 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
SHIPS IN ( TOTAL TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED 
TRADE AND CARGO FORM SAMPLE CARGO REVENUE ship Cargo 
(tons) (dollars ) (dollars/ship) (dollars/ton) 
Coastal - General 57 14,988 16,516 289 1.102 I-' 
1.0 
Coastal - Dry Bulk 4 2,948 1,786 446 0.606 Ln 
(1) Total Shipping Arrivals - 72. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information obtained from Oamaru Harbour Board. 
Appendix XIX 
REVENUE RECEIVED BY TRADE AND CARGO FORM OTAGO 
Year Ended 30 September 1970 
SHIPS I~l) TOTAL TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED 
TRADE AND CARGO FORM SAMPLE CARGO REVENUE . snip Cargo 
(tons) {dollars} {dollars/snip) (dollars/ton) 
Overseas - General 72 73,066 197,571 2,744 2.704 
Overseas - Logs 7 43,351 47,938 6,848 1.105 
i-' 
\.0 
Overseas - Dry Bulk 4 19,190 25,345 6,336 1.320 m 
Coastal - General 29 17,622 35,785 1,234 2.030 
Coastal - Dry Bulk 1 1,557 2,599 2,599 1. 669 
Coastal - Liquid Bulk 6 48,814 71,659 11,943 1.468 
Ro11-on/ro11-off 10 25,306 28,143 2,814 1.112 
(1) Total Shipping Arrivals - 371. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information obtained from the Otago Harbour Board. 
Appendix XX 
REVENUE RECEIVED BY TRADE AND CARGO FORM BLUFF 
Year Ended 30 September 70 
SHIPS IN (1) TOTAL TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED 
TRADE AND CARGO FORM SAMPLE CARGO REVENUE snip Cargo 
(tons) . (dollars) (dollars/ship) (dollars/ton) 
Overseas - General 77 146,757 593,315 7,705 4.042 
Overseas - Dry Bulk 11 113,507 107,036 9,730 0.943 
Overseas - Tiwai I-' 1.0 
Smelter 3 14,029 6,127 2,042 0.436 -....J 
Coastal - General 30 24,650 39,316 1,310 1. 595 
Coastal - Dry Bulk 8 12,070 17,859 2,232 1.479 
Coastal - Liquid Bulk 5 27,283 25,839 5,167 0.947 
(1) Total Shipping Arrivals (excluding Stewart Island Ferry) - 294. 
SOURCE: Calculated from information obtained from the Southland Harbour Board. 
Appendix XXI 
AVERAGE WOOL PRODUCTION ON A COUNTY BASIS, 1967-1970 
SHEEP NUMBERS AVERAGE NUMBERS PRODUCTION ESTIMATES 
COUNTY 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1967/70 Wool (1) Wool (2 ) 
(~) (Bales) 
Marlborough 769,865 788,198 769,113 775,725 8,843,265 25,715 
Awatere 353,074 361,505 360,035 358,205 4,083,537 11,874 
:Kaikoura 259,416 254,983 263,309 259,236 2,955,290 8,593 
560,354 571,168 568,122 566,648 6,458,547 18,781 
Golden Bay 5,128 94,969 89,097 96,398 1,098,937 3,196 
19,034 14,338 17,093 16,822 191,770 558 
Inangahua 63,737 74,274 71,097 69,703 794,614 2,311 
Westland 211,206 209,121 209,750 210,026 2,394,296 6,962 
Amuri 574,296 576,009 560,881 570,395 6,502,503 18,908 I-' 
Cheviot 334,994 339,510 328,487 334,330 3,8 ,362 11,083 \J:) 
722,535 746,352 715,882 728,256 8,302,118 24,141 00 
345,929 354,741 347,229 349,299 3,982,009 11,579 
Rangiora 116,984 112,340 107,019 112, 1,278,099 3,716 
170,406 160,659 151,158 160,741 1,832,447 5,328 
rd 243,068 237,480 242,383 240,977 2,747,138 7,988 
Malvern 823,530 819,269 786,564 809,788 9,231,583 26,844 
Paparua 183,729 153,792 145,107 160,876 1,833,986 5,333 
Waimairi 4,685 4,658 5,253 4,865 55,461 161 
Heathcote 13,505 8,451 11,271 11,076 126,266 367 
Mount Herbert 57,205 55,456 58,346 57,002 649,823 1,889 
Akaroa 159,921 156,191 152,399 156,170 1,780,338 5,177 
rewa 109,578 103,637 105,351 106,189 1,210,555 3,520 
Ellesmere 451,008 444,488 428,598 441,365 5,031,561 14,631 
Ashburton 2,558,616 2,514,900 2,515,669 2,529,728 29,218,358 84,962 
Appendix XXI (cont' d) 
SHEEP NUMBERS AVERAGE NUMBERS PRODUCTION ESTIMATES 
COUNTY 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1967/70 Wool (1) Wool (2 ) 
(IE"S) (Bales) 
Geraldine 661,249 670,179 672,439 667,956 7,815,085 22,725 
s 442,523 443,544 412,709 432,925 5,065,223 14,729 
MacKenzie 777,112 790,727 791,535 766,458· 8,967,559 26,076 
1,133,622 1,127, 1,100,373 1,120,376 13,108,399 38,117 
Waitaki 982,244 1,016,685 1,030,541 1,009,823 ,905,813 34,620 
248,312 255,360 264,767 256,146 3,022,523 8,789 
Waikouaiti 192,360 195,392 201,449 196,400 2,317,520 6 0 739 
u1a 44,897 45,307 46,388 45,531 537,266 1,562 
470,729 490,300 523,620 494,883 ·5,839,619 16,981 
Bruce 736,196 733,633 768,040 745,956 8,802,281 25,595 
1,448,243 1,464,871 1,496,752 1,469,955 17,654, 0 51,335 
Tuapeka 1,078,407 1,125,044 1,175,697 1,126,383 13,527,859 39,337 
Maniototo 641,629 675,505 '679,221 665,452 7,852,334 2,283 
402,769 392,443 388,530 394,580 4,697,475 13,659 
696,536 714,595 729,601 713,5.77 8,420,209 24,484 
Southland 5,2 ,980 5,347,060 5,598,437 5,386,826 74,876,881 217,729 
Wa1 2,178,010 2,265,059 2,365,603 2,269,557 31,546,842 91,733 
1. Average sheep numbers multiplied by average production per sheep (see Appendix XV). 
2. Bas on a bale containing 343.9 Ibs ( average bale weight during 1969/70 season). 
SOURCE: Department of Statistics Sheep Returns 1968, 1969, 1970; New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' 
Economic Service Annual Review of the Sheep Industry 68/69, 1969/70, 1970/71. 
I--' 
"-0 
\0 
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Appendix XXII 
AVERAGE WOOL PRODUCTION PER SHEEP, 1969/1971 
AVERAGE PRODUCTION 1969/1971 
AREA AVERAGE 
(lbs. ) 
Christchurch 11. 8 10.9 11. 5 11.4 
Timaru 12.0 11.1 12.2 11. 8 
Dunedin 12.0 11. 5 12.0 11. 8 
Invercargi11 13.4 14.1 14.3 13.9 
New Zealand 12.1 12.1 12.2 12.1 
SOURCE: New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service, 
Annual Review of the Sheep Industry. 1968/69, 1969/70, 
1970/71. 
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Appendix XXIII 
INLAND TRANSPORT RATES FOR WOOL 
Dol per Bale(l) 
DESTINATION 
ORIGIN Picton Christchurch Timaru Dunedin Invercargill "Centre"( 
Marlborough 0.65 2.73 3.27 4.30 5.20 0.84 
Awatere 1.13 2.50 3.20 4.07 5.00 0.54 
Kaikoura 1. 76 1. 97 2.87 3.73 4.70 0.54 
Waimea 1.66 3.27 3.93 4.80 5.70 0.46 
Golden Bay 1.97 3.47 4.14 5.00 5.90 0.86 
Buller 3.40 2.80 3.47 4.30 5.20 
Inangahua 4.00 2.55 3.13 4.00 4.30 
Westland 4.07 2.63 3.20 4.07 4.30 
Arnuri 2.87 1. 60 2.63 3.53 4.50 0.54 
Cheviot 2.13 1.60 2.63 3.53 4.50 0.54 
Waipara 2.67 1.22 2.34 3.44 4.30 0.54 
Ashley 1.15 1.15 
Rangiora 0.98 0.98 
Eyre 0.77 0.77 
Oxford 1.15 1.15 
Malvern 1.15 1.15 
Paparua 0.44 0.44 
Waimairi 0.44 0.44 
Heathcote 0.44 0.44 
Mt Herbert 0.44 0.44 
Akaroa 1.15 1.15 
Wairewa 0.98 0.98 
Ellesmere 0.98 0.98 
Ashburton 3.27 1. 30 2.87 3.80 0.55 
Geraldine 0.77 0.77 
Levels 0.77 0.77 
MacKenzie 0.77 0.77 
Waimate 0.77 0.77 
waitaki 3.67 2.63 1. 60 1. 97 3.13 0.53 
Waihemo 1.05 1.05 
Waikouaiti 0.85 0.85 
Peninsula 0.62 0.62 
Taieri 0.84 0.84 
Bruce 4.70 3.20 2.50 0.60 1. 81 0.60 
Clutha 4.90 3.47 2.80 0.60 1. 38 0.60 
Tuapeka 5.10 3.60 2.90 0.60 2.39 0.60 
Maniatoto 5.00 3.53 2.87 0.85 2.80 0.85 
•••• continued 
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Appendix XXIII continued 
DESTINATION 
ORIGIN Picton Christchurch Timaru Dunedin Inverc 11 
C0unty (' 
"Centre" ,( 
Lake 5.50 4.00 3.33 0.85 3.27 
Vincent 5.50 4.00 3.33 0.85 3.27 
Southland 0.81 
Wallace 5.70 4.30 3.60 2.70 1. 24 
Picton 2.73 3.40 4.30 5.20 
Lyttelton 0.60 1. 87 3.00 3.93 
Timaru Port 1. 76 0.27 2.08 3.20 
Otago Port 2.93 2.08 0.27 2.18 
Bluff 4.00 3.33 2.39 0.65 
(1) Effective at 4 November 1971. .Movements under 40 miles in 
distance are assumed to move by road transport. 
(2) The New Zealand Wool Board calculated the average distance 
each bale of wool must travel in reaching its county's 
"centre". Rates have been based on these distances. 
SOURCE: Railway charges taken from Alteration to Scale of 
CharSes, New Zealand Government Railways, Supplement 
to t e New zealand Gazette, 4 November 1971. Road 
transport charges supplied by Ministry of Transport, 
(includes 5~ per cent increase as from 15/5/71). 
0.85 
0.85 
0.81 
0.81 
WHARFAGE (1) 
PORT Frozen Meat Wool 
(TonI (Bale) 
Picton 0.50 0.10 
Nelson 1.00 0.50 
Lyttelton 0.37 0.37 
Timaru 0.88 0.41 
Dunedin 0.70 0.35 
P·ort Chalmers 0.70 0.35 
f 1.74 0.65 
n.a. - not available. 
1) Effective as at 1 January 1971. 
(2) Average Stevedoring Cost 
Appendix XXIV 
PORT THROUGHPUT CHARGES 
HARBOUR IMPROVEMENT 
Frozen Meat Wool 
(Ton) (Bale) 
0.25 0.25 
0.22 0.04 
0.25 0.08 
0.25 0.08 
(3) using All-weather Mechanical Loaders. 
LOADING COST(2) TOTAL 
Frozen Meat Wool Frozen Meat 
(Ton) (Bale) (Ton) 
n.a. 1. 35 n.a. 
6.90 1.44 8.15 
9.25(3) 1.04 9.84(3) 
6.97 7.85 
8.42 0.86 9.30 
8.44 0.84 9.39 
.29 (3) 1. 00 11.24(3) 
6.44 8. 
8.36 0.86 10.10 
SOURCE: Waterfront Industry Commission Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the 9 months 
Ended 30 September 1970, Harbour Board By-Laws and Schedule of Charges. 
WoOI 
(Bale) 
1.45 
2.19 
1.45 
1. 27 
1. 27 
1.43 IV 
0 
1. 51 w 
PORT COMBINATIONS 
One South 
Lyttelton 
Timaru 
Otago 
Bluff 
Wellington 
Lyttelton 
Wellington 
Timaru 
Otago 
Wellington 
Bluff 
All Ports Included 
Appendix XXV 
TRANSPORT COSTS INCURRED IN MOVING WOOL FROM COUNTY TO 
SHIP, WHEN HARBOUR IMPROVEMENT RATE IS EXCLUDED 
67/1970 Production Estimates 
COST 
(dollars) 
4,963,123 
4,351,992 
4,285,864 
4,875,138 
4,952,322 
4,321,523 
4,197,070 
4,670,495 
3,207,400 
PORT COMBINATIONS 
Two South and Ports 
Lyttelton 
Otago 
Lyttelton 
Bluff 
Timaru 
Otago 
Timaru 
Bluff 
Wellington 
Lytte1ton 
Otago 
Wellington 
Lyttelton 
lington 
Otago 
Wellington 
COST 
(dollars) 
3,826,125 
3,784,951 
3,774,270 
3,646,563 
3,835,843 
3,774,151 
3,743,801 
3,616,094 
I\.) 
o 
.;:. 
FREEZING 
WORKS 
Stoke 
Picton 
Kaiapoi 
Belfast (2) 
Islington 
Fairfield 
Smithfield 
Pareora 
Pukeuri 
Burnside 
Finegand 
Mataura 
Makarewa 
Lornevil1e 
Ocean Beach 
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Appendix XXVI 
RAILWAY CHARGES FOR THE MOVEMENT 
OF FROZEN MEAT TO SOUTH ISLAND PORTS 
Dollars per Ton 
PORT 
2.29 12.28 20.50 
12.03 2.09 18.55 
19.52 17.57 3.93 
19.85 17.57 2.92 
20.50 18.55 2.85 
21.81 19.85 8.85 
23.44 21.48 12.28 
23.77 21. 81 12.78 
24.75 23.11 14.80 
27.83 25.77 18.87 
29.88 27.83 20.50 
31. 43 29.37 22.46 
32.97 30.91 23.77 
32.45 30.91 23.44 
32.97 31.43 23.77 
23.44 28.34 
21.48 26.29 
12.78 19.20 
12.53 19.20 
11. 70 18.55 
8.31 16.57 
2.09 14.05 
2.36 13.54 
7.76 11. 38 
13.79 2.64 
16.32 9.54 
18.87 12.78 
20.18 14.80 
20.18 14.55 
20.50 15.06 
SOURCE: Alteration to Scale of Charges, New Zealand Government 
Railways, Supplement to the New Zealand Gazette, 
4 November 1971. 
33.48 
30.91 
24.09 
24.09 
23.44 
22.13 
20.50 
20.18 
18.87 
14.80 
12.53 
8.03 
4.77 
3.93 
2.69 
YEAR 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
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Appendix XXVII 
TRENDS IN COOK STRAIT RAIL FERRY AND 
RAIL/AIR CARGO MOVEMENTS, 1963/1970 
MOTOR RAIL FERRY 
VEHICLES (1) FREIGHT TRAFFIC 
(Numbers) (Deadweight Tons) 
21,474 48,922 
37,362 143,655 
45,592 180,650 
51,396 215,480 
60,690 294,933 
66,067 .343,791 
76,067 421,064 
89,055 507,281 
(1) Passengers' Motor Vehicles plus Lorries 
and Trade Cars. 
SOURCE: Marlborough Harbour Board and Ne'l;"'" 
Zealand Railways Department. 
RAIL/AIR 
FREIGHT TRAFFIC 
(Manifest Tons) 
25,286 
21,131 
22,017 
27,009 
20,150 
14,580 
16,277 
23,936 
Appendix XXVIII 
TRENDS IN INTER-ISLAND COASTAL SHIPPING FREIGHT MOVEMENTS, 1964/1970(1) 
Manifest Tons 
HARBOUR BOARD 
YEAR Nelson Ly::t:te1ton Timaru Oamaru Otago Southland TOTAL 
1964 132,292 562,594 80,729 31,543 178,120 67,341 1,052,619 
1965 137,4 570,403 69,269 31,404 170,752 66,413 1,045,652 
66 150,058 618,678 81,406 31,070 171,294 67,736 1,120,242 
1967 117,044 739,055 82,370 34,104 143,238 60,2 1,176,045 
I'.J 
68 89,215 734,650 74,709 29,186 144,664 52,401 1,124,825 0 ...,J 
69 .. 67,890 728,123 63,702 33,422 145,361 51,690 1,090,188 
1970 65,053 744,166 42,842 21,384 139,992 76,785 1,090,242 
(1) Motor Spirits and Petroleum Products are Excluded. 
SOURCE: Taken from Harbour Board Annual Reports, Trade Statistics and Shipping Manifests. 
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Appendix A 
REGIONAL MULTIPLIERS 
The multiplier is a figure illustrating the marginal 
effect of a change of one economic variable upon another 
economic variable, of which the first economic variable is 
a component. Hege1and(1966) has traced the multiplier concept 
to the late nineteenth century. It was popularised by R.F. Kahn 
in the 1930's in connection with the development of an 
employment multiplier. J.M. Keynes extended the concept 
by developing the investment multiplier • 
. The Keynesian analytical framework recognises four 
principal types of income-generating activities: a) Production 
of goods and services for consumption; b) Private and public 
investment in real capital; c) Local government expenditures; 
and d) Exports of goods and services. Total national income 
is then expressed as 
y = C + I + G + (X - M) 
where Y = national income 
C = consumption 
I ::::: investment 
G = government expenditure 
(X-M) ::::: export earnings 
This income equation may be rewritten to apply to 
regional analysis as 
Y = aC + bI + cG + g(X - M) 
where the parameters at b, c, and g represent the regional 
income generated from each amoun-t of expenditure in each 
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category. (This assumes that there is no feed back from other 
regions). Setting consumption as a function of income 
C :::: kY 
where k equals the regional propensity to consume, the 
equation for income may be rewritten as 
Y :::: akY + gX 
where investment and current government expenditure are 
autonomously determined. But since 
C kY 
Y :::: akY + gX 
and therefore 
Y 
(1 - ak) 
where the factor 1 
----
is the regional multiplier, 
(1 - ak) 
and it is the result of the chain of spending that results 
from the injection of outside money into the regional economy_ 
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Appendix B 
THE OUT-OF-KILTER ALGORITHM(l) 
The out-o Iter algorithm solves the problem of 
determining the minimal cost circulation through a capacitated 
network. It may also be used to compute the maximum flow 
possible between any two nodes in a costless, capacitated 
network, and the shortest path between pairs of nodes in a 
network. 
The network is assumed to be characterised by nodes, 
i; arcs between the nodes (i, j); flow across the arcs, x .. ; 1.J 
unit costs of flow across these arcs, c .. ; 1.J as well as lower 
bounds on the flow across these arcs, 1. " and upper bounds, 1.J 
u ..• The algorithm computes the flows between particular 1.J 
nodes, x .. , which minimize total cost: 1.J 
1. .E. 1. J c. , x .. 1.J 1.J for all i and j; 
but these flows must satisfy a set of constraining conditions -
2. 
3. 
1 .. "!.!!" 1.J 
E. x .. 
J J 1. 
x .. 1.J 
The flow, 
for all i and j. This ~ecessitates 
u ij that the flow, x .. , is in accordance 
with the arc cap~city restraints, and 
E. x., = 0 for all i. This in turn means J 1.J 
that in a circulation, what arrives 
at a node must also leave the node. 
" which satisfies the flow constraints 
J 
(2), and the conservation of flow requirement (3), is called 
feasible. In computing the minimal cost feasible circulation 
the algorithm operates with both arc costs, c .. , and node 1.J 
ices • The node ce I is the price of a unit of 
a particular commodity at node i A net arc cost, C':' " is 1.] 
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defined as: 
4. ij :: c .. +TT:- IT· lJ I ~ 
Thus c:-: represents the total cost of transporting one unit lJ 
from node i to node j . It is found by comparing the cost of 
retaining a unit of the commodity at i, with the cost of 
moving it to node j. But in moving the unit from i to j the 
commodi ty price at i:-TI; , is "lost II and an actual transport 
cost, c .. , is incurred. If the sum of these cost proves to be lJ 
greater than the commodity price at j, ,-r, then it is not J 
profitable to transfer the unit from i to j, that is, ij 
will be positive. If the unit at node j costs more than at 
i, plus the transportation cost c .. , C:-. will be negative lJ 1J 
and it would be profitable to all concerned to move the unit 
from i to j. If . = 0, this would mean that the unit 
J 
commodity's value at j was exactly balanced by its value at i 
plus the transportation cost (IT + c .. ), and the system 
, lJ 
would be indifferent to the commodity moving from i to j. 
The limitations placed on the permissible flow level, 
provi~ed by the conditions in (2), combined with the possible 
levels of total system costs (4), yield the following conditions 
that will be satisfied by an optimal solution to the minimal 
cost circulation problem: 
5. If 0 then x .. = u .. j lJ lJ 
6. If c .. = 0 then 1.:-:= x. ~ u .. lJ lJ 1 lJ 
7. If .. > 0 then x .. :: 1.. lJ 1J lJ 
These equations summarise the preceeding discussion. 
For example, equation (5) states that when the net arc cost 
~ is negative, that is, it is profitable to move the commodity lJ 
from i to j, flow along this arc ought to be as large as 
possible - equal to the upper capacity limit. The out-of-kilter 
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algorithm is designed to calculate the flow pattern which 
satisfies these requirements. 
Arcs which do meet the optimality conditions, 
(5), (6) and (7), are defined as "in-kilter". Conversely arcs 
not satisfying these requirements are "out-of-kilter". Such 
out-of-kilter arcs can be in one of two states: 
(a) They may be feasible but not optimal. These arcs have 
flows satisfying (2), but not (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) They may be infeasible. In this situtation flow is 
either below the lower or above the upper bounds. 
Associated with any state that an arc may be in is 
a non-negative integer called the kilter number of that arc.{2) 
Arcs having a kilter number of zero are defined as in-kilter, 
while out-of-kilter arcs have positive kilter numbers - indic-
ating either the infeasibility of the arc flow, or the degree 
to which the optimality properties set out .in (5), (6), and 
(7) are not satisfied. Every arc is assigned a kilter number. 
The algorithm 'operates by selecting an out-of-kilter 
arc and rearranging the flows through the network in an attempt 
to reduce the kilter number of that arc to zero. Node prices 
may have to be increased to generate flows through a certain 
portion of the network. If the original problem was so 
formulated that it met the feasibility requirements, the 
algorithm would terminate with an optimal solution when the 
kilter number of all arcs were zero. This flow would be both 
feasible and optimal in terms of minimal costs. 
Footnotes 
(l) The description of the algorithm is drawn from Sinclair 
(1969,79 2) I and Durbin and Kroenke (1967). 
(2) Gauthier(1968,107) lists the three states that in-kilter 
arcs, the 8 states that out-of-kilter arcs May be in. 
